


Legalizing Deficit of Decent Work? Social Dialogue in Indonesian Gig Economy for Online *Ojek* (*Ojol*)

A Research by **Dinna Prapto Raharja,
Fransiscus S Joyoadisumarta,
& Timboel Siregar**

This project is supported by
ITUC-Asia Pacific and the ILO ACTRAV

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Summary of Research Findings

For several years, the platform economy has permeated Indonesia's economy, instilling hope for a better future work for Indonesia. Indonesian start-up digital-based companies have attracted big investments, allowing for a rapid growth of various consumer services at one's fingertips and broadening access to standardised online delivery services. There were times when the phenomenon was believed to be able to turn around national concerns over the trend of deindustrialisation, the decreasing employment elasticity in the economy, the lack of competitiveness of the business sector, and the middle-income trap. The use of applications to bring together supply and demand in both goods and services was seen as a promising way to cut the cost of rejuvenating the Indonesian economy.

While studies on the platform economy and gig work are growing, little has been revealed on how the online motorcycle taxi-drivers (known locally as *ojek online* or *ojol*) understand gig work and how they respond to the debates and concerns around gig work. In our study we ask: How do these *ojol* understand gig work? How do they respond to the debates and concerns around gig work in the platform economy? How much do these *ojol* bring home every day? How long are their working hours and their working days per month? How much are their daily operation costs? Do these *ojol* have the needed health and employment insurance? Do these *ojol* perceive themselves as “partners” of the platform company? Do these *ojol* wish to be “partners” or “employees” of the application company? What are the main topics of debate and issues of concerns around *ojol*? In short, this research maps the discourse of work in the platform economy while identifying the enabling environment for improving the well-being of gig workers, including ways to organise them.

We find that in the introductory years of the platform economy, these *ojol* had been attracted to the job for its flexibility and relatively good daily income. As time went on, however, the *ojol* realised that the fare declined and the bonus became harder to get (before the bonus program disappeared altogether). The most challenging part is how the incoming orders are dripping (*netes*) rather than flowing.

From the survey of 400 *ojol* operating in Jakarta, Depok, Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi – all of whom have worked for at least six months for either Gojek or Grab, we find that over 60 percent of these *ojol* earn mostly between Rp. 80,000 and Rp. 120,000 or approximately USD5.70 and USD8.57 (40 percent of respondents) or between Rp. 121,000 and Rp. 160,000 or approximately USD8.60 and USD11.4 (27.3 percent of respondents). Such earnings are accumulated after working between 10 to 12 hours (by 52.3 percent of the respondents) or 13 to 15 hours (by 21 percent of the respondents). For 77.5 percent of the respondents, the total number of working days per month ranges between 26 and 30 days per month while 15.5 percent of the respondents work for at least 21 to 25 days per month. Their take home pay is even less than the aforementioned earnings. According to 37.8 percent of the respondents, they need to spend at least Rp. 41,000 to Rp. 50,000 (approximately USD2.90 to USD3.57) or Rp. 51,000 to Rp. 60,000 (approximately USD3.6 to USD4.28) per day for parking, meals, and gasoline. They add more hours of work to solve their problem of living from day-to-day earning. They understand the risks of being overworked, sick, fatigued, and they admit experiencing work accidents, which they do not report to the platform company.

Asked why they stay with the company despite their wish for a better income and working conditions, the respondents think they are already skilled to do the work as *ojol*, they can get fast cash, they can work part-time, they have a network that can support their work, and they do not have other job options. Interestingly, there are those working beyond nine hours who still think that *ojol* is a side job. This suggests the *ojol*'s confusion about part-time work in a platform economy.

As of now, there is no validation of legal status as a profession for the *ojol* in Indonesia. There is ambiguity of protection causing a deficit of decent work for these workers. On the one hand, they are classified as “partners” of the platform companies, but the terms set out by the government on partnership are lacking in enforcement. On the other hand, the *ojol* is denied their rights as workers because the Indonesian government does not consider fares as a form of wage. Without a status as transportation company, by law, the platform companies should have no authority to set fare rates for any transportation service. Yet in practice, they have been setting fare rates without prior consultations, let alone agreement, with the *ojol*.

The *ojol* express difficulty to organise and form unions because of the risk of getting terminated by the platform company without prior notice or dialogue. The Indonesian trade union confederations trying to organise these *ojol* report a similar challenge in conducting collective bargaining. The *ojol* activists report trying bipartite dialogue with the platform companies and sending letters demanding clarification and time to meet, with no luck. The *ojol* activists have also tried to meet with ministerial officials and legislators, but they were unsuccessful. Their way of expressing their concerns, therefore, has been through mass demonstrations. The government assigns the National Commission for Monitoring Business Competition (KPPU) to monitor the platform companies doing activities that may imply control and ownership of smaller partners. Unfortunately, the enforcement of such mandate by the KPPU is also weak. While it is expected by the government to promote change in platform companies' behaviour, the KPPU has no dedicated budget to implement its mandate.


As for the *ojol* who responded to the survey, an overwhelming 95 percent call themselves partners of the platform company. Only 66.3 percent read the contract, 22.5 percent did not read the contract at all, and 11.3 percent were not certain of the terms and conditions of the contract. Interestingly, when asked about their expectations, 49.5 percent of the respondents hope to be employees of the company, while 50.5 percent hope to be partners.

In short, we see a legalising of deficit in decent work for *ojol* in Indonesia. The social dialogue is stalled. The *ojol* have no legal standing to defend themselves, let alone negotiate for their rights.

It is pertinent that we do understand how platform companies are creating a market ecosystem in which the competition with other platform companies is in terms of keeping the loyalty of costumers, drivers, and partners. As described in the image below, a digital platform company treats the *ojol* as both labour and consumer power. As labour power, the *ojol* deliver passengers, food, and documents as assigned by the digital platform companies through the application. As consumers, the *ojol* are captive market for products from vendors with existing

partnership contracts to sell products to the *ojol*: internet data, phone minutes, grocery products, health insurance, work accident insurance, loans to buy new motorcycle, etc. The platform company may disseminate information to *ojol* about the national (public) health and employment programmes from BPJS Kesehatan and BPJS Ketenagakerjaan¹, but they also sell insurance programs from private companies to the *ojol*.

Figure 1.
The Categories of Digital Platform Companies in Indonesia



Overall, we find that the deadlock in social dialogue shows that the fate of *ojol* is at a critical juncture. There is danger in the government discourse that pushes these *ojol* towards the partnership path. By doing so, the government would continue to overlook the vulnerability of the *ojol* as labour power and consumer power to a market ecosystem that the digital platform company has created, sustained, and earn money from. (***)

Researchers: *Dinna Prapto Raharja, Ph.D (Principal Investigator), Dr. Fransiscus S Joyoadisumarta, and Timboel Siregar*

¹ BPJS Kesehatan is Indonesia's Social Security Administrator for Health while BPJS Ketenagakerjaan is Indonesia's Employees Social Security System.

Ringkasan Eksekutif

Dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, platform ekonomi telah berkembang dalam perekonomian Indonesia dan membawa harapan untuk pekerjaan yang lebih baik untuk masa depan Indonesia. Perusahaan rintisan berbasis digital di Indonesia pun berhasil menarik investasi besar-besaran. Hal ini membuat berbagai pelayanan via telepon genggam berkembang pesat, salah satunya adalah meluasnya akses layanan pengiriman online yang terstandarisasi. Pernah ada saat dimana fenomena ini diyakini akan membawa Indonesia untuk melawan tren deindustrialisasi, kurangnya daya cipta dalam membuat lapangan pekerjaan, lemahnya daya saing sektor bisnis, dan jebakan kelas menengah. Penggunaan aplikasi untuk mempertemukan penawaran dan permintaan baik berupa barang maupun jasa dinilai menjanjikan untuk memangkas biaya dalam meremajakan perekonomian Indonesia.

Meskipun studi tentang ekonomi platform dan kerja *gig* sudah dilakukan, masih sedikit yang terungkap perihal bagaimana para pengemudi ojek online memahami konteks kerja *gig* dan bagaimana respon mereka perihal perdebatan dan persoalan seputar kerja *gig* di platform ekonomi ini. Penelitian kami menanyakan hal-hal seperti: Bagaimana para ojol memahami kerja *gig*? Bagaimana respon mereka perihal perdebatan dan persoalan seputar kerja *gig* dalam ekonomi platform? Berapa penghasilan yang ojol hasilkan setiap harinya? Berapa lama jam kerja mereka? Berapa hari mereka bekerja dalam satu bulan? Berapa biaya operasional sehari-hari mereka? Apakah para ojol memiliki asuransi kesehatan dan asuransi ketenagakerjaan yang dibutuhkan? Apa yang para ojol pahami perihal perannya sebagai "mitra" bagi perusahaan platform? Apakah ojol ingin menjadi "mitra" atau "karyawan" untuk perusahaan aplikasi? Apa topik utama dalam perdebatan dan isu-isu yang menjadi perhatian seputar ojol? Pada intinya, penelitian ini memetakan diskursus kerja dalam ekonomi platform sekaligus mengidentifikasi lingkungan seperti apa yang dapat meningkatkan kesejahteraan dalam kerja *gig* dan bagaimana cara mengorganisirnya.

Kami menemukan bahwa pada awal berkembangnya ekonomi platform, para ojol tertarik untuk melakukan pekerjaan ini karena fleksibilitas waktu bekerja dengan pendapatan harian yang relatif baik. Namun seiring berjalannya waktu, ojol menyadari bahwa tarif yang ditentukan perusahaan aplikasi menurun, bonus semakin sulit didapat – bahkan kemudian program bonusnya pun hilang. Bagian yang mereka sebut paling menyulitkan adalah bahwa pesanan yang masuk dalam aplikasi kini "menetes" dan bukannya mengalir.

Berdasarkan survei terhadap 400 ojol yang beroperasi di Jakarta, Depok, Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi, yang semuanya telah bekerja minimal 6 bulan di Gojek atau Grab, kami menemukan bahwa lebih dari enam puluh persen ojol memiliki penghasilan harian antara Rp. 80.000 – Rp. 120.000,- atau sekitar 5.7 USD – 8.57 USD (40% responden) dan antara Rp. 121.000 – Rp. 160.000 atau sekitar 8,6 USD – 11,4 USD (27,3% responden). Jumlah tersebut dihasilkan setelah bekerja antara 10-12 jam (52,3%) atau 13-15 jam (21%) dengan jumlah hari kerja per bulan sebanyak 26-30 hari per bulan (77,5%) atau minimal 21-25 hari per bulan (15,5%). Penghasilan bersih mereka tentunya lebih sedikit dari penghasilan tersebut, sebab seperti yang dialami oleh 37,8% responden, mereka mengatakan bahwa mereka harus merogoh kocek setidaknya antara Rp. 41.000 – Rp. 50.000 atau sekitar 2,9 USD – 3,57 USD atau Rp. 51.000 – Rp. 60.000 atau sekitar 3.6 USD – 4.28 USD per hari untuk biaya parkir, biaya makan, dan biaya

operasional seperti mengisi bensin. Karena penghasilan yang mereka dapatkan pada hari ini digunakan untuk biaya kehidupan hari esok, para ojol pun sering menambah jam kerja mereka apabila mereka membutuhkan uang lebih. Para ojol memahami risiko dari terlalu banyak bekerja seperti sakit dan kelelahan. Para ojol pun mengaku mengalami kecelakaan kerja dan tidak melaporkan kecelakaan tersebut ke perusahaan platform.

Apabila para ojol ditanya mengapa mereka tetap bekerja di perusahaan aplikasi meskipun mereka menginginkan penghasilan dan kondisi kerja yang lebih baik, dalam survey, para ojol menjawab bahwa mereka sudah merasa terampil melakukan pekerjaannya, mereka bisa mendapatkan uang dengan cepat, mereka dapat menjadikan pekerjaan ini sebagai pekerjaan paruh waktu, para ojol memiliki jaringan yang dapat mendukung pekerjaan mereka, dan mereka tidak memiliki pilihan pekerjaan lain. Menariknya, beberapa pengemudi ojol yang bekerja di atas 9 jam masih menganggap ojol sebagai pekerjaan sampingan. Hal ini menunjukkan kebingungan pengemudi ojol perihal apa yang disebut pekerjaan dalam ekonomi platform.

Hingga saat ini, belum ada pengesahan status hukum ojol sebagai profesi di Indonesia. Adanya ambiguitas atas perlindungan ini menyebabkan defisit pekerjaan layak bagi para pekerja ini. Di satu sisi, mereka diklasifikasikan sebagai "mitra" untuk perusahaan platform, tetapi ketentuan yang ditetapkan oleh pemerintah tentang kemitraan kurang dalam penegakannya. Di sisi lain, ojol ditolak haknya sebagai pekerja karena pemerintah Indonesia tidak menganggap ongkos dalam pekerjaan mereka sebagai upah kerja. Karena perusahaan platform menolak status sebagai perusahaan transportasi, secara hukum, perusahaan platform seharusnya tidak memiliki wewenang untuk menetapkan tarif untuk layanan transportasi apa pun. Namun dalam praktiknya, perusahaan-perusahaan tersebut menetapkan tarif tanpa berkonsultasi terlebih dahulu terlebih meminta persetujuan dari pihak ojol.

Para ojol juga mengungkapkan kesulitan mereka untuk mengatur dan membentuk serikat pekerja. Mereka menghadapi risiko diberhentikan oleh perusahaan platform tanpa pemberitahuan atau diskusi terlebih dahulu. Konfederasi serikat pekerja Indonesia yang mencoba mengorganisir para ojol juga melaporkan tantangan serupa ketika akan melakukan perundingan bersama dengan aplikator maupun pemerintah. Para aktivis ojol sudah mencoba dialog bipartit dengan perusahaan platform, mengirim surat menuntut klarifikasi dan waktu untuk bertemu namun hal tersebut tidak membuahkan berhasil. Aktivis ojol juga bertemu pejabat menteri dan anggota legislatif namun juga tiada hasil yang diperoleh. Oleh karena itu, cara terakhir yang dapat mereka lakukan untuk menyuarakan keprihatinan adalah melalui demonstrasi massa. Pemerintah menugaskan Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (KPPU) untuk memantau perusahaan platform yang melakukan kegiatan yang dapat menyiratkan penguasaan dan kepemilikan kemitraan. Sayangnya, penegakan mandat KPPU juga lemah; KPPU diharapkan oleh pemerintah untuk mendorong perubahan perilaku perusahaan platform, namun mereka belum memiliki anggaran untuk menjalankan mandat tersebut.


Di sisi ojol, dalam survei yang kami lakukan, 95% responden menyebut diri mereka sebagai "mitra" perusahaan platform tetapi hanya 66,3% membaca kontrak, sementara 22,5% tidak membaca kontrak sama sekali, dan 11,3% tidak yakin dengan apa yang tertulis dalam

kontrak. Menariknya, ketika ditanya tentang harapan mereka, 49,5% berharap menjadi karyawan perusahaan sementara 50,5% berharap menjadi “mitra”.

Pendek kata, kita sedang menyaksikan legalisasi defisit kerja layak bagi ojol di Indonesia. Proses dialog sosial *mandek*. Ojol tidak memiliki kedudukan hukum untuk membela diri terlebih mendiskusikan haknya.

Penting untuk kita lihat bahwa perusahaan platform menciptakan ekosistem pasar di mana persaingan dengan perusahaan platform lain adalah dengan cara menjaga loyalitas pelanggan, pengemudi, dan mitra lainnya. Seperti yang dijelaskan pada gambar (terlampir), sebuah perusahaan platform digital memperlakukan ojol sebagai tenaga kerja sekaligus konsumen. Sebagai tenaga kerja, ojol mengantarkan penumpang, makanan, dokumen yang ditugaskan oleh perusahaan platform digital melalui aplikasi. Sebagai konsumen, ojol adalah *captive market* untuk produk-produk dari vendor yang memiliki kontrak kemitraan untuk menjual produk ke ojol, seperti data internet, menit telepon, produk sembako, asuransi kesehatan, asuransi kecelakaan kerja, kredit untuk membeli sepeda motor baru, dan lainnya. Perusahaan platform mungkin menyebarkan informasi ke ojol tentang program kesehatan dan ketenagakerjaan dari BPJS Kesehatan dan BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, tetapi mereka juga menjual program asuransi dari perusahaan swasta kepada ojol.

Figure 1.
The Categories of Digital Platform Companies in Indonesia



Secara keseluruhan, kami menemukan bahwa kebuntuan dalam proses dialog sosial menunjukkan bahwa nasib ojol kini berada pada titik kritis. Ada bahaya dalam wacana pemerintah untuk mendorong status kerja ojol ke jalur kemitraan. Bila didorong ke arah

kemitraan, pemerintah akan terus mengabaikan kerentanan ojol sebagai tenaga kerja dan konsumen di mana perusahaan platform digital menciptakan ekosistem pasar yang mereka ciptakan, pertahankan, demi menghasilkan pendapatan untuk perusahaan. (***)

Peneliti: *Dinna Prapto Raharja, Ph.D (Principal Investigator), Dr. Fransiscus S Joyoadisumarta & Timboel Siregar*

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1. Introduction

A platform economy entered the Indonesian economy following a massive investment in the digital platform application company Gojek in 2006. Gojek was the first Indonesian company to bear the title “Unicorn startup” in 2016 and was valued at USD10.5 billion. This company was originally a motorcycle taxi booking service company through a call centre, which later developed into a digital application company. Competitors that provide similar services include Grab, Uber (now out of competition after being acquired by Grab), Cyberjek, Anterin, Maxim, BitCar, Bonceng, FastGo, OkeJack, Indo-Jek, Teknojek, Hello Jek, and Bojek. Some of these companies only operate in a few provinces or cities, while others cover all provinces of Indonesia. In some areas outside the capital city, there are carisinyal.com, Heloojek (East Java), Find (Kalimantan), and Ajo (West Sumatera). There are also the drivers working with large marketplaces such as Tokopedia, Bukalapak, Shopee, Lazada, Blibli, Orami, JD.ID, Bhinneka, Sociolla, and Zalora. E-commerce or online shopping has accelerated the growth of application-based transportation. On 17 May 2021, Gojek and Tokopedia announced a USD18-billion mergers to create GoTo Group. It was the largest business deal in the country’s history.

A platform economy is defined as an activity providing services, either temporary, online, or offline, in groups or individual, and ranging from micro-tasks, full projects, or something in between. This phenomenon has been called various terms, such as digital economy, sharing economy, gig economy, collaborative economy, or peer to peer economy. However, in broad terms, a platform economy consists of an online marketplace that involves at least three parties, namely the platform provider, the supplying, and the demanding parties.

The platform companies serve as an intermediary that coordinates service provision between buyers and sellers of either goods or services. The platform companies create an algorithm that ensures every demand would get the supply of service. The algorithm serves many functions of ensuring a standardised service for costumers. This algorithm has been assumed as fair, helping business take a large amount of data on supply and demand, make sense of it all, and then distribute the jobs for suppliers. Algorithms are at the core of almost any company in a digital platform economy.

Studies have shown that the values and choices of these algorithms are not the result of any democratic process or agreements between the stakeholders who notably are buyers and sellers.² The algorithms remain unregulated in many countries. To some extent, the algorithms allow the transfer of most of the costs, risks, and liabilities unequally to the stakeholders. The application, or the website that buyers and sellers use, gives platform companies an advantage in terms of being able to avoid the high cost of labour, social protection, fixed assets, and production equipment.³ Consequently, platform companies can have a high rate of growth because they are low cost in production but can create an ecosystem of buyers and sellers of


² M.P. Zimmer, M. Niemimaa, A. Tulkka and A. Balyere. “Algorithms as a platform for work: when work is entangled with an algorithm”. Conference: pre-ICIS Workshop on Changing Nature of Work at Seoul Korea. Dec 2017.

³ Florian A Schmidt, Digital labour markets in the platform economy: Mapping the political challenges of crowd work and gig work. *Friedrich Ebert Stiftung fes-2017plus.de*, 2017.

services to bring everyday goods and services to people with a click in an application. This attracts investors to invest billions of dollars and, with the company increasingly becoming financially stronger and stronger, allowing them to monopolise the market and compete with traditional companies.

There are two categories of a platform economy. The first is the Cloud Work (Web-based digital labour) and the second is the Gig Work (location-based digital labour). The Cloud Work is a task or work order that can be done remotely via the internet and is based on locations. These types of categories include freelance marketplaces, micro tasking crowd work, and content-based creative work. The task is usually sent to individuals. The work falls into the Crowd Work category when the task of work is sent to a group of people. The kinds of activities that fall into this category include accommodation, transportation and delivery services, and household services and personal services. See figure 1 for the further breakdown of the companies in the digital platform economy.

Figure 1. The Categories of Digital Platform Companies in Indonesia



Source: Florian A Schmidt, 2017 p. 7

Some platform companies in gig work have evolved from delivering persons and goods to delivering food, documents, bigger goods, micro tasking delivery, etc. The application companies Gojek, for example, developed GoCar, GoFood, GoMart, GoSend, GoBox, GoTix, GoMed, GoMassage, GoClean, GoAuto, GoGlam, Gojek Bills, GoPulsa, GoPay, and GoPoint. Some

of these services did not last long (GoMed, GoMassage, GoClean, GoAuto, GoGlam). The company is also entering financial technology by launching GoPay, GoBills (now GoTagihan), GoPoint (now Gopay Point), and GoPulsa. Recently, Gojek has also ventured into services that mimic what Zoom and YouTube provide, called GoPlay.

Despite the growth of the digital platform company, there has not been any official update on the total number of user population of the application or on the total number of individuals and business units supporting the system by using the application. The support system includes the ojol, the two-wheeled drivers executing the orders for passengers, food, documents delivery through the application. It has become public knowledge that the Indonesian government does not receive such data from the platform companies due to privacy reasons. When we started this study, an internal source from Gojek informed us that there are about 1.5 to 2 million *ojol* for Gojek. Meanwhile, *ojol* solidarity groups told us the figure is at 4 million *ojol* from both Gojek and Grab. We don't have any numbers on courier drivers working for other platform companies.

Through this study we offer an insight into the social dialogue on gig work for *ojol* in Indonesia. This shed lights on the location-based work with tasks given to selected individuals serving as *online ojek (ojol)*. This choice is made to highlight the specificity of social dialogue for a sector that is yet to be accepted as public transportation but has been growing rapidly in the past few years, employing millions of drivers.

How do these *ojol* understand gig work? How do they respond to the debates and concerns around gig work in a platform economy? How much do these *ojol* bring home every day, how many hours do they work a day, how many days per month, their daily operation costs? Do these *ojol* have the needed health and employment protection or insurance from the daily risk of going to work? What do these *ojol* understand about being “partners” to the platform company? Do these *ojol* wish to be “partners” with or “employees” of the application company? What do these *ojol* think about their overall working conditions, collective bargaining, and freedom of association?

With the information, we then dissect the context, content, and process of social dialogue as experienced by the *ojol* in Indonesia. What are the main topics of debate and issues of concerns around *ojol*? What are the consequences of these debates and the concerns over the relations among government and non-government stakeholders in this context in Indonesia? What is the power relation among these stakeholders? This research maps the discourse of work in the platform economy while also identifying the enabling environment for improving the well-being of gig workers, including ways to organise them. We conclude by identifying ways to improve the social dialogues between government, platform companies, and *ojol* towards decent work.

2. Research Methodology

Our research uses a combination of descriptive quantitative and qualitative methods. The use of both quantitative and qualitative methods is to provide panoramic view of the research landscape of *ojol* work in Indonesia. Descriptive research is used to describe a population's characteristics. It collects information to answer the what, where, when, and how of a population or group's behaviour. Descriptive research does not address why a phenomenon

happens or probe its causes. However, descriptive study data can be useful in investigating variable relationships (correlations) that would be useful in future research (Craig A. Mertler, 2016, p. 111).

The descriptive quantitative analysis captures the overall working conditions, including the rights, of gig workers in Grab and Gojek motorcycle drivers (*ojek*), from their profiles to how much they take home per day, their social protection, and their work hours. It also allows us to capture the perspective of these *ojol* on freedom of association and collective bargaining, including their views on partnership and whether they would rather see themselves as partners of the platform companies or as employees. The qualitative analysis captures the perspectives of workers, the platform companies, and government on gig work and social dialogue.

The population of the research is the *ojek* in Indonesia, which is estimated by GARDA (*Gabungan Aksi Roda Dua*, an association of online motorcycle drivers) to be approximately 4 million individuals across Indonesia in 2020. Since there is no contacts database of these drivers, and due to resource limitations, for the descriptive quantitative analysis, we start with a convenient sampling focused on the districts of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi. With this, we cover two provinces (Jakarta and West Java), which include the five districts of Jakarta and four districts in West Java. To qualify as survey respondents, an *ojol* must have worked for at least six months as *ojol*. This is to make sure that the respondents know the rules of the job well, the working conditions, and the issues pertaining to working as *ojol*. We then take a quota sampling where we take 80 respondents from each district of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi (total of 400 respondents). Our respondents work at either Grab and Gojek because the system of wage, social protection, and working condition in these two platform companies are comparable. We exclude courier drivers such as those from Lazada and Shopee after finding out in the early stages of the interviews and literature review that their contracts and application are not comparable to those of Grab and Gojek. Next, we ensure that there are female *ojol* serving as our respondents, using the snowball sampling technique whenever possible to identify spots to find female *ojol*.

The descriptive quantitative method employs a structured face-to-face survey of four hundred (400) *ojol* from Gojek and Grab operating in the capital city of Jakarta and the suburbs that surround it: Depok, Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi. The survey was done over three weeks, from 18 October to 11 November 2021.

Appendix 1 captures the structured survey questions. The survey produces descriptive information on:

- a. **The profile of *ojol*:** gender, year of birth, district/city of residency, latest education, the number of years working as *ojol*, whether the job is the main or supporting income, whether the respondent has worked for other platform companies as *ojol*, whether the respondent is currently using other platform companies as *ojol*, the respondent's star rating, whether the respondent has other income-generating skills, the factors affecting the respondent's intent to keep working for the platform company, and the kind of service the respondent often choose/take from the application (person, food, or document).

- b. **Their working experience as ojol:** whether the respondent has experienced being suspended, how many times the account has been suspended over the past six months, whether the respondent knows why the account was suspended, whether the respondent ever experienced being the subject of complaints by customers, whether the respondent has participated in any solidarity groups among *ojol*, whether the respondent was involved in any activity to voice the interest of *ojol* to government, and whether the respondent was involved in any activity to voice the interest of *ojol* to the platform company.
- c. **Tariff, bonus, and social protection:** the satisfaction level of respondents (with the basic tariff, bonus system, social assistance, and tariff change), the respondent's perception regarding the need to participate in social security programmes, whether the platform company pays for their participation in social security programmes (health care, work accident, death benefits), whether the respondent has an active membership in BPJS Kesehatan and BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, whether the respondent has heard of or knows the benefits of participating in the employment insurance programmes from BPJS Ketenagakerjaan (covering work accident, death, and old-age benefits).
- d. **The working conditions around being an ojol:** the average daily income at the time of the interview, the average working hours per day and the average working days in a month, the frequency of getting the maximum incentive (*tutup point*), and the daily operational costs.
- e. **The concept of partnership as understood by ojol:** the meaning of partnership (flexible hours/possible as part-time work, ability to select incoming orders, being paid per order, source of quick cash, not being a full-time employee, being in an equal position with the platform company, and whether the respondent is engaged in the decision-making process of the platform company), the expectations of the respondent (as employee or as partner to the platform company), whether the respondent see themselves as a partner to the platform company, and whether the respondent reads the contract with the platform company well).

The survey questions were designed after doing a literature review and in-depth online (via Zoom) or phone interviews with six *ojol* from both Gojek and Grab. We also explored including courier motorcycle drivers from two e-commerce platform (Shopee and Lazada) but decided that their application and the working method of these drivers are not comparable to those of Gojek and Grab, so we exclude these courier *ojol* from the survey. We conducted a pilot survey on six (6) *ojol* to test the clarity and effectiveness of the survey instrument before launching the survey method to the 400 respondents.

We employed four (4) enumerators, two male and two female, all with undergraduate diplomas in social science. All enumerators were trained and have participated in the pilot survey to test the instrument. The enumerators bring a print copy of the questionnaire for the respondents to read while being asked. The enumerators then input the respondents' answers to a central Google form, which only the principal investigator could edit. An evaluation was done in the third, seventh and the last day of the survey. Each enumerator was required to

submit a memo documenting the experience of doing the survey; the memos were shared and analysed in a team meeting for data processing.

The enumerators came to *pangkalan ojek* (meeting spots of *ojek*), malls, train stations, or approached those waiting by the streets. Each interview lasted from 10 to 12 minutes. We ensured that the environment for surveying was conducive: not crowded, without loud background noises, and that every respondent was interviewed one-on-one. Each respondent received a modest transportation allowance of Rp. 50,000 (approximately USD3.57)⁴ when completing the survey. The allowance was sent by transfer or e-wallet.

Appendices 2, 3, 4, 5 capture the semi-structured interview questions for the qualitative method. The qualitative approach helps capture the debates and issues at hand and the possible future of working in Indonesia as *ojol*. We gathered information by doing:

- a. semi-structured in-depth interviews with twelve (12) *ojol* drivers from the survey whose experience and knowledge on working and the social dialogue in the sector enrich the findings; each interview lasted from 45 to 60 minutes (two females, two males, four males who just engaged in organising the 5 January 2022 demonstration, and four males who are involved in solidarity groups for *ojol*). We intended to interview one more female, but she was sick for more than a week that time lapsed for the interview schedule.
- b. semi-structured online in-depth interviews with government representatives relevant in the social dialogue to capture the perspectives of government in doing social dialogue on gig work (the Ministry of Manpower, the Jakarta Office of Ministry of Transportation (Dinas *Perhubungan* Jakarta), the Ministry of Cooperatives & SMEs, and KPPU (*Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha*, The National Commission for Monitoring Business Competition). We also captured the public statements from a webinar organised by the Ministry of Manpower on “the Pattern of Protection for Application-based Drivers as Service Providers, on 15 December 2021 where we recorded and made transcripts on the statements made by the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs and the Ministry of Transportation. We also interviewed an expert in business competition who worked in the KPPU from 2001-2021 to enrich the context aspect. We had a meeting scheduled with the Ministry of Transportation, but the meeting was eventually called off. We offered the Ministry the opportunity to respond in written forms, but we never heard back from them.
- c. a focus group discussion with three labour confederations: KSBSI (*Konfederasi Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia*), KASBI (*Konfederasi Kongres Aliansi Serikat Buruh Indonesia*), KSPSI (*Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia*) to capture the perspectives of existing labour confederations on gig work and whether they have tried to include these workers in the confederations. KSPI (*Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Indonesia*) requested a separate meeting because their national congress was held on the day of the focus group discussion.

⁴ We use an assumption of Rp. 14,000 per 1 USD.

- d. a thematic literature review from peer-reviewed publications and official government reports or *press releases*.

We also approached the platform companies Grab and Gojek for interviews, but they never replied on our request for interviews (see appendix 6 on the time tracking of our outreach to Grab, Gojek, and the Ministry of Transportation).

3. Conceptual Framework

A. Decent Work in Gig Work

Decent work conveys several dimensions in jobs, be it in the formal economy or in unregulated sectors. The International Labour Organization (ILO) conceptualised decent work in 1999 to refer to adequate opportunities for work, remuneration (in cash and in kind), safety at work, and healthy working conditions⁵. This concept looks not only at income rates but also income security, social protection, and the fundamental rights of workers (freedom of association, non-discrimination at work, and the absence of forced labour and child labour) and social dialogue where workers may voice their views, defend their interests and engage in discussions to negotiate work-related matters with employers and government authorities.

We are also familiar with the concept of fair work, the practice and policy of employing people while providing a balanced rights and responsibilities between employers and workers so that all these individuals have effective voices, opportunities, security, fulfilment, and respect. Internationally, it is the norm that everyone has the right to “the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work” as recognised in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other international and regional human rights treaties, as well as related international legal instruments, conventions, and recommendations of the International Labour Organization (ILO)⁶. The just and favourable conditions of work ensure: (a) remuneration that provides all workers, as a minimum, fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women who are guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work, and a decent living for themselves and their families, (b) safe and healthy working conditions, (c) equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted to an appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority and competence, (d) rest, leisure, and reasonable limitations in working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays.

We use decent work to capture the issues surrounding the pay and working conditions of gig workers for three reasons. *First*, the spirit of decent work spans beyond just fair remuneration but also include humane working conditions. *Second*, the spirit of fair remuneration is not limited to a certain size of private sector business; the key is a balanced

⁵ Dharam Ghai, Decent work: concepts and indicators. *International Labour Review* vol. 142 no. 2, 2003.

⁶ General Comment No. 23 United Nations Economic and Social Council on the right to just and favourable conditions of work (article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). 27 April 2016. Available at

<https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=4slQ6QSmlBEDzFEovLCuW1a0Szab0oXTdlmnsJZZVQfoUYy19kME5pOqRbao%2BukB1Kzn1MMnQL24FFvtlIdk%2F%2FR%2FF0GthE%2BTiGSATb%2BUa3WMS0%2F%2BfVfQFg02%2BY%2FTVuqU>

framework for productive workplace relations that ensures economic prosperity as well as social inclusion. *Third*, decent work allows room for dialogues between workers and the ones responsible for assigning work to these workers.

We recognise the debates surrounding this vision of reaching decent work in gig work. Gig work implies flexibility of work with a short-term assignment and pay per order. All of these are considered fair to workers agreeing to join the platform companies. This is what we then often hear being assumed about work flexibility in gig work: a gig worker can choose whenever to open the application platform to start receiving orders, can choose to turn down incoming orders, can work for several application platform. Flexibility is also assumed in that the workers have some free time in between incoming orders. For such flexibility, digital platform companies around the globe have refused to recognise gig workers as employees or call the payment for executing orders made by the application as wage. The digital platform companies categorise gig workers in the sector as “self-employed”.

We note, on the other hand, that the flexibility of gig work may be controlled and limited by the algorithms that the digital platform companies develop to manage its ecosystem. The digital platform companies continue to transform their algorithm for assigning orders to workers, yet none of these algorithms are known to the workers, the government, let alone the public. As the digital platform companies venture into lines of services being delivered through their application and as the investment grows, the companies adjust the calculation for sending order and paying the services for delivering orders. The so-called optimising code has generated public anxieties for its possibly negative impacts to workers given the inability of government or workers to control it.

We recognise that a digital platform performs three specific functions: (1) matching workers with demand; (2) providing a common set of tools and services that enable the delivery of work in exchange for compensation, and (3) setting governance rules whereby good actors are rewarded and poor behaviour is discouraged.⁷ Digital platforms are designed differently by application companies to serve a variety of purposes, from offering options of delivery service (e.g., instant delivery, one-day delivery, normal 3-4 day delivery, etc.) to options of goods and services to deliver (e.g., food, documents, packages small and big, personal ride, shared ride, cleaning service, moving service, etc.). As noted elsewhere, these application companies are the gatekeepers of demand, determining the rate of service, working conditions, terms of working, and more. The platform act as “matchmakers”, the intermediaries to reduce transaction costs and possible asymmetric information situations that could then enable interactions that would not occur directly.⁸ With these functions, a digital platform enters into the workspace of informal sector workers where usually workers would negotiate jobs and pay rate on a person-to-person basis.

Is there decent work in Indonesian gig work for *ojol*? We can relate the question to the discourse on whether the gig workers are free agencies who are empowered or an agent being


⁷ ILO, *Issue Brief #5: Job Quality in the Platform Economy*. Prepared for the 2nd Meeting of the Global Commission on the Future of Work 15-17 February 2018.

⁸ Heiner Heiland, “Workers’ voice in platform labour”. *Study No. 21*, July 2020, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, p. 7.

exploited.⁹ It has been identified elsewhere that digital platforms have centralised power over the recruited workers delivering the services and centralised policies to retain consumers and workers with particular monitoring and reward systems that may affect the overall working conditions of people working in the sector.

Choudary (2018) appropriately said that digital platforms create value of interaction between workers (as producers) of service and their clients (as consumers) through technology. The work is specific, which is usually in response to a specific request by the consumer, who then pays the workers. The core interaction is described by Choudary as three phases: **discovery**, when producers and consumers find each other; **exchange**, when goods, services, and money change hands; and **relationship**, fed by multiple interactions and repeated exchanges. In a nutshell, the application companies provide a platform to enable the core interaction, namely managing successful and repeatable interactions so that eventually the initially subsidised system can sustain itself in an ecosystem of incentives (in this the platform may either value consumers more highly than workers, which would subsidise consumers' participation while increasing the workers' cost burden, or the other way around), network (what is beneficial is having a two-sided network effects, a phenomenon in which an increased volume of producers using the platform makes it more attractive for consumers to participate, and those consumers in turn attract more producers), and increased multihoming costs (namely the cost of users participating in more than one platform, which affect whether the user base would be retained by a single company or easily be switched to other companies'). See Figure 2.

Figure 2. The Design Choices of Platforms to Ensure the Success and Repeatability of Interactions



Source: Choudary (2018, p. 4).

The windows for exploitation of people working in the digital platform has been identified. Taking samples from across Europe, Heiland (2020) noted that platform companies create different types of fragmentations of platform workers: putting platform workers to be legally understood as self-employed, which is then followed by the general trend of escape from employment law, and the credo of “don't ask permission, ask forgiveness” have made it difficult for policymakers and workers to respond to platforms other than to react. Worse,

⁹ Sangeet Paul Choudary, *ILO Future of Work: The architecture of digital labour platforms: policy recommendations on platform design for worker well-being*. Research Paper Series No. 3. (ILO: Geneva, 2018).

platform companies make use of legal fragmentation according to national borders and in the digital space.

This is to say that the workers are seen as individuals rather than groups with shared interest different from those of the platforms', which affect their ability to do collective action. Collective bargaining is typically only available amongst workers who are employed rather than self-employed. In Finland, gig workers "work all the time" to make a living in courier work.¹⁰ Others highlight the non- and low payment, income insecurity, the lack of compensation for their own capital equipment, the blurred boundaries between work and private life affecting balance in the life and health of workers, the risk of work intensification in the name of flexibility, rating systems, and task or job allocation.¹¹ The digital platform carries the risk of precariousness and non-standard work affecting income, working conditions, health and safety, representation, and social protection.

Further citing Choudary's framework of core interaction among workers, platforms, and consumers, in essence, a case of exploitation of workers would happen when: (1) the platform takes power away from workers enough that the workers' interest may be disregarded in favour of an efficient market on the platform or to direct profit to the platform, (2) the platform takes bargaining power and rights away from workers, (3) the platform policies make workers subservient to the platform, (4) the platform design decisions that make workers dependent on the platform, effectively locking them in, for instance making it difficult for them to switch to other platforms, or (5) the platform does not allocate risks and rewards fairly across the ecosystem that workers are forced to take on higher risks or not being rewarded sufficiently.¹²

Kuhn¹³ calls the current discussion of gig work as freelancers as a misunderstanding about the nature of the work. Freelance work, she says, generally connotes short-term employment relationships with several different clients and compensation on a project basis where freelancers are classified as independent contractors. For these reasons, freelancers are typically skilled professionals providing expert service, which is not the case with *ojol* in Indonesia. Freelancers add value by generating ideas, lowering the cost and risk of innovation, providing entrepreneurial management expertise not available in-house, enabling the use of specialised human capital not available in-house and enhance the flexibility and agility of business.¹⁴

We do not have such a parallel condition, choice, and opportunity to generate ideas, innovate, and improve expertise as motorcycle drivers or *ojol* in Indonesia. Therefore, in our view, placing gig workers as freelancers is also a misunderstanding. There are times when these *ojol* flock by the street while waiting for hours for incoming orders; they do not have a certain window of time to use the waiting time for skill development. The application also does not

¹⁰ Ritta Juntunen, "Does the worker have a say in the platform economy?" SAK, *Time of Opportunities project* (2017).

¹¹ Christophe Degryse, "Digitalisation of the economy and its impact on labour markets", *Working Paper* 2016.02 European Trade Union Institute. (Brussels: ETUI, 2016); Harald Hauben (ed), "The platform economy and precarious work". Study requested by the EMPL committee. (Luxembourg: European Parliament, 2020).

¹² Choudary, 2018, p. 9.

¹³ Kuhn 2016.

¹⁴ Burke & Cowling 2015

allow *ojol* to introduce ideas or innovate when delivering certain goods or persons; there is simply no algorithms of higher payment that'd reward them.

Even with skilled freelancers, the debate remains on the legality of this classification status as freelancers because firms exercise significant control over the work condition and compensation. Freelancers now also have unions, such as the Freelancers Union in USA, Canadian Freelance Union, Musicians' Union of Ireland, BECTU for media and entertainment freelance workers in UK, the UGT in Spain, and more. Those believing in the importance of union for freelancers say that the self-employed may be highly or vulnerable workers, but trade unions need to adapt its strategies in the context of employment relationships becoming individualised (Wynn 2015). After all, all workers regardless of their working hour or employment status need a minimum condition that upholds their dignity.

In short, uncertainty remains in this digitally mediated work. For sure the people in the sector may not be called employees, but they remain workers. We need to review, therefore, the concept of an employer, of employment. Stewart¹⁵ observes a triangular relationship in gig work:

1. *between the gig worker and the digital intermediary (the platform company)*, which is governed by a contract describing the terms and conditions of the worker's participation in the process and giving the digital intermediary the right to supervise, discipline and discharge the worker or suspend the worker from using the platform. Usually, the worker bears most if not all of the risk associated with providing necessary equipment and tools, interruptions in service by the platform, deactivation of the service, and more.
2. *between the digital intermediary and the end-user (individual or business)*, which is governed by standard terms and conditions that must be accepted by the end-user when they log into the digital service or platform. Typically, it limits the obligations and responsibilities of the intermediary for any problems that may occur in the production or delivery process. The end-users are usually rarely aware of the extent to which the intermediary's responsibilities are limited by these contracts.
3. *between the gig worker and the ultimate user of their service*. This part is more ambiguous. It depends on the business model adopted by the intermediary as characterised by regulators.

Next, we will discuss the social dialogue aspect of gig work. Social dialogues are defined by where the dialogue takes place. We will therefore highlight the general aspects of social dialogues as well as the specific characteristics of social dialogue affecting work in Indonesia.

¹⁵ Stewart, 2017, p. 5-6

B. Social Dialogue in Gig Work

Social dialogue is an important component of good governance in many countries. The ILO defines social dialogue as “all types of negotiation, consultation, or simply exchange of information between, or among representatives of governments, employers, and workers, on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy”. Further, as ILO defines, a social dialogue can exist as a tripartite process or without direct government involvement engaging only the workers and company managements. A dialogue can be informal or institutionalised, can be at the enterprise level, regional, or national levels, can be inter-professional, sectoral, or a combination of professional and sectoral.

Context wise, the question is why a social dialogue emerges. Social dialogue emerges for various reasons, from an economic crisis, an absence of regulatory regime or legal certainty affecting certain sectors, to changes in industrial relations. Social dialogue is nothing new in Indonesia. For years, Indonesia has implemented social dialogues for employment and work issues. There are employers’ association, APINDO (the Indonesian Association of Employers), associations of profession, trade unions and union confederations. Studies show that the reform of labour laws post the New Order authoritarian regime have provided rooms for labour movements to articulate demands for better working conditions.¹⁶

Globally, social dialogue in gig work occurs under an absence of regulatory regime on the sector and the discrepancy of knowledge on what the platform economy would bring to all stakeholders. We may be able to see a broader use of digital platforms in our daily lives and how they ease our lives as consumers to some extent, but there is a gap of information about how people are recruited to build and sustain the ecosystem, or what the number of jobs created is.

Content wise, we ask how workers are organised to participate in social dialogue. Social dialogue is expected to discuss the viewpoints of stakeholders in the world of work, which gives it the potential to address challenges and resolve important issues and affecting the stakeholders. Yet, a social dialog requires an enabling environment for it to be optimal. The ILO specifically mentions the importance of the state: “the state cannot be passive even if it is not a direct actor in the process”. The state is expected to create a stable political and civil climate that enables all stakeholders to operate freely without fear of reprisal. For workers, freedom of expression and to associate is critical for social dialogue participation. Working together among workers to voice needs and interests is fundamental for participation in social dialogue; there can’t be a social dialogue without representation of voices. Well-functioning, independent trade unions capable of effectively representing their members’ interests is critical to extend dialogue between social partners.¹⁷ When the working conditions are poor, workers would not only be exploited and forced to reach decent living remuneration,¹⁸ but in countries where a

¹⁶ TURC, *Dialog Sosial dan Posisi Tawar Serikat Pekerja di Arena Demokrasi*. (Jakarta: TURC, 2018).

¹⁷ Heribert Kohl, “Freedom of Association, Employees’ Rights and Social Dialogue in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans: Results of a survey of 16 formerly socialist countries in Eastern Europe”. (Hans Bockler Stiftung, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Otto Brenner Stiftung, European Trade Union Institute: 2009).

