



Prospectus

DRAWN TO LIFE: *towards common craft*

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PROLEGOMENA

Too many academic essays begin by thanking contributors rather than thanking recipients. I do not want to ignore the help I have received thus far. But I choose to thank you at this point. Thank you for your patience, your understanding, and your willingness to read. There are a couple of things I wanted to mention here at the start. First, please know that I know how sweeping and abstract my claims can be. I also know that this is typical of “green” graduate students. But I also want to point out that in this case it is purposeful. I am casting a wide net in order to whittle to a fine point. A simple point. Drawing is critical to making just as making is critical to living. Second, I have adopted an unusual format. One of my central ideas is that drawing is itself an operation of two-ness. A line constituted one side and another. It constitutes their connection and their separation. I have organized my writing by giving each idea two sides. Recto, the top or front side of the page, foregrounds the mechanics. Meanwhile, the verso turns the page over to present the conceptual framing on the back side. I hope it can help retain the two-ness, connectivