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Nukes prevent great power war in multiple hotspots

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This paper started by presenting an overview of the concept of nuclear deterrence. The paucity of empirical and measurable data, and the inability of testing deterrence, means deterrence theory is frankly speaking, of a speculative nature. As a consequence, it has to rely on logical arguments and a coherent framework. By and large, effective deterrence depends on credibility and capability. The enemy must believe that the threat made by the deterrer is credible, and that the deterrer is capable of executing the threat. **The logic behind deterrence is sound.**

Even when faced with a challenge such as the notion that different countries have a different image of rationality and might assess threats differently, deterrence theory appears to be solid. It supersedes cultural and national differences because it appeals to basic instincts like fear and survival.

In the debate section we addressed some critiques of nuclear deterrence. Firstly, Wilson’s claim that nuclear deterrence is ineffective for deterrence purposes; and secondly the use of conventional deterrence as an alternative to nuclear deterrence. Wilson’s claim that deterrence does not work is based on faulty reasoning and erroneously equating deterrence with compellence. Moreover, he ignores the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons and the lack of credible defensive measures against such weapons. As a result, Wilson’s arguments do not support his original claim.

An additional issue that we addressed in the debate section was directed at proponents of nuclear abolitionists. If we eliminate all nuclear weapons, and by extension nuclear deterrence, on what alternative can we rely to provide security and stability? The only possible alternative would be conventional deterrence. However, conventional deterrence is unlikely to be sufficient unless it is incredibly strong. This would require an exorbitant amount of military spending; a burden few countries can carry. In contrast, **a small nuclear deterrent enables smaller**

countries to deter larger and more powerful countries. Moreover, it can do it at a relatively small cost. Conventional deterrence will also face more problems with respect to the cost-benefit analysis. Countries are prone to making overestimations and miscalculations in their cost-benefit analysis. Facing a conventional deterrent, they might still think that they have a reasonable chance of success in achieving their goal and that they can achieve that goal swiftly.

Nuclear weapons offer almost absolute clarity in the cost-benefit analysis. The immediate prospect for utter destruction leaves no room for miscalculations. Accordingly, **it will be much more effective in avoiding large-scale conventional wars**. While conventional deterrence may

be more appropriate for lower levels of conflict, it is not a viable alternative for deterring large conventional wars.

Our case study section started off with Russian-American/NATO case. **Despite** deteriorating relations and **a tenser environment**, **deterrence is very likely to ensure stability**. Thanks to nuclear sharing and a comprehensive multilateral alliance, Russia will refrain from belligerent activities against a NATO state. Nuclear deterrence will force both parties to behave cautiously. Because of the danger of escalation, limited conflict also seems unlikely to break out. Nevertheless, both parties should be mindful of encroachments on each other's sphere of influence and the possibility of accidents happening during moments of heightened tension.

The Sino-American extended deterrence case is more complex. Unlike the first case, this region has a higher probability of conflict due to territorial disputes over island in the SCS and ECS. Extended deterrence is also less credible in this case because of the absence of nuclear sharing and a multilateral alliance framework. Moreover, China's power is growing at fast pace. Nonetheless, we argue that China will most likely be deterred from resorting to high levels of violence. Howbeit, it will not be deterred solely by virtue of nuclear deterrence. Instead, deterring China requires a mix of both extended conventional and extended nuclear deterrence, so that escalation dominance can be maintained at any level. Yet as China will continue to grow, the US' extended deterrence will become less credible, unless The US will bolster its security guarantees by building an alliance framework comparable to that of NATO in Europe. If it fails to do so, countries in China's vicinity might proliferate themselves. This would result in even more hands on more nuclear triggers.

The Indo-Pakistani case is the most intense of the three case studies. The region is rife with border conflicts and Pakistan's revisionist tendencies and use of sub-conventional tactics form a constant threat. Despite all these gloomy indicators **neither India nor Pakistan have used nuclear weapons** or escalated conflicts into full blown wars. Up until now, **the region has seen a considerably high degree of nuclear stability**. Be that as it may, it is questionable how long India will stand for Pakistani belligerence. Pakistan's asymmetric escalation posture has been able to prevent Indian conventional counterattacks to date, but if it continues to launch sub-conventional attacks the situation might escalate. Furthermore, India has gradually moved away from its unequivocal no-firstuse doctrine. **Despite increasing tensions, we argue that nuclear**

deterrence is likely to provide stability. Additionally, the Indo-Pakistani case is subject to third-party intervention which further decreases the likelihood of escalation. **In the absence**

of nuclear deterrence, it would also be more likely that limited conflicts escalate into large-scale wars.

Ultimately, the question boils down to this: would the world be a safer place without nuclear weapons? It is completely understandable that people consider these weapons to be morally abhorrent. Yet from a strategic perspective, this paper argues that nuclear deterrence provides a high degree of stability. It is likely that **in the absence of nuclear deterrence, the world**

would see more great power wars

. For the moment,

there seems to be no viable

alternative to nuclear deterrence

. That being said, nuclear deterrence does require constant vigilance in order to prevent accidents. Additionally, countries should increase the role of diplomatic dialogue and mediation. But if that fails, nuclear deterrence will act as the ultimate guarantor of security and stability.

Conventional wars cause extinction

Dvorsky 12 [George, Chair of the Board for the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies]

"Could nuclear disarmament actually increase our chance of an apocalypse?,"

<https://io9.gizmodo.com/could-nuclear-disarmament-actually-increase-our-chance-5969204> 12-18-2012 RE

It needs to be said, therefore, that the absence of nuclear weapons would dramatically increase the likelihood of conventional wars re-emerging as military possibilities. And given the catastrophic power of today's weapons, including the introduction of robotics, weaponized nanotechnology, and AI on the battlefield, the results could be devastating. As we recently argued, a World War III fought with conventional weapons represents and existential threat.

CP Text: All states with the exception of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

No solvency deficits—Noko's rational

Beauchamp 17 Zack Beauchamp [Zack Beauchamp is a senior correspondent at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on foreign policy and international relations. His work focuses on the rise of the populist right across the West, the role of identity in American politics, and how fringe ideologies shape the mainstream. Before coming to Vox, he edited TP Ideas, a section of Think Progress devoted to the ideas shaping our political world. He has an MSc from the London School of Economics in International Relations], 9-8-2017, "The case for letting North Korea keep its nukes," Vox, <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/9/8/16256880/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-test-containment> // ash

Give deterrence a chance

The most fundamentally important fact about North Korea's nuclear program is that it is born out of fear — fear, specifically, of the United States.

The Korean War began in 1950 when North Korea invaded the South and nearly conquered all of it. The only reason it didn't was intervention by a US led-coalition, which in turn nearly took the entire North, stopped only by a Chinese counterintervention. After the war ended in an armistice in 1953, the US pledged to defend South Korea against future attack and left thousands of US troops deployed there — a constant reminder to Pyongyang that the world's strongest military power was its enemy.

Put another way, North Korea's entire foreign policy and national identity has evolved around the threat of war with America. As a result, they've always been trying to improve their military capabilities in order to deter the US from invading.

"They're hyper-focused on our military and what we can do," explains Dave Kang, the director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California.

The nuclear program, which began in the 1950s, was designed to be the ultimate answer to this problem. The thinking among three generations of Kims was that if North Korea had nuclear weapons, they could inflict unacceptable costs on the US if it were to invade the North.

Nuclear weapons, in other words, would be the ultimate deterrent against regime change.

This explains why North Korea has invested so many resources, and been willing to accept crushing international sanctions, in order to develop a nuclear bomb and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that could hit the US mainland.

"There's pretty broad agreement that Kim Jong Un wants a nuclear arsenal, including a nuclear-armed ICBM that could put cities and targets in the United States at risk, to deter an attack and

to ensure survival and prevent regime change,” says Kingston Reif, the director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association.

What this brief history suggests is that North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear missiles is fundamentally rational. North Korea is not a suicidal state; there is no evidence that it wants to blow up an American city and invite regime-ending retaliation. Its goal, according to every piece of evidence we have, is the opposite: to avoid war at all costs.

Nukes prevent bioweapon acquisition

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Finally, we turn to estimating the effect of both nuclear and chemical weapons pursuit and acquisition on the risk of initiating biological weapons pursuit in models 5 and 6. These results are equally interesting because they provide support for the notion that biological weapons (in addition to chemical weapons) can also be appropriately considered a “poor man’s nuclear bomb.” Similar to the

impact of possessing nuclear weapons on the probability a state pursues chemical weapons, nuclear weapons possession has a strong negative effect on biological weapons pursuit in both models 5 and 6. After

holding the underlying level of demand constant in model 6, simply possessing a nuclear weapon appears to decrease the instantaneous risk that a state will pursue biological weapons to virtually zero

(1.44×10^{-7}). This is consistent with the understanding of nuclear weapons as so powerful that they make the possession of other types of WMDs less relevant. Even before countries such as the United States abandoned their chemical weapons programs, for example, they abandoned their biological weapons program. The United States eliminated its offensive BW program under a Nixon administration order in 1969 and had shut down the program by the time it signed the BWC in 1972. France and Great Britain similarly eliminated their offensive BW programs. Russia stands in stark contrast to this argument, however. Evidence revealed after the cold war demonstrated that the Soviet Union maintained a vibrant offensive BW program at the Biopreparat complex through the end of the cold war. This demonstrates that grouping CBWs into a single category may not accurately represent the way countries actually think about them. Biological weapons, given their greater theoretical destructive capacity, may be considered somewhat differently. This is a potential path for future research.

North Korean CBW capability and use is uniquely likely

Kazianis, MLA in IR at Harvard, ’19 (Harry J., Senior Director of Korean Studies at the Center for the National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/us-invasion-north-korea-would-be-opening-gates-hell-57377>, May 13) BW

Would the Trump administration actually consider invading North Korea? First of all, it goes without saying I hope this never happens. However, **history tells us we must plan for the**

worst. So what would military action against the DPRK look like? While there are no certainties in modern warfare, one thing is certain: an attack on North Korea to rid the world of what can only be described as the most vile regime on the planet could be an unmitigated disaster. As I explained in a debate for the Week in 2014, there is four reasons a regime-change-style invasion of North Korea would be insane. First, Kim has likely read a history book in the last twenty years: Suppose Washington did decide to dispose of the evil thugs in Pyongyang. How would it proceed? It would start by heavily bolstering the amount of military assets within striking distance of North Korea. This would involve bringing in multiple aircraft carrier battle groups, increasing the number of troops in South Korea for a ground invasion, moving in large amounts of land-based aircraft, and boosting missile defenses in South Korea, Japan, and allied bases. In many respects, the U.S. would be dusting off an integral component of the 1991 Gulf War playbook — build a large attack force that can overwhelm the enemy. Simple, right? The problem is that such a **massive military mobilization can't be hidden.** North Korea would

instantly realize what was up. **Pyongyang would** certainly **have a** **clear incentive to strike hard**

and fast knowing it constituted its best chance for survival. Here we see the great folly of Saddam Hussein: allowing coalition forces to build one of the world's most powerful fighting forces on his doorstep. Kim would realize his best chance — maybe his only chance — would be to strike with everything in his arsenal at the first sign of a build-up. Second, North Korea would have every reason to launch a nuclear war: Why would a nation with less wealth than Ethiopia put billions of dollars into acquiring nuclear weapons? The answer is simple: to ensure that anyone considering imposing regime change won't take the risk. If Washington ever decided it was time to take the regime down, what reason would Pyongyang have from holding back? None. While there is debate whether Kim's missiles have the range or accuracy to hit the continental U.S., it does seem likely they could hit Seoul or Tokyo — one hell of an atomic parting gift. Kim knows all too well he would never be able to defeat an allied invasion — he may just decide to take as many souls down with him as possible. Third, **Kim might unleash**

his other weapons of mass destruction we all forget about: In a **2012 report on North Korea's military, the U.S. Department of Defense** noted that "North Korea probably has had a **longstanding chemical weapons** (CW) **program with the capability to produce nerve, blister, blood, and choking agents and likely possesses a CW stockpile.** North Korea probably

could employ CW agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles." Some reports estimate that the regime could possess **as much as 5,000 metric tons** of chemical weapons. While opinions vary regarding North Korea's biological weapons capabilities, the same report sees such a program as a strong possibility, noting,

"North Korea continues to research bacterial and viral biological agents that could support an offensive biological weapons program. Infrastructure, combined with its weapons industry, gives North Korea a potentially robust biological warfare capability." Imagining a nightmare scenario involving even a small cache of chemical or biological weapons is not hard. A handful of such weapons launched at Seoul could create a panic not seen since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. Even just one attack with such fearsome weapons on a civilian target must be avoided.

That causes extinction

Millett & Snyder-Beattie '17. Millett, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford; and Snyder-Beattie, M.S., Director of Research, Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford. 08-01-2017. "Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity," Health Security, 15(4), PubMed

In the decades to come, advanced bioweapons could threaten human existence. Although the probability of human extinction from bioweapons may be low, the expected value of reducing the risk could still be large, since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future generations. We provide an overview of biotechnological extinction risk, make some rough initial estimates for how severe the risks might be, and compare the cost-effectiveness of reducing these extinction-level risks with existing biosecurity work. We find that reducing human extinction risk can be more cost-effective than reducing smaller-scale risks, even when using conservative estimates. This suggests that the risks are not low enough to ignore and that more ought to be done to prevent the worst-case scenarios. How worthwhile is it spending resources to study and mitigate the chance of human extinction from biological risks? The risks of such a catastrophe are presumably low, so a skeptic might argue that addressing such risks would be a waste of scarce resources. In this article, we investigate this position using a cost-effectiveness approach and ultimately conclude that the expected value of reducing these risks is large, especially since such risks jeopardize the existence of all future human lives. Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death

tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,¹ while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.² The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,³ while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world's population at the time.⁴ It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote

populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity's favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.^{5,6} While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule out the possibility entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.^{7,8} There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and the Western Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population).⁹ In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,¹⁰ and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.^{11,12} Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.¹³⁻¹⁷ Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.¹⁸ In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.¹⁹⁻²¹ Although these experiments had scientific merit and were not conducted with malicious intent, their implications are still worrying. This is especially true given that there is also a long historical track record of state-run bioweapon research applying cutting-edge science and technology to design agents not previously seen in

nature. The Soviet bioweapons program developed agents with traits such as enhanced virulence, resistance to therapies, greater environmental resilience, increased difficulty to diagnose or treat, and which caused unexpected disease presentations and outcomes.²² Delivery capabilities have also been subject to the cutting edge of technical development, with Canadian, US, and UK bioweapon efforts playing a critical role in developing the discipline of aerobiology.^{23,24} While there is no evidence of state-run bioweapons programs directly attempting to develop or deploy bioweapons that would pose an existential risk, the logic of deterrence and mutually assured destruction could create such incentives in more unstable political environments or following a breakdown of the Biological Weapons Convention.²⁵ The possibility of a war between great powers could also increase the pressure to use such weapons—during the World Wars, bioweapons were used across multiple continents, with Germany targeting animals in WWI,²⁶ and Japan using plague to cause an epidemic in China during WWII.²⁷