¹⁸ R.D. Mariani, “Working conditions in the Bangladeshi garment sector: social dialogue and compliance”. Master thesis at the Department of Technology, Dynamics and Sustainable Development, TU Delft, 2013.

trade union congress was formed and spoke on behalf of the poor, such as in Ghana, the income level and poverty rate also improved.¹⁹

In the Indonesian gig economy, freedom of expression and to associate is not suppressed by the state, but there are signs that application companies would not allow any of their *ojol* to speak up as a group about the working contracts or issues that may affect the company negatively. The contract agreed by the *ojol* implies an agreement “to refrain from influencing other *ojol* to demonstrate/doing sweeping/offbid/and everything else that may affect the company negatively or disturb public order”.

Process wise, we ask how social dialogue operate and function. The ideal form of social dialogue is in tripartite fashion; it has been documented as helpful to overcome serious economic and labour market difficulties.²⁰ In such ideal condition, collective bargaining may occur to discuss terms of employment, the macroeconomic environment affecting employment, and the rate of remuneration or compensation to workers. If the situation is less than ideal, for instance when there is fragmented unionism or unorganised interest groups, a dialogue may continue whenever there are social agents that rose to voice concerns and demands from the groups. The intensity of social dialogue may vary from information sharing (where there is neither discussion nor dialogue), consultation (where there is an exchange of views), to negotiation (the most formal and legally binding form, where there is a reaching of agreement by consensus).²¹ The government may also vary their approach during the decision-making part: whether to take the inputs as a case-by-case demand or as a demand needing a systemic response. Others see the social dialogue process from how the government centralise or decentralise the dialogue,²² whether the government takes unilateral actions²³ or imposes an agreement.²⁴

Our study aims to fill in the research gap by identifying the context, content, and process of social dialogues as attempted by the *ojol* in the Indonesian gig economy. We note the standpoints of government, workers, and the application companies, the mobilisation of voices, and the progress of social dialogues.

¹⁹ Mohammed Mwamadzingo and Ditiro Saleshando (eds). “Trade Unions and Poverty Alleviation in Africa”. (Harare & Geneva: ILO, 2003).

²⁰ ILO, “Social Dialogue and the future of work”, Thematic brief with support from the Government of Sweden (ILO: 2020).

²¹ Caroline O’Reilly, “Social dialogue and tripartism. Presentation material at the Labour and social policies for decent work”, Bangkok, June 14-17 2016.

²² Michael Gold, Peter Cressey and Evelyne Leonard, “Whatever happened to social dialogue? From partnership to managerialism in the EU Employment Agenda”, *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 13, no 1 (2007): 7-25.

²³ Youcef Ghellab and Konstantinos Papadakis, “The politics of economic adjustment in Europe: state unilateralism or social dialogue”. In *The global crisis: Causes, responses and challenges*, International Labour Office, (Geneva: ILO, 2011).

²⁴ Oscar Molina & Fausto Miguelez, “From negotiation to imposition: social dialogue in austerity times in Spain.”, *Working Paper No. 51*. (Geneva: ILO, 2013).

4. Findings

A. The Context: Why a Social Dialogue for Ojol Emerged in Indonesia

Indonesia is a middle-income country where precarious work is common. There are those who work as *becak* driver (the manual tricycle with a passenger wagon attached to the front or side part of the *becak*), as motorcycle taxi driver known as *ojek*, parking guy, porters carrying heavy loads in markets or ports, drivers for wagons used for public transportation, trash collectors, street vendors, stall vendors, and many more. These jobs do not require much skill, education, or training. The Indonesian government categorise this work as informal sector work. According to the definition from the National Statistic Agency (BPS), informal sector workers are people whose main income come from being self-employed, working alone with the help of temporary labourers, working alone with the help of full-time labourers, working as a free agent in the agriculture sectors, working as a free agent in non-agriculture sector, and working for family members without compensation. The remuneration for informal sector workers may come in bulk by the end of a week/two weeks/a month, or as a commission per incoming order or per daily profit. These workers typically do not have social protection, be it health or employment insurance. The Statistic Agency recorded a total 78.14 million informal sector workers in the country as of February 2021.²⁵

This definition of informal sector work is broad but unclear on the nature of the work in attracting the income that sustains the work. This lack of clarity becomes an issue when digital technology invades into the workspace that used to be occupied by these precarious workers. The phenomenon of online ojek (*ojol*) employs big data, algorithms, and artificial intelligence to reduce the intermediate cost between consumers and drivers when doing a transaction. It used to be that motorcycle taxi drivers (*ojek*) negotiate with a potential passenger before the transaction is finalised. There is nothing forcing the driver during the transaction. Under such freedom to choose, a driver can be categorised as belonging to informal sector work. The problem comes when there is a digital platform company building an ecosystem of drivers that promises consumers (or passengers) no negotiations on the fare rate of the *ojek* at a competitive price. Worse, there are multiple digital platform companies building an ecosystem of markets where the drivers become one of the components that sustain the ecosystems. These digital platform companies dare to “burn money” to attract drivers and consumers to use their application. At this stage, it is appropriate to say that it is a mistake to view the drivers, the *ojol*, as self-employed and informal sector workers. These *ojols* serve the interest of the digital platform companies, helping the digital platform companies grow and generate income.

In this subsection, we investigate why social dialogue emerged for *ojol* in Indonesia. We start by tracing the emergence of online two-wheeled ride-hailing services and how the public and government responded.

The invasion of digital technology in informal sector work is nothing new. Globally we have heard of the Uber Technologies since 2009, which utilised one of the most talked about models of ride-sharing that changed how people look at taxi and public transportation. The use

²⁵ Katadata.co.id, Berapa jumlah pekerja informal pada Februari 2021, 7 May 2021,. Available at <https://databoks.katadata.co.id/datapublish/2021/05/07/berapa-jumlah-pekerja-informal-pada-februari-2021>

of digital technology to request a ride, get a driver to bring one from one point to another, get an estimate time of arrival along with a non-negotiable but affordable fare was seen as attractive. Cheaper than conventional taxi, Uber charged a minimum price or a price that is based on an algorithm of time and distance of the trip. Consumers benefit from the ease of finding a ride using an easy-to-use smart phone app, the certainty of finding a ride, and the convenience of paying the friendlier rate using credit cards.

The digital platform model for solving transportation problems also attracted the interest of Indonesians. Three Indonesians (Nadiem Makarim, Kevin Aluwi and Michaelangelo Moran) developed an app and multi-service platform named Gojek in 2010 to link customers with courier delivery services, both car and motorcycle delivery services. Back then the idea of Gojek was to provide employment to those who only needed a motorcycle, smartphone, and the spirit to work.²⁶ Starting with GoRide, GoCar, GoSend and GoFood services, Go-Jek is today hailed as the “super app”, providing 20 services across transportation, finance, and entertainment.²⁷ Since 2018, Go-Jek services have become available in 167 cities throughout Indonesia,²⁸ and, as of 2020, in Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and India.²⁹ Go-Jek became Indonesia’s first unicorn (businesses valued at USD1 billion) in 2016 after only releasing its application in 2015. Go-Jek was named 17th in 2017 in Fortune’s List of the *50 Companies that Changed the World*.³⁰

No doubt the enthusiasm for the new business model of global digital platform companies spilled over to Indonesia, too. When Gojek (and Grab) were still new, the pricing of fare, thus the take-home income for *ojol*, was relatively good. The *ojol* felt attracted to the new business model given the initial fare rate for delivering passengers, food, or documents. The rate per kilometer was Rp. 4,000 (approximately USD0.28). Back then, an *ojol* can bring home Rp. 300,000 – Rp 400,000 relatively easily per day (approximately USD21.40 to USD28.50). In the early days, drivers also benefit from incentives for joining the app such as the chance to get a cash bonus for reaching a certain total fare a day. Gojek’s rate was relatively better than Grab then, but the drivers said that Grab remained attractive because the daily bonus reward was more enticing. Some drivers that we interviewed admit installing both Gojek and Grab application to see which one was better for generating income.

Back in the initial years of gig work, the *ojol* were aware of the challenge of agreeing to the online contract in the application to set incoming order in their smart phones, but they dismissed these challenges in the hopes that this job-generating tech is a better job option. Indeed, in those days there was an absence of regulation on fare rate and on registration of vehicle for public transportation purposes. Furthermore, the *ojol* faced oppositions, often violent ones, from the non-online motorcycle taxi drivers (a.k.a. *ojek pangkalan*) who consider them as unfair competitors. None of these seem big enough for mobilising an interest against the digital platform companies. Looking back to before 2015, the *ojol* that we interviewed, both men and women, admitted that they dared to bear all risks because of the relatively good income, the flexible hours to turn on the app, and the manageable work hours per day. They

²⁶ *Detik.net*. 2021. 5 Fakta Gojek yang sudah 11 tahun berdiri, October 14. <https://inet.detik.com/business/d-5766722/5-fakta-gojek-yang-sudah-11-tahun-berdiri>

²⁷ [Produk \(gojek.com\)](https://www.gojek.com)

²⁸ “Kini GO-JEK Hadir di 167 Kota dan Kabupaten Indonesia”. <https://www.gojek.com/blog/gojek/go-jek-dimana-mana/>

²⁹ Tentang | Gojek [Tentang \(gojek.com\)](https://www.gojek.com)

³⁰ Tentang | Gojek [Tentang \(gojek.com\)](https://www.gojek.com)

did not even bother about the 20 percent fee charged by the platform company to the ojol for every order or transaction.

- *“I liked it that I can do it [the ojol work] whenever to add into my main income. I was a salaried worker going to office between 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and after work I can turn on my app and become ojol.”* (Informant #8, Male).
- *“I can take care of my child because to me my child is important. I am a single mother and I need daily income. As ojol, I can turn on the app after I drop my child to school, pick up my child again and prepare lunch for her, rest for few minutes, and then by late afternoon until midnight I go back to work as ojol.”* (Informant #33, Female)
- *“When joining, I and many other drivers were attracted by the incentives, bonus, gimmicks. We did not even look at the fare rate. Once the company had many drivers, however, our rate went downhill.”* (Informant #2, Forum Pengemudi Mitra Daring Indonesia).

Indeed, the ojol changed their mind upon realising that the fare rate went downhill through the years, the bonus system was dropped, and the working hours to meet the acceptable take home income per day declined significantly. The uneasy feeling emerged around 2015. The ojol argued that their typical efforts to secure enough take-home income have grown irrelevant. Our informants argued that:

“Typically, I can just stand by some residential areas, stations, terminals and secured incoming orders during the morning rush hour, and then the pattern was repeated for the afternoon and evening rush hour, but now the length of time to wait for the orders gets longer. We called this phenomenon “a dripping order”; we may get one order and who knows when another one would come in...I usually get 15-30 orders per day, but now I'd be lucky to get 2 orders and I've opened my app since 6 a.m. (the interview was at 8:00 p.m.)” (Informant #4, Male).

The pandemic only worsens the take-home income for ojol. An ojol that we interviewed observed that it is not just that people don't go to work and are restrained in mobility, but the numbers of ojol on the streets, stations, and public places are increasing.

“People register to work as ojol because it is (relatively) easier to get accepted. So the more unemployment there is out there, the more people would register as ojol. I think the scale of consumer per driver is 1 to 20, per 1 customer there are 20 drivers.” (Informant #8, Male).

There were seven (7) drivers that we interviewed face-to-face who also argued that the contract of charging 20 percent fee to ojol is not respected by the platform companies. They showed us the screen that they'd see when an order is incoming. The drivers can only see the point of pick-up and point of drop-off. They cannot see the fare rate let alone how much is charged to passengers. For this reason, they strongly argued that an active app can be disadvantageous to ojol because they cannot reject the incoming order but had no way of knowing how much they would take home from delivering the order. We also note the gap of

knowledge among the *ojol* on the current fare rate. The news said Rp. 3,000 (approximately USD0.21), while some *ojol* said Rp. 2,000 (approximately USD0.14), and others said Rp. 1,200 per kilometres (approximately USD0.08).

Regulation wise, this is what we found displayed by digital platform companies on the fare rate for *ojol*. Table 1 captures the basic rate of Gojek fare according to Government Regulation No. 118/2018 where the drivers are told they pay a 20 percent fee for every order completed.

Table 1.
Basic Rate of Go-Jek Income According to Government Regulation No. 118/2018

Services	Zone	Low-demand fee (per km)	High-demand fee (per km)	Minimum fee	Notes
GoRide	Zone I	IDR 1850	IDR 2500	IDR 7000 – 9000 for 4 km	Jawa Non-Jabodetabek, Sumatera, Bali
GoRide	Zone II	IDR 2250	IDR 2650	IDR 9000 – 10500 for 4 km	Jabodetabek
GoRide	Zone III	IDR 2100	IDR 2600	IDR 7000 – 9000 for 4 km	Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Indonesia Timur
GoCar	Zone I	IDR 3500	IDR 6000	IDR 10000 for 1 km	Jawa, Sumatera, Bali
GoCar	Zone II	IDR 3700	IDR 6500	IDR 10000 for 1km	Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Indonesia Timur

Table 2 shows the rate for sending packages or documents (GoSend), while Table 3 shows the rate for sending food (GoFood).

Table 2.
GoSend Basic Rate (2020)

Services	Zone	Minimum Fee	Short Distance	Medium distance	Long distance
GoSend Instant delivery	Jabodetabek	IDR 13000	IDR 2815	Not regulated	IDR 3000/km after 10 km
GoSend Same Day Delivery	Jabodetabek	IDR 13000	IDR 2815	IDR 1800 for 6-15 km	IDR 1200/km after 15 km

For Grab, the basic fare rate of *ojol* refers also to the Government Regulation No. 118/2018 (see Table 4). Just like Gojek drivers, the *ojol* of Grab are told that they pay 20 percent of their income for every order that they deliver.

Table 3.
GoFood Basic Rate (2017)

Services	Zone	Minimum Fee	Short Distance	Medium distance Long distance
GoSend Instant Delivery	Jabodetabek	IDR 4000	IDR 2000 per km	Using GoPay
		IDR 9000		Using cash
GoSend Same Day Delivery	Jabodetabek	IDR 10000	IDR 2000 per km	Using GoPay
		IDR 13000		Using cash

Table 4.
Basic Rate of GrabBike Income According to Government Regulation No. 118/2018

Services	Zone	Low-demand fee (per km)	High-demand fee (per km)	Minimum fee	Notes
GrabBike	Zone I	IDR 1850	IDR 2500	IDR 7000 – 9000 for 4 km	Jawa Non-Jabodetabek, Sumatera, Bali
GrabBike	Zone II	IDR 2250	IDR 2650	IDR 9000 – 10500 for 4 km	Jabodetabek
GrabBike	Zone III	IDR 2100	IDR 2600	IDR 7000 – 9000 for 4 km	Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Indonesia Timur

Juxtaposing these displayed rates with the demands from *ojol* during demonstrations on 3 November 2015 and 18 August 2018 (see Table 5), we can confirm that *ojol* suffer from a non-transparent mechanism in terms of how and why a fare gets reduced so significantly (from Rp.4,000 per kilometre to Rp. 3,000 and then Rp. 1,200 to 1,600). The vulnerability of the *ojol* is imminent when looking at the irony of demanding a return to Rp. 4,000 per kilometre in 2015 then Rp. 3,000 in 2018.

Based on our survey of 400 *ojol* respondents in Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi, 53.8 percent of whom work for Grab and 46.3 percent for Gojek, we find that more than seven out of ten *ojol* have high-school education (72.8 percent) and almost two of ten *ojol* have middle school education (16 percent). Over two-thirds of the respondents have worked for at least three years while four out of ten have worked for at least four years. To most of these respondents, being *ojol* is their main income (88.3 percent). Half have tried working for other platform companies (49.5 percent), while three out of ten respondents use multiple application to make ends meet (32.3 percent).

As a background, 37 out of the 400 respondents were female (9.3 percent), while 90.8 percent were male. Figure 3 captures the age distribution. Over two-thirds of the *ojol* therefore are millennials and part of Generation X. They are relatively young. We crosscheck the distribution of age and education background of *ojol* and come up with Figure 4 that describes the distribution of gender in age and schooling. We find there that the younger *ojol* mostly have high school diplomas and are male; female *ojol* are typically with a high school education and

relatively older than their male peers. We then crosscheck the distribution of age, income, and sex to describe how old our female respondents are (see Figure 5).

Both male and female treat *ojol* as their main income. Surprisingly, there are many younger males that treat *ojol* as their main income. And then we crosscheck the distribution of gender by the daily hours of work (see Figure 6). There we can see that both males and females work between 10 to 12 hours or 13 to 15 hours a day, including a female who works up to 15 hours a day. We had this female interviewed. She is a single mother with three children who said she had no other options but to work at *ojol*, and she tried to enjoy it because she likes riding motorcycle anyways. Further, we also dissect the gender, the daily hours of work and whether the *ojol* consider it as their main job (Figure 7). The interesting finding is that those who treat the job as a part-time job ended up spending more hours than expected, both for males and females.

Figure 3.
Distribution of Respondents' Age




Figure 4.
Distribution of Age, Education, and Gender




Figure 5.
Distribution of Age, Gender and Whether Ojol is their Main Income
(left = full time job, right = side job, red = male, green = female)




Figure 6.
Distribution of Hours of Work per Day by Gender
(red=male, green=female)





Figure 7.
Distribution of Respondents by Gender, by Age and Type of Jobs
(Upper row=full-time job, lower row= part-time job,
first column=male, second column=female)



We find that in terms of take-home income a day, over 60 percent of the respondents bring home mostly between Rp. 80,000 to Rp. 120,000 or approximately USD5.70 to USD8.57 (40 percent), or between Rp. 121,000 to 160,000 or approximately USD8.60 to USD11.40 (27.3 percent). We got this number by calculating the difference between their total daily earning with the daily operation costs (which cover parking, meals, and gasoline). Among the respondents, 10.5 percent earn less than Rp. 80,000 and only 13 percent earn between Rp. 161,000 and Rp. 200,000. They earn this after working between 10 to 12 hours (52.3 percent), 13 to 15 hours (21 percent) per day and between 26 to 30 days (77.5 percent) or at least 21 to 25 days per month (15.5 percent) per month.

Figure 8.
Percentage distribution of respondents based on their earnings per day




Figure 9.
Percentage distribution of respondents
based on their average working hours per day





Figure 10.
Percentage distribution of respondents based on their working days per month



Case Box 1.
The Ojol's Reflection that Their Working Condition is Worsening

Case Box 1

Informant #8, Male, working for Grab since 2017

"The working condition right now, when we talk about income is different from when it was [when I first joined Grab]. I joined ojol thinking that this job is easy to do...once we register as ojol, we'd immediately get accepted and then allowed to take orders from the app. But when more drivers registered to join, the ratio between costumers to drivers become 1:20.... I notice this at the Rawa Buntu commuter line station. The number of customers at this commuter line station is constantly declining. There used to be traffic jam every morning around 10 a.m. and every evening around there, but it's so different now..."

...For me, working is a responsibility. First, it's a responsibility because the amount of payment we earn reflects the amount of our responsibility. Take it or leave it. Period. It's all following the same law. If we talk about ojol, then take it or leave it, it's all a fixed amount that you get. Applicator also have limits in what they can do. If you like it then you take it, if you don't like it then you leave it, there's still so many people that wants to work as drivers, that's how Grab think."

The take-home pay of these drivers is relatively small because they said their daily operational costs (parking, meals, gas) ranges between Rp. 41,000 and Rp. 50,000 or approximately USD2.90 to USD3.57 (37.8 percent of the respondents), between Rp. 51,000 and Rp. 60,000 or approximately USD3.60 to USD4.28 (19 percent of the respondents), or a minimal between Rp. 31,000 and Rp. 40,000 or approximately USD2.20 to USD2.85 (14 percent). This means that these drivers spend a lot of hours of work for a minimal income, between Rp. 30,000 (approximately USD2.14) if they are unlucky or a maximum of Rp. 120,000 (approximately USD8.57) on good days. We juxtapose the range of remuneration per day, the work hours per day, and whether the *ojol* is taking the job as full-time job or side job in Picture 9. In the graph, we can see that the *ojol* who take *ojol* as full-time job either spend 10 to 12 hours or 13 to 15 hours of work with a minimal rate of income (between USD5.71 and USD4.28).

Figure 11.
Distribution of Work Hours, Income per Day, and
Whether the Respondent is Treating Ojol as Full Job or Side Job





Figure 12.
Percentage distribution of respondents based on
their daily operational costs (Parking, Meals, Gas)



Case Box 2.
The Ojol's Reflection on the Incoming Orders from Platform Company

Case Box 2

Informant #4, Male, working for Gojek since 2016

"We (ojol) need to be consistent in activating our account in the application, meaning that if we turn it on at 6 a.m., we turn it on at 6 a.m. every day, that's usually how we work. We usually look for orders around the residential areas, commuter line stations, etc. Especially in the morning (when everyone starts their activities). Past 9 a.m, after all of the people arrived at their workplace, there will be usually 2-3 hours of order drop, or we called it 'netes' (drip, usually addressed to describe slow liquid drip), meaning that orders come in only one by one with a long pause in between...."


...Other than that, when we talk about looking for orders, it all comes down to the condition of our own individual account as well. If we have a-not-so-good profile because of past mistakes or complaints, such profile will affect our account's ability to reach for customers. Meanwhile, if we are diligent at looking for orders (activating account and not rejecting orders) and if the profile was good, we can gain up to 15 to 30 orders. In my context, my account is not in a good condition because I used to have a full-time job...Consequently in my account I am considered as "a not consistent driver". As the result of this, I've only had two orders today even though I've activated my account since 6 a.m. (the time of the interview was at 9 p.m.). I look for orders at Depok Baru commuter line station, and because it is currently under COVID-19 limited mobility restriction, the regulation reduces the number of customers that use ojol. I would probably end up getting only 3 orders today.... my highest income of the day would be about Rp. 80.000 (approximately USD5.71).

Another issue is on app suspension. The *ojol* whom we interviewed complained about having to bear all the consequences of app problems and the costumers' mishap that even a small mistake that caused complaints from customers would cost the *ojol* their income and work. A suspension is automatic per consumer's complaint in the app. Until the case is cleared, the driver would automatically lose the chance to earn income for the rest of the day. In the earlier days, the *ojol* recalled, they can come to customer service for clarification, which they believed is strengthening the chance that their version of the story would be understood (and forgiven) by the platform company. But now, they can only make clarifications by phone, which the *ojol* argue prolongs the uncertainty of getting back their jobs. The *ojol* feel violated by this suspension because to them they can never know when they would lose their income. One *ojol* that we interviewed said that the suspension is unfair without court ruling, not only because it is arbitrary, implemented immediately without any clarifications and understanding of what

ojol experience with the customers or the app, and most of the time the suspension does not pertain to criminal activities.

In our survey, almost four out of ten respondents (38.3 percent) have experienced having their app account suspended by the platform company, of which 78.6 percent knew why their account was suspended. Among those with suspension experience, nine out of ten (90 percent) have experienced at least one suspension in the last six months, while 10 percent have experienced two suspensions in the last six months. This shows that the probability of getting an account suspended is not that rare.

Figure 13.
Percentage of Respondents with Experience of Getting Complaints by Customers



The *ojol* activists whom we interviewed argued that they have done everything possible despite the limitations on their end to voice out their concerns to the platform companies. They mentioned sending a series of letters asking for meetings; sending letters to government officials in the Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Manpower, Police, and KPPU through their personal networks; and contacting informally government officials and parliament members seeking for suggestions and time to meet. All were in vain. They also have tried doing a series of demonstrations (see Table 5).

Table 5.
List of Demonstrations by Ojol (2015-2021)

Date	Location	Issues and demands
3 November 2015	Jalan Palmerah Selatan, Jakarta Pusat	Refusing the arbitrary fare decline from Rp. 4,000 to Rp. 3,000 per km without informing the drivers prior

16 November 2015	Gojek headquarter in Kemang, Jakarta Selatan	Gojek violating Law No. 13/2003 on employment, demanding <i>ojol</i> be taken as employees, accusing that the deposit of Rp. 40,000 - 100,000 is a fraud
August 2016	Gojek headquarter in Kemang, Jakarta Selatan	Protesting the policy of giving a bonus based on star performance
3 October 2016	Gojek headquarter in Kemang, Jakarta Selatan	Protesting the performance-based evaluation that disadvantage <i>ojol</i>
27 June 2017	Maspion Plaza, Jakarta Utara	Demanding incentives and complained about account suspension
3 and 4 July 2017	Lippo Building Kuningan, Jakarta Pusat	Complained about the problem in cashing the incentives of working during Eid-al-Fitr where a driver may earn up to Rp. 10 million, demand to revoke regulations that disadvantage drivers, and reject arbitrary suspension
23 November 2017	Ministry of Transportation & Istana Negara, Jakarta Pusat	Demanding the government to acknowledge the legal standing of <i>ojol</i> as a profession
18 August 2018	Gelora Bung Karno Stadium, Jakarta Pusat	Demanding for fare rate to return to Rp. 3,000/km from the current Rp. 1,200-1,600/km. The demonstration was aborted because of the call to support the opening of the Asian Games 2018 hosted by Indonesia in the stadium.
19 September 2018	The demonstration started in front of Grab office at Bendungan Hilir, and then moved to the headquarter of Grab at Lippo Kuningan	Demanding a fair contract with transparent process, adjusting the fare rate according to regulation on transportation formula, and abort 20 percent fee for platform companies

30 October 2018	Grab office, Kuningan	Demanding the release of a suspended account, transparency in fee rate for drivers
5 August 2019	Jalan Pasaraya Blok M, Jakarta Selatan	Demanding the release of a suspended account and revoke such rule
15 January 2020	Gedung DPR-RI, Senayan, Jakarta Pusat	Demanding the legality of profession, for the fare rate to be evaluated, and to limit the number of <i>ojol</i> in high-density areas
19 November 2021	Kantor Pusat Gojek, Kebayoran Baru-Jakarta Selatan	Demanding clarity on the pricing of Go-Food rate
5 January 2022	Medan Merdeka Barat & in front of Istana Negara, Jakarta Pusat	Protesting the fare rate, the arbitrary suspension, and the lack of response from the government to end the polemics and uncertainty in <i>ojol</i> work

Source: processed by authors from various sources

To these *ojol*, social dialogue emerged out of three factors:

1. The absence of legal acknowledgement of the profession as public transportation service providers.
2. The growing difficulty to earn enough income per day despite the long hours of activating the app and the tough working conditions (including the lack of room to get bonus reward, the automatic suspension when facing complaints from consumers, the operational cost, and other life risks).
3. The uncertainty in the job as the platform company would automatically suspend an account and terminate a contract with *ojol* even before any communication is made by the platform company with the drivers.
4. The lack of dialogue between *ojol* and the platform company.
5. The absence of a tripartite dialogue between *ojol*, the platform company, and the government. What the government provides are ad-hoc forums to receive visits or demonstrations by *ojol*, online seminars and talks, but the follow-up is reported by *ojol* as unclear.

B. The Content: How Workers are Organised to Participate in Social Dialogue?

From our interviews, we find that there are three kinds of *ojol*. The *ojol* place themselves in the following categories:

- a. *Pahlawan keluarga* (family hero), namely *ojol* who focus on executing orders in order to provide income for the family.
- b. *Aktivis* (activist), namely *ojol* who spend some of their time to attend meetings, join seminars, learn issues in order to fight for the rights of *ojol*.
- c. *Unit Reaksi Cepat* (the fast reaction unit), namely *ojol* who spend some of their time to organise solidarity movements such as visits and provision of help (financial and non-financial) to fellow *ojol*.

To the *ojol*, to be active or not is a choice. Some joined the *Unit Reaksi Cepat* pride in their interest to help others, but they don't want to get into trouble by being activists. Those who became activists admit that they used to be activists during their student years (be it in middle or high school and in university). These activists dared to speak up. Some of them experienced contract termination due to their activism, but they persevered. Their voices were loud and strong; some are young, and some are older. They claim that "we are not stupid, we had our education, we know our rights." These activists dared to face the pressures against unionisation of *ojol* voices. We find from our informants that voicing out their rights and mobilising other *ojol* in the digital platform work is highly risky. The following is the description:

- a. "We may be hit by those who don't like what we do. They made it as if a motorcycle accident has happened, that we endanger a passenger' life and then the next day I lose my job. I had that experience...." (Informant #16, Male).
- b. "There are *cepu*, namely hitman that the [digital platform] companies hire and pay on monthly basis. They are the ones voicing messages to other *ojol* that things are just fine; they would urge others to participate in temporary fun activities such as tour, gift giving, but I know for sure the chiefs of these hitman group, or *cepu* are tasked to make sure that none of the *ojol* join any unions." (Informant #35, Male from a Trade Union Confederation).
- c. "[I suspect] there are spies in the *ojol* communities, an infiltration of digital platform companies to every attempt we do to organise these *ojol*. Somehow then our plan to demonstrate was leaked to the company and the contracts of the *ojol* involved were terminated." (Informant #27, Male from a Trade Union Confederation).

Among *ojol*, there are numerous solidarity groups that are typically formed at local levels: some by streets, others by sub-districts, and there are also those organising at district, city, and national levels. The local ones usually start as basecamps, namely the meeting spot of *ojol*. Some basecamps are better looking than others: with a space to lay down and watch TV while the *ojol* are waiting for orders, or adjacent to a small store where the waiting *ojol* can purchase meals from the locals. In some areas, communities provide this meeting spot. These are some names where the local groups join up and form alliances or platform to voice concerns in the form of demonstrations (see Table 6). We also find that some of these alliances comprise of groups with legal standing, e.g., the Seroja foundation dedicated to educating *ojol* on current issues affecting their work.

Table 6.
Alliances or Platforms to Execute Ojol Demonstrations in Indonesia

Alliance Name	Description	Activity
1. Garda (Gabungan Aksi Roda Dua)	A platform for voicing <i>ojol</i> concerns by demonstration	2018 demonstration at the presidential palace
2. Aliansi Laskar Malari	Formed after splitting from Garda, announced in January 2019.	Involvement in Regulation from Ministry of Transportation No. 12/2019
3. Forum Pengemudi Mitra Daring	Formed after splitting from Aliansi Laskar Malari, which now consists of an alliance of communities, groups of <i>ojol</i> such as Keluarga Besar Driver Jabodetabek, Go Grab Indonesia, Lintas Gajah Mada, and Patra Indonesia.	Demonstrating in Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi
4. Gerhana (Gerakan Hantam Aplikasi Nakal)	Grab office, Kuningan.	Demostrating in front of Grab office

Indeed, we find that the four trade union confederations in Indonesia (KSPSI, KASBI, KSBSI and KSPI) are paying attention to the conditions of *ojol*. Some have dedicated more resources than others. There are three areas of similarity in the views of these confederations: (a) collective bargaining and freedom to associate are critical for anyone, be it employees or partners; (b) the employment relations should be pushed by the government because a platform company, or what they call an application company, has no legal rights to determine fare rates in the transportation business; and (c) in the future, industrial relations would be more flexible and short-term, much like what we see today with the *ojol* so it is not suitable to discuss the matter from the partnership point of view.

Drawing from the *focus group discussion* and interviews, such confidence from the Confederations that *ojol* constitute an employee-employer relationship rather than a partnership is based on the following rationale: (a) fare rate is income and thus just the same as wage, (b) a digital platform simply makes the distribution of order to work easier and faster; being digital does not eliminate the fact that the digital platform companies are the ones giving the orders to the *ojol*, (c) it is not uncommon for employers to ask that the employees provide an asset to make the work possible, e.g., a motorcycle for sales workers, or a computer for accountants and administrative workers, which means that categorising *ojol* as partners because they bring along own motorcycles and pay all operational expenses to do the work remains misplaced.

In our interviews with *ojol* activists, it becomes clear that there are four factors contributing to the currently weak organising of the *ojol*:

1. **The divide of will among the ojol.** In our survey, the *ojol* are split between those who want to be partners with and those who want to be employees of the platform company: 49.5 percent hope to be employees to the company, while 50.5% hope to be partners. Judging by the follow-up in-depth interviews on the rationale behind the split of choice, we find that the *ojol* with prior experience as employees or taking *ojol* work as additional income prefer to become employees. Having a prior background on employment protection raises the chance that their understanding of employment protection would shape their views about working as *ojol*. Those wanting to be partners primarily focus on the lure of working with flexible hours where they can open the application anytime and earn more if they can.
2. **The precarity of work**, making the *ojol* pressured to focus on earning a daily income rather than organising for some purpose that remains vaguely understood by the government.
3. **The intimidation that deters these vulnerable workers to organise and raise their voices.** As mentioned above, the risk to losing their job is imminent when an *ojol* is known to participate in mobilising for a demonstration or raising their voice against the platform company. In the contract between *ojol* and the platform company, we find a clause on “persuading other drivers to conduct demonstration/sweeping/offbid/other things that may disadvantage the company and disturb public order” that is classified as violation level 5, which is the highest violation and risks automatic termination of contract for those involved.
4. **The hegemony of discourse that ojol work is a partnership** rather than explaining what facilitation is available if *ojol* is employment and if *ojol* is partnership. We find that the government officials on a personal level have difficulty explaining why *ojol* is a partnership. They cannot explain what the state would do differently to *ojol* if somehow some *ojol* agree to coming together and forming a cooperative vis-à-vis the platform company; there is no explanation on the kinds of special treatment to these *ojol* cooperatives or what the plans are if the working conditions of the *ojol* worsen because of the algorithms tailored by the platform company.

Further on partnership, we find that there is a gap between the definition of partnership and partnership as practiced by the platform companies and as understood by the *ojol*. Partnership in the dictionary means: “a formal agreement between two or more parties to handle a business or share profit”. Normatively, a partnership hinges on mutual understanding, mutual sharing, and equal standing before the law. In the national civil law (*Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata*), any formal agreement that is binding is protected by the principle of freedom to agreeing on (the content) of a contract. When the ability to question the content of an agreement is missing, one has the basis for questioning the legality of the agreement as a partnership.³¹ Future studies should investigate the contracts of Grab and Gojek to dissect the basis for insisting that the contract between *ojol* and platform company is a partnership.

³¹ Wicaksono, M.A.S. (2020). Penerapan sanksi penghentian operasioanl sementara dan putus mitra sepihak oleh PT. Gojek Indonesia ditinjau dari Pasal 1243 Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Perdata. *Uniska Law Review* vol. 1(1): 1-20.

As for the *ojol*, our survey shows that their remaining with the company has little to do with satisfaction of the fare rate or the partnership. We rank their reasons for staying with the company from the reason that the respondents agreed with the most to the lowest ones. Down the line (in yellow), we start to see a polarisation of views on the reason for staying with the company, and they are essentially tied with the questioning of partnership status with the company (if we call this relation a partnership).


Table 7.
Respondents' Reasons for Staying with the Company
(Signs of polarisation of views are highlighted in yellow)

Reasons indicated by the 400 respondents	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Neutral/ Don't know
1. I am skilled to do this work.	186	203	4	0	7
	389 agree		4 disagree		
2. I can get fast money.	74	235	50	12	29
	309 agree		62 disagree		
3. I can make it a part-time job.	80	212	62	35	11
	292 agree		97 disagree		
4. I have network that can support my work.	90	198	57	33	22
	288 agree		90 disagree		
5. I don't have other job options.	87	185	76	23	29
	272 agree		99 disagree		
6. I am happy with what I earn here.	59	169	103	22	47
	228 agree		125 disagree		
7. I feel an improvement of income from time to time.	44	167	110	41	38
	211 agree		151 disagree		
8. I get social insurance.	38	108	139	71	44
	228 agree		125 disagree		
9. My voice is heard by the company.	24	152	119	47	58
	176 agree		166 disagree		

From our survey memo, we need to note here that for the *ojol*, their understanding of being heard by the company includes having access to customer service when they have problems with the app. In other words, being heard here is not related to the contract issue.

When asked about whether *ojol* are partners to the digital platform company, an overwhelming 95 percent of the respondents said yes, but only 66.3 percent have read the contract well, while 22.5 percent did not read the contract at all and 11.3 percent were not certain what was written in the contract. Interestingly, when asked about their expectations, 49.5 percent hope to be employees to the company while 50.5 percent hope to be partners.

Figure 14.
Percentage distribution of respondents based on their expectations on work status



On social insurance, we find that both Gojek and Grab offer insurance products from private companies on top of communicating the government programme on health insurance from BPJS Kesehatan and the work accident and death insurance from BPJS Ketenagakerjaan. Gojek offers the “Gojek Swadaya” (*Self-Paid Gojek*) programme, which provides various optional social protection packages for *ojol*, from vehicle insurance (using Pasarpolis), health care (using Allianz), to financial services such as Future Savings, Siaga Savings, Umroh/Hajj Savings, Installment Service to buy phone, vehicles, or other household needs, and loans. For this Gojek works with banks and financial service such as BNI, BNI Syariah, FINDAYA and BTN. Gojek also provides discounts and vouchers that are valid in selected stores such as Telkomsel (for phone service) and Alfamart (for household products). If an *ojol* buy private health insurance from Allianz that Gojek brokers, it will cost Rp. 2,300 per day for inpatient, outpatient including surgery, and basic immunisation for parents and two kids. Meanwhile Grab offers InHealth health insurance with the payment of Rp. 6,700 per day covering life insurance, gynecologist, ear, nose and throat specialist, ophthalmologist, pediatrician, inpatient and outpatient care. However, the programme is only available to Elite+ drivers.

Both Gojek and Grab also provided some form of social assistance. Gojek deploys its social assistance under *Yayasan Anak Bangsa Bisa* (a foundation) in the form of vouchers, including COVID-19 relief programmes that has provided 2.9 million free meals in 2020. Study shows, however, that only 89 percent of drivers had received this assistance.³² Grab also provides drivers affected by COVID-19 with an assistance package valued at Rp. 3.8 million, which already includes Rp. 800,000 for PCR tests. Based on our in-depth interviews, the *ojol*

³² LD FEB UI, 2020.

don't know why some received some social assistance during the pandemic while others with similar or worse conditions did not.

**Case Box 3.
Life as a Female Ojol**

Case Box 3

Informant #9, Female, working for Grab since 2019, a single mother of three children

"I started working at 6.00 or 6.30 a.m. I work according to targets, as soon as I reach the target, then I can go home. But if we take orders for food delivery, we cannot put the exact timeframe on how many minutes or hours it takes for us to wait and deliver. It all depends on how long the waiting list is and how many drivers are up to take for the orders. What I'm sure is I started working at 6.00 to 6.30 a.m. and finished at 11.00 to 11.30 p.m. If we took 10 trips (orders from application), we can get up to Rp100,000 of income for the day. If we took 16 trips, we can get up to Rp160,000 plus Rp45,000 bonus, so the total would be Rp200,000. If we talk about income from orders, we cannot put a fixed amount on it, because it depends on the distance of the orders, and how far or how close we deliver the order also comes into consideration... There's pause between orders, and when there's a pause, I just wait. Even though sometimes, for example when it's raining, the orders would be nonstop. And that means we cannot take a rest, but that also means that we can reach the goal faster.... I am disappointed that often the applicator wouldn't listen to the driver's explanation [when my application was suspended]. I remember it was nighttime and there was pouring rain, I called customer service. I explained the situation while heavily crying, telling customer service that if my account got suspended, I couldn't work tomorrow and that meant I would have no income.... and what can I do? It was not my fault..."

Informant #33, Female, working for Grab, a single mother of one

"The income earned before and after the pandemic was really different by a mile. Now, I could only earn Rp100,000 per day. Meanwhile before the pandemic, I could earn up to Rp300.000 to Rp400,000 per day... What is unpleasant about being a female? There was an incoming order, a passenger order, I always need to ask whether it is ok that I am a female driver. I had the experience of being rejected as a female driver, he said: sorry I am looking for a male driver." And because of the cancelation from passenger, my account rate went down...."

We surveyed how many of the *ojol* are covered by the government social insurance programmes BPJS Kesehatan and BPJS Ketenagakerjaan. We found that only 85 percent of the respondents feel the need to get social insurance protection. Only 54 percent of the respondents are covered by BPJS Kesehatan, and 21.5 percent are covered by BPJS Ketenagakerjaan. Less than half of the respondents are familiar with programmes from BPJS Ketenagakerjaan (50.5 percent have heard about work accident programme, 49.5 percent have heard about death benefit programme, 58% have heard about the old-age benefit programme,

while 36.8 percent admit that they had never heard of any BPJS Ketenagakerjaan programme). Further, of those who have heard about BPJS Ketenagakerjaan programmes, only roughly half understand what the programmes do or provide.

C. The Process: How the Social Dialogue Operates and Functions

Social dialogue requires a process. It does not happen overnight, and its intensity may vary over the years. We highlight the importance of the extent to which the social partners are able to negotiate collective agreements that govern terms and conditions of employment in a social dialogue³³ because social dialogue is an important pillar of economic sustainability and sound labour market governance.³⁴ Here, pursuing social dialogue is not seen as the sole interest of business partners but also the government.

Based on the interviews with the *ojol* activists, we identify these three paths to social dialogues for *ojol* in Indonesia:

1. The partnership path, namely the view that *ojol* are expected to be partners with the digital platform companies
2. The employment path, namely the view that *ojol* are employees of the digital platform companies
3. The business competition, namely the view that there is competition between digital platform companies that put the *ojol* jobs along with its income rate, bonus, and the working condition at risk.

We find that most of the time there is a dichotomisation of social dialogue paths – partnership vs. employment – while there are gaps of state protection in either of the two. In the partnership path, there is strong rejection from *ojol* activists and the trade union confederations. The government has yet to explain how having a status as “special partnership” would help the *ojol* improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis the platform companies. There may be regulation on what comprises the fare rate for delivery service from the Ministry of Transportation, but there is no explanation of how the enforcement has been or would be done. If seen from the employment angle, there are gaps in acknowledging the vulnerability of these workers in the digital platform ecosystem. Nobody raises the fact that *ojol* do not just serve as labour power that makes sure that the mission of the platform company to link consumers with vendors succeed, but also as consumer power that makes sure that the other partners of the platform companies, such as banks, financial sector players, phone and insurance companies, are linked to a captive market: the *ojol*.

We confirm from the interviews with *ojol* activists, trade union confederations, and our very own interviews with government representatives that there is yet to be any institutionalised channel of communication for social dialogue on *ojol* in Indonesia. Two officials from the Ministry of Manpower said that the leading ministry handling *ojol* today is the Ministry of Cooperatives and Small Medium Enterprises. However, the Ministry of Cooperatives

³³ Susan Hayter & Valentina Stoevska, *Social Dialogue Indicators*, (Geneva: ILO, 2011).

³⁴ ILO, *Research Brief: Peak-level social dialogue as a governance tool during the COVID-19 pandemic*. 2020. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---dialogue/documents/briefingnote/wcms_759072.pdf

and Small Medium Enterprises denied its purported leading role, saying that *ojol* is a multi-agency engagement. Such absence of formal channel renders the efforts from *ojol*'s groups and associations futile. As an activist shared during the interview:

"On 27 March 2018, I heard that we'll get an audience with President Joko Widodo. I was surprised. I heard that from my contact at the Ministry of Transportation. So, on the agreed day we all gathered at istana negara (the presidential palace). It was around 4 p.m., and we waited until almost sunset, but nobody came to see us." (Informant #2, Male).

In terms of business competition, we explore the role of KPPU (*Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha*, or the National Commission for Monitoring Business Competition). From our interview with a KPPU official and an expert on business competition who worked at KPPU until the end of 2021, we learn that KPPU's role is at the civil law level among business units, not at individual levels. The reference to this role is Law No. 20/2008 on Micro, Small, Medium Enterprises where Large Enterprises are not allowed "to own and control" the non-large enterprises that are their partners. Because of this law, KPPU is responsible in monitoring the digital platform companies. What is being watched is the partnership, whether there's a level playing field between the large and small business entities. Practically, KPPU shared that it has been watching the digital platform companies operating the *ojol* and noted the potential to control the smaller partner through the lack of transparency in the contract. Further, the KPPU shared that the goal of such monitoring is not to punish but rather to have the platform company change its practice.

KPPU, therefore, is not engaged in any social dialogue on *ojol*. Its involvement in the *ojol* issue is for law enforcement purposes. If *ojol* drivers submit a letter and evidence of violation, and there is a testimony from a witness, from expert, and guidance for court proceedings, KPPU would follow through. If there's a meeting between *ojol* representatives and government, such as one that was organised by the Ministry of Transportation and was attended by KPPU representative, the purpose is merely to observe.

KPPU, therefore, is not using Law No. 5/1999 in its engagement of the *ojol* issue. Law No. 5/1999 is about the Prohibition of Monopoly and Unhealthy Business Competition. To the KPPU, *ojol* is about partnership in the spirit of cooperation, not competition. The KPPU acknowledges, however, that its mandate is different from a similar agency in other countries that also handles consumer grievance. The KPPU also describes that unfortunately its engagement on *ojol* issue is not equipped with financial support from the government. The KPPU authority that we interviewed admit that they have voiced this need for budgetary support several times to no avail.

The *ojol* are aware of the KPPU's stand. The response from the activist is that there is a mismatch between what the KPPU does and the *ojol* need. The *ojol* need the KPPU to ensure change in the contracts between platform companies and the *ojol*. The role of the KPPU is expected to be concrete.

5. Discussion

We can argue here that the *ojol* understand gig work as an income generation opportunity. They are not aware of the negative consequences of the work until they found no ways to improve their income with their labour. In general, *ojol* have minimal understanding of how the platform companies operate. These workers are aware, however, that *ojol* is gig work with low skill. *Ojol* look for income on a day-by-day basis; they are aware that whatever is earned today, there is no guarantee of a similar income tomorrow. This captures the precarity of work.

We can also say that what is published as public relations profiling of platform companies is often far from how the *ojol* experience it. The experience of female *ojol* is one example. We heard that female *ojol* is vulnerable to sexual harassment and thus are offered the *chance* to deliver food and documents/goods rather than passengers. In reality, delivering food may require unpredictable waiting times that reduce the chance of receiving the next order soon, and delivering documents/goods may mean delivering big and heavy documents that risk the safety of female *ojol*. Another example is the 20 percent fee that *ojol* must pay for every successful transaction. The reality is, the *ojol* do not know the fare rate of the order, or whether after going somewhere far there'd be another order coming back. All these circumstances put the *ojol* at risk of distrust of the platform and of suffering from physical exhaustion that puts their long-term health at risk.

Our survey shows that the pandemic is placing the *ojol* at a higher risk of coming home with not enough money for the day despite the long hours of work and the high operational costs. The risk of getting suspended is not getting any lower. The mechanism of suspend first and then verify puts *ojol* in *worsening* labour conditions. The *ojol* have no means to predict what's next after every order, whether a customer may give a rate or comment that risks their livelihood. Unfortunately, most *ojol* have no social protection. What the *ojol* do not realise is how they are also a market for products that the platform company thinks is needed by the capture market that is the *ojol*: the grocery store, the phone store, the insurance company, etc.

We note that it is unfortunate that under such poor conditions, the social dialogue for the Indonesian *ojol* is stalled. There is a gap between what the *ojol* communicate and need as workers and citizens and what the government understands about *ojol* and gig work.

1. The government argues that *ojol* is not an employment but a partnership despite the *ojol* reporting in dialogues that they have not been treated as partners of the digital platform companies.
2. The government insists that *ojol* are self-employed people, implying and justifying the platform company for pooling the contribution of *ojol* as non-salaried workers in national social insurance programmes (including those organised by government: the health insurance programme of BPJS Kesehatan and the work accident and death benefit programmes of BPJS Ketenagakerjaan) rather than paying the companies' share of contribution for these *ojol*. By this, the government overlooks the reality that *ojol* are central in generating and maintaining the ecosystem of sellers and buyers for the digital platform companies. The government also overlooks the reality that *ojol* are treated as a market by the

digital platform, being persuaded and convinced to buy health insurance, internet data, and staple needs from sellers with whom the digital platform has an agreement with.

3. The government aligns its response with the narratives from the digital platform companies rather than being bipartisan in the context of social dialogue. The government keeps repeating the mantra that “*ojol* is partner to the digital platform companies” and rejecting the term “employment”. This kind of binary choice overlooks the reality that the government needs to acknowledge the vulnerability of *ojol* in the ecosystem that the platform companies built and make swift actions to protect these *ojol*.
4. There is no clarity from the government on who is the leading ministry to whom *ojol* can come for exchange of information, consultation, and negotiation. In our interviews and in a public webinar that we recorded and transcribed, the Ministry of Manpower said that the Ministry of Cooperatives and Micro Small Medium Enterprise is the leading sector handling *ojol*. But upon confirmation, the Ministry of Cooperatives repeated what the *ojol* reportedly experienced, i.e., that the Ministry said that “there are multiple agencies responsible to handle *ojol*”. This kind of response suggests an absence of institutionalised channel for social dialogue for *ojol*. The unfortunate reality of this lack of ownership of social dialogue for *ojol* means that they are at risk of being ping-ponged between ministries when voicing concerns and demands. The multiple agency handling suggests an absence of institutionalised channel for social dialogue for *ojol*.

We also note the ambiguity on the regulations that protect *ojol* in the public space. The Ministry of Transportation Regulation (*Permenhub*) No. 12/2009 was aimed at ensuring safety on the use of motorcycle for public interest. There is acknowledgement of the two kinds of motorcycles being used for public interest: one that uses an online application and one that doesn't. We must note that the government is ambiguous here; it does not use the term “motorcycle as public transportation” because Law No. 22/2009 excludes motorcycle as public transportation. In the legal context of Indonesia, a ministry-level regulation cannot defy the law, which is issued by the parliament. So, the focus of the ministry regulation is on ensuring that the driver is healthy, has a permit to drive a motorcycle, complies with traffic regulations, checks the motorcycle regularly, and wears the safety attributes. The regulation mentions the “fare rate” in the application, which it says in Article 9 must be based on the calculation of the (motorcycle) usage service. However, the platform companies have never acknowledged themselves as transportation companies; so, by law they are forbidden from setting fare rates for transportation. Nevertheless, the ministerial regulation has one chapter that specifies the components for setting the fare rate, namely the direct cost (i.e., the depreciation cost of vehicle, capital interest, the driver, insurance, vehicle tax, gasoline, tyres, maintenance and reparation, the depreciation cost of cell-phone, phone minutes or internet data, and profit for [driver] partners) and the indirect cost (i.e., the fee for using the application). Further in Article 12, it is mentioned that the platform company (or, as the regulation calls it, the “application company”) must prioritise deliberation on fare rates with the stakeholders. Further, in Article 14, the regulation mentions the standard operating procedures for suspending and terminating the contract for *ojol*, stipulating that the procedure must be clear on the types of sanction, the level of sanction, the steps of sanction, and when the sanction can be revoked. It specifically

mentions that “any sanction must be deliberated with the partner”. In Article 15, it is said that the *ojol* is partner to the application company (or digital platform company).

We find a mismatch between the government saying it does not acknowledge the *ojol* as public transportation and the fact that the government is saying all things that the platform company must provide. Moreover, we find no mechanism to enforce these regulations. We noted statements in public from the Ministry of Transportation and found that what they are trying to do is simply to protect the passengers while at the same time saying that the motorcycle is too dangerous (given the risk of traffic accidents) to be acknowledged as public transportation.

Therefore, we’d report here that there’s possibly an effort by the government to legalise a deficit of decent work of *ojol* by providing the aforementioned rules and regulations that focus on the passengers or the platform companies and the government’s interest but ignoring the protection for the *ojol*. There was no doubt on the part of the government officials that we interviewed that *ojol* are self-employed individuals, giving a strong assumption that the *ojol* have the free will and equal standing with the platform company when agreeing to the contracts made by the platform company.

When we interviewed the Ministry of Manpower, there are signs that they somehow find it difficult to say that *ojol* are not employees. The Ministry of Manpower cannot deny that these *ojol* are workers, which is why they assign a sub-division on industrial dispute to handle grievances from *ojol* and tame *ojol* demonstrations. The Ministry of Manpower also mentioned that the freedom of association is the right of all workers, citing Law No. 21/2000 on trade unions as reference. They cannot explain, however, how *ojol* are supposed to form trade unions if there is a regulation that categorise these *ojol* as small-medium enterprises. The Ministry of Manpower chose to highlight its role in ensuring that the *ojol* are covered by BPJS Ketenagakerjaan programmes for work accident and death benefits. They encourage *ojol* to register as self-employed workers to BPJS Ketenagakerjaan. Based on data obtained from BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, as of 30 November 2021, there are 7,694 *ojol* from Grab and 119,258 *ojol* from Gojek participating as self-paying (non-salaried) member of BPJS Ketenagakerjaan (see Table 8).

Table 8.
The Data of Self-Paying Members of BPJS Ketenagakerjaan
(Work Accident and Death Benefit Programmes) per 30 November 2021 by Region

No.	Region	Grab	Gojek
1	Banten	329	10,095
2	Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Papua	368	5,712
3	DKI Jakarta	2,100	30,173
4	West Java	1,221	18,137
5	Central Java & Yogyakarta	2,034	12,243
6	East Java	548	19,102

7	Kalimantan	426	4,196
8	Sulawesi & Maluku	229	4,229
9	South Sumatera	78	3,355
10	North Sumatera	321	6,896
11	West Sumatera & Riau	40	5,120
Total		7,694	119,258

Source: BPJS Ketenagakerjaan


Another sign of legalising the deficit of decent work is the regulation on registration as a business unit for *ojol*. Based on the Regulation of Ministry of Transportation No. 12/2021 on Standard of Business Activity and Products of Permit based on the Risks in Transportation Sector, the *ojol* is listed in a permit for business registration: KLBI 49424 – as *ojol*, covering the business of carrying passengers on two-wheeled vehicles. There is actually a mention of KLBI 49424 – as special rent vehicle, covering vehicle renting from door to door operating within the city, from and to the airport, or other transportation spots using an application with a specified fare rate. This second KLBI category, however, does not cover taxi and *ojol*. Further legal study is needed to understand why such regulation is issued by the Ministry of Transportation whose mandate is to regulate public transportation.

It is also worthy to note that there were questions about the legal status of digital platform companies. If these platform companies are an application company, then there should be regulations by the Ministry of Information rather than from the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Cooperatives and Small Medium Enterprises.

Last, we'd like to highlight the regulatory gap that emanates from overlooking the reality that the platform companies are not doing business as usual. The platform companies are creating a market ecosystem in which the competition with other platform companies is to keep the loyalty of costumers, drivers, and partners. As described in Picture 12, a digital platform company is treating the *ojol* as both consumer power and labour power. As labour power, the *ojol* deliver passengers, food, documents as assigned by the digital platform company. As consumer power, the *ojol* are captive market for products from vendors with partnership contracts with the digital platform company. In other words, it is actually misplaced to develop a binary dichotomy debating whether the *ojol* are employees or partners because the *ojol* are both.


By issuing ambiguous protection of *ojol*, the government misses the core responsibility of the state in ensuring protection for any workers and citizens working as partners, as employees, or as business units. Picture 13 describes how *ojol* may fall under these three paths of protection and that they deserve getting special attention for they are at the lower part of the chain in each path. The state is responsible to secure jobs for citizens, to protect citizens going into legal contracts, and to provide protection as citizens (e.g., getting health and employment insurance).

Figure 15.
The Digital Platform Ecosystem



Source: authors

Figure 16.
The Core Responsibility of State for Any Path of Social Dialogue for Ojol



Source: authors

Overall, we find that the deadlock in social dialogue shows that the fate of *ojol* is at a critical juncture. There is a danger in the government discourse pushing these *ojol* into the partnership land. By doing so, the government would continue to overlook the vulnerability of the *ojol* as labour power and consumer power in the ecosystem of market that the digital platform company has created, sustains, and earns money from.

If Indonesia recognises the international norm that everyone has the right to “the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work” as recognised in the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other international and regional human rights treaties, as well as related international legal instruments, conventions, and recommendations of the International Labour Organization (ILO), then the stalled social dialogue would serve as an alarm that *ojol* is being legalised into deficit of decent work. Decent work is relevant here because it is anchored in income and social security, non-discrimination principle for humane working conditions, for a balanced framework for productive workplace relations, for dialogues between workers and the ones responsible for assigning work to these workers.

6. Conclusion

This research maps the discourse of work in the platform economy while also identifying the enabling environment for improving the well-being of gig workers, including ways of organising them. We find that by pushing the social dialogues into the partnership path, the government is helping legalise a deficit of decent work by creating regulations that are ambiguous and insensitive to what the *ojol* have been voicing.

Several questions may be asked as a reflection. Since the digital platform companies are entering into the workspace of informal sector workers who are typically low-income, low-skilled, and vulnerable, what kinds of protection mechanism is in place so that instead of raising the vulnerability of these individuals, the work created is improving the dignity of these individuals? Have we overlooked the social cost of digital platform companies for the lower income families: their health cost (communicable and non-communicable disease), the risk of injuries given work accidents, the risk of death, the risk to children being left unsupervised by parents working long hours as *ojol*, etc. The socioeconomic status of these workers are poor or near-poor, which means that measures must be taken to anticipate them falling into poverty or deeper poverty given the work that they think would feed their families.

We recommend the improvement of the stalled social dialogue. To improve the social dialogues between government, platform companies, and *ojol*, decent work should be in the mindset of government. It is important not to overlook the different nature of business that the digital platform companies are engaged in. These companies are building ecosystems of markets. These ecosystems are competing. The *ojol* are playing several roles in supporting the ecosystem, both as labour power and consumer power. And because *ojol* have no control over the contract they agree with the platform company and have little room to maneuver given the precarity of work, it is the responsibility of the government to remain bipartisan in the social dialogues on *ojol*. At the end of the day, we shall not forget that platform companies are invading the workspace of low-income workers whose lives used to depend on genuine one-on-one negotiation between customer and workers. It will become unfair to place the burden of organising the interests of *ojols* without seeing of their limited resources and capability to defend their workspace.

Appendix 1. The Structured Survey Questions

Criteria of Respondents:

- 1) Officially registered as an online ride-hailing driver, whether as a person, food, or package delivery driver. Example: Grab and Gojek drivers.
- 2) Have worked as an online ride-hailing driver for a minimum of six months.
- 3) Domiciled in Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi.

Make sure the situation when collecting information is safe and conducive for respondents (i.e. not noisy, intimidating, crowded, etc.).

Enumerator in charge

- Raffa
- Yusi
- Catherine
- Dicky

Letter of Agreement

Dear Sir/Madam,

We humbly request for 12-15 minutes of your time to ask several questions in regards to your duration of work, working hours, wage, working conditions, and rights to social protection as long of your profession as a driver or courier in the online economy.

We are from Synergy Policies, a consulting of research and training firm in Jakarta, that is currently researching about the online economy working model of online ride-hailing drivers. I, (*enumerator name*), will assist to fill your answers into our online survey pages. For more information on our institute, please visit Synergypolicies.com. The team in charge of this research possess a long track record in the political-economy and social protection issues, namely Mrs. Dinna Prapto Raharja (PIC), Mr. Fransiskus Joyoadisumarta, and Mr. Timboel Siregar.

Please answer honestly in accordance to what you experience. Should there be any questions you do not wish to answer, please inform us. If there is anything unclear, please let us know.

After you have finished filling the questionnaire completely and validly, we will provide each respondent with IDR 50,000 e-wallet balance as a token of gratitude for participating in our survey. The e-wallet balance will be transferred once the head of research team confirms the survey completion. Should there be any reason our team deems the answers provided as invalid (for example, answering inconsistently or "I don't know" many times), then we have the right to end the survey and as a result, the survey is considered null.

We will maintain the confidentiality of your name and other information on your identity. Phone number will be required to transfer the e-wallet balance.

Should you have any question, please reach our head of research team, Assoc. Prof. Dinna Prapto Raharja, Ph.D through WhatsApp (+62 877 7*** ****). Thank you for your willingness to fill this questionnaire.

Best regards,
Researcher

4) Has the information on the study been read out to you?

- Yes
- No

5) Are you willing to fill this questionnaire?

- Yes
- No

6) Interview start time (*example: 8:30 AM*)

7) Location of interview (*example: Phone/online, in front of Pondok Cina Station, Margo City Foodcourt, at the sideroad of Margonda Street, etc.*)

Section 1: Respondent Demography

1.1. Nickname of respondent

1.2. Gender

- Male
- Female
- Prefer not to answer

1.3. Year of birth

1.4. Regency/City of domicile

- Bekasi Regency
- Bogor Regency
- Bekasi City
- Bogor City
- Depok City
- Administrative City of West Jakarta
- Administrative City of Central Jakarta
- Administrative City of South Jakarta
- Administrative City of East Jakarta
- Administrative City of North Jakarta
- Tangerang City

South Tangerang City

1.5. Latest Education

- Primary School (SD)
- Middle School (SMP)
- High School/Vocational High School (SMA/SMK)
- Diploma 3 (D3)
- University

1.6. Which company do you currently work at?

- Grab
- Gojek

1.7. How long have you been working as a ride-hailing driver/courier in online economy?

- 6 months-1 year
- 1-2 years
- 3-4 years
- 4-5 years
- More than 5 years

1.8. Is this profession your main job or side job?

- Main job
- Side job

1.9. Rank the type of job you take in your platform from the most to the least often.

	1	2	3
Ride-hailing driver (GoRide, GrabBike)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Food delivery courier (GoFood, GrabFood)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Package delivery courier (GoSend, GrabExpress)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

1.10. Please state your degree of agreement related to whether the following statements influence your willingness to continue working at this place/company. (Scale 1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral/ Don't Know	Agree	Strongly Agree
I do not have any other job options	<input type="radio"/>				
I can earn money quickly in this place	<input type="radio"/>				

I am satisfied with my income as a driver in this place	<input type="radio"/>				
I can make this job as a side job	<input type="radio"/>				
I already have a network to support my work	<input type="radio"/>				
I am already skilled to work in this place	<input type="radio"/>				
I feel improvement of salary from time to time	<input type="radio"/>				
I receive social protection/security in this place (health insurance, work protection, life insurance, old age protection)	<input type="radio"/>				
I feel my opinions are heard by the company I'm working for	<input type="radio"/>				

1.11. Have you previously worked in another platform provider company?

- Yes
- No

1.12. Are you also currently working in another platform provider company?

- Yes
- No

1.13. What is your current driver reputation/rating?

- Under 4.00
- 4.00-4.29
- 4.30-4.59
- 4.60-4.89
- 4.90-5.00

1.14. Do you have another skill that can generate income other than driving motorcycle?
(example: Marketing, Sales, Cashier, Gadget service, etc.)

- Yes
- No

Section 2: Experience During Work

2.1. Has your driver account in the application ever been suspended?

- Yes
 No

2.2. If yes, do you know the reason behind your driver account's suspension?

- Yes
 No

2.3. If yes, how many times have you been suspended in the past six months?

- 1 time
 2 times
 3 times
 More than 3 times

2.4. Have you ever been complained by a customer?

- Yes
 No

2.5. Have you ever participated in a drivers solidarity group? (example: Barikade Gojek, Solidaritas Gojek, GARDA, etc.)

- Yes
 No

2.6. Have you ever participated in voicing the interests of DRIVERS to the GOVERNMENT?

- Yes
 No

2.7. Have you ever participated in voicing the interests of DRIVERS to the PLATFORM PROVIDER COMPANY?

- Yes
 No

Section 3: Wage, Bonus, and Aid Program for Drivers

3.1. Please state your satisfaction related to the working condition in your current company:

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral/ Don't Know	Agree	Strongly Agree
I am satisfied with the base fare/service fee rate in this company	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

I am satisfied with the bonus system in this company	<input type="radio"/>				
I am satisfied with the social aid I received from the company	<input type="radio"/>				
I am satisfied with the fare adjustment in this company	<input type="radio"/>				

Section 4: Social Protection/Security

Social security is an insurance taken to avoid the loss of income due to ailment/work accident/death/old age either provided by the government (BPJS Kesehatan, etc.) or by private company (Allianz, BCA, InHealth, etc.).

4.1. Do you feel the need to subscribe for a social protection/security program?

- Yes
- No

4.2. Does your company cover your private health insurance program expenses?

- Yes
- No

4.3. Does your company cover your private work accident and life insurance program expenses?

- Yes
- No

4.4. Are you currently active as a participant of the Social Security Administrator for Health (BPJS Kesehatan) program?

- Yes
- No

4.5. Have you ever heard of the Working Accident Protection (JKK), Death Protection (JKM), and Old Age Protection (JHT) programs from the Employees Social Security System (BPJS Ketenagakerjaan)? (check all that apply)

- I have heard of the JKK program
- I have heard of the JKM program
- I have heard of the JHT program
- I have never heard any of the programs

4.6. Do you understand the benefits of the JKK, JKM, and JHT programs from the Employees Social Security System (BPJS Ketenagakerjaan)? (check all that apply)

- I understand the benefits of the JKK program
- I understand the benefits of the JKM program
- I understand the benefits of the JHT program
- I do not understand the benefits of any of the programs

4.7. Are you currently active as a participant of the Employees Social Security System (BPJS Ketenagakerjaan) program?

- Yes
- No

Section 5: Working Condition

5.1. How much is your average earnings per day as a driver in your current company?

- < IDR 80,000 per day
- IDR 80,000-120,000 per day
- IDR 121,000-160,000 per day
- IDR 161,000-200,000 per day
- IDR 201,000-240,000 per day

5.2. How much is the average working days per month as a driver?

- Less than 5 days per month
- 6-10 days per month
- 11-15 days per month
- 16-20 days per month
- 21-25 days per month
- 26-30 days per month

5.3. In one week, how often do you reach the maximum daily incentive?

- 0-1 time
- 2-3 times
- 4-5 times
- 6-7 times
- I do not aim for daily incentive

5.4. How much is your operational costs per day as a driver? (*example: meal, gas, parking fee, cigarette. Enumerator can help the driver to calculate their daily operational cost*)

- < IDR 20,000 per day
- IDR 21,000-30,000 per day
- IDR 31,000-40,000 per day
- IDR 41,000-50,000 per day
- IDR 51,000-60,000 per day
- > IDR 60,000 per day

5.5. How much is your duration of work per day as a driver?

- Less than 4 hours
- 4-6 hours
- 7-9 hours
- 10-12 hours
- 13-15 hours
- More than 15 hours

Section 6: Partnership

6.1 Please state your degree of agreement related to the meaning of “becoming a partner to the company.” (Scale 1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree)

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral/ Don't Know	Agree	Strongly Agree
I work flexibly: can determine my own working hour, can work just as a side job	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I can accept or reject the orders I take	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I only get paid according to the jobs I complete (per order or per delivery)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am not a full-time/permanent employee in this company: not paid monthly, do not have base salary, working relation is short-term	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have an equal position with my job provider: can express opinion and be listened to regarding the rate of fare/service fee per order, can express opinion and be listened to regarding the working condition	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I am involved in the decision-making process of job provider: have right to speak, get informed before fare/bonus adjustments	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

6.2. In working as a driver, which employment status do you prefer?

- Worker/employee
- Partner

6.3. Do you consider yourself as a partner of the company?

- Yes
- No

6.4. Do you thoroughly read the Terms & Conditions/Contract/Partnership Agreement given by the company?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe

Token of Gratitude

After you have finished filling the questionnaire completely and validly, we will provide each respondent with IDR 50,000 e-wallet balance as a token of gratitude for participating in our survey.

The e-wallet balance will be transferred once the head of research team confirms the survey completion. Should there be any reason our team deems the answers provided as invalid (for example, answering inconsistently or “I don’t know” many times), then we have the right to end the survey and as a result, the survey is considered null.

We will maintain the confidentiality of your name and other information on your identity. Phone number will be required to transfer the e-wallet balance.

Phone Number

E-wallet for Token of Gratitude

- GoPay
- OVO
- DANA
- ShopeePay
- Phone Credit
- Bank Transfer

If the phone number used for the transfer is different from the one written above, please write the phone number below. If you choose the bank transfer option, please write your Bank Account details below.

Appendix 2. The Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Ojol

- 1) Has your driver account in the application ever been suspended? If yes, do you know the reason behind your driver account's suspension?
- 2) Have you ever participated in voicing the interests of Drivers to the Government/Platform Provider Company? Could you tell us more about the group and the aspirations?
- 3) Does your company cover your public or private health insurance/work accident/life insurance program expenses? There is an expectation from the government that drivers use the scheme of self-sponsored insurance at BPJS Kesehatan and BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, what's your view on this?
- 4) How much is your average earnings per day as a driver in your current company? Are you satisfied with the fare adjustments made by your company from time to time? Why?
- 5) As a driver, what is your average working hours per day and working days per month? What do you think about this working condition.
- 6) Do you currently consider yourself as a partner of the company? If you can choose, would you prefer an employment status as a "worker/employee" or a "partner" in working as a driver? Why?

Appendix 3. The Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Government Representatives

1) We discovered that online drivers are not included in the category of 'manpower' as termed in the Manpower Law, which was confirmed by the Ministry of Manpower. On the other side, online drivers are categorised under 'partnership' work while in fact, some drivers do not feel they are partners to the platform company. Based on this, we would like to learn more about how is the working relation between the online driver and their platform from the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs' partnership perspective.

2) We discovered that online drivers are at risk from loss of income as a result of price rivalry (or a 'fare war') between platform companies. Based on this, we would like to learn more about how the Business Competition Supervisory Commission views the development of job sectors created by the digital labour platform.

3) We discovered that online drivers work with limited flexibility of time, long working hours (with average of over 10-12 hours, with some even reaching 15 hours), uncertain earnings, and lack of sufficient social security protections. These workers are hesitant to afford social security programs independently. Based on this, we would like to learn more about how the Ministry of Transportation takes income fulfillment and adequate working condition into consideration.

Appendix 4. The Semi-Structured Interview Questions for Platform Company

- 1) What are the advantages of partnership that platform company provides to its online drivers? (for example in terms of fare pricing, working condition, training, joint decisionmaking, etc.)
- 2) What pattern of partnership model does platform company aim for?
- 3) We discovered that there is a price rivalry (or a “fare war”) between online ride-hailing platform providers. Can you share with us how is the internal process in platform company in addressing this kind of price rivalry between online ride-hailing platform providers?
- 4) We discovered that there existed instances of communication between online ride-hailing platform providers with government institutions, such as the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Manpower. Can you inform us what is the perspective of government regarding their ideal form of partnership model?
- 5) We discovered that there were instances of communication between online ride-hailing platform providers with representative of online ride-hailing drivers. Can you inform us what is the perspective of drivers when communicating with the platform company?

Appendix 5. The Guiding Questions for Focus Group Discussion/Interview with Trade Union Confederations

- 1) What is the stand point of your Confederation on *ojol* as gig work? (pay rate, social protection, working condition, collective bargaining, and freedom of association). Is this employment, partnership, or something else?
- 2) Has there been attempts to reach out to *ojol* and their activists? What have you learned about the organizing of *ojol* in Indonesia?
- 3) What is your observation on social dialogue for *ojol* in Indonesia?
- 4) What are the consequences of these debates and concerns regarding the relations between government and non-government stakeholders on gig work in Indonesia?

Appendix 6. The Non-Responding Informants

1. Platform company: GOJEK

[5/12/2021]	Synergy Policies' Communication Officer contacted Jabodetabek Manager of GOJEK, attaching the invitation letter & explanation message through WhatsApp messenger. At the same day, he replied saying that he would discuss the invitation with Corporate Affairs Team of GOJEK that able to answer the issues delivered in the invitation letter.
[7/12/2021]	Synergy Policies' Communication Officer followed up the WhatsApp message to confirm about the availability of GOJEK to attend the discussion via Zoom. But no respond from the Jabodetabek Manager.
[9/12/2021]	Synergy Policies' Communication Officer once again followed up the WhatsApp message to confirm about the availability of GOJEK, this time while also attaching the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the discussion, but still no respond from the Jabodetabek Manager.
[7/1/2022]	Synergy Policies' Executive Director contacted Chief of Public Policy & Government Relations of GOJEK to re-send the invitation and was told to send the invitation via email to publicrelations@gojek.com . Synergy Policies' Communication Officer emailed the invitation letter & ToR at the same day. But no respond to the message until now.

2. Platform company: GRAB

[5/12/2021]	Synergy Policies' Communication Officer contacted Public Relation Officer of GRAB, attaching the invitation letter & explanation message through WhatsApp messenger. At the same day, she replied that she would discuss the invitation with the Public Affair Team of GRAB and ask if we could send the invitation via email. Synergy Policies' Communication Officer emailed the invitation letter the next day.
[6/12/2021] until [22/12/2021]	Public Affairs, Policy, and Social Impact Officer of Grab responded to the invitation saying that they are unavailable to attend the discussion because they were busy at the end of the year and asked for ToR & questions list. Synergy Policies' Communication Officer emailed the ToR & questions list asked but no following respond from GRAB.
[5/1/2022] and [7/1/2022]	Synergy Policies' Communication Officer followed up the conversation via email to confirm about the availability of GRAB to attend the discussion via Zoom. But no respond from the Public Affairs, Policy, and Social Impact Officer of Grab.

[18/1/2022]	Public Affairs, Policy, and Social Impact Officer of Grab responded to the email saying they weren't able to reply because they were busy meeting deadlines at the beginning of the year. She asked if we're still interested to have discussion with GRAB. At the same day Synergy Policies' Communication Officer replied to the message, proposing the date of the discussion. But no respond to the email until now.
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3. Government: Ministry of Transportation of The Republic of Indonesia

[6/1/2022]	Synergy Policies' Program Officer emailed the invitation letter addressed to the Minister of Transportation. To make sure the letter was received, Synergy Policies' Communication Officer mailed the printed version of the invitation to the Ministry of Transportation headquarter.
[10/1/2022]	Ministry of Transportation Secretariat contacted Synergy Policies' Communication Officer via WhatsApp messenger to confirm availability after rescheduling the time of the discussion.
[11/1/2022] the scheduled day of the discussion	Secretary of the Minister of Transportation called the Synergy Policies' Communication Officer to ask about the questions will be asked in the discussion, because the Minister of Transportation is with her and wants to know about the questions. Within 15 minutes, Synergy Policies' Communication Officer sent the questions list via WhatsApp messenger, and was immediately told that the Director General of Land Transportation will be attending the discussion an hour late from the earlier rescheduled time. Researchers wait for an hour in the Zoom Meeting to then be told that the Director General of Land Transportation would not going to be attending the discussion. Synergy Policies' Communication Officer then asked the Secretary of Director General of Land Transportation & Public Relation Officer of Ministry of Transportation to write the answer of the questions list sent earlier. They said yes, will be answered soon.
[20/1/2022]	Synergy Policies' Communication Officer followed up the WhatsApp message with the Secretary of Director General of Land Transportation about the questions list, he said will be answered, but no answer received until now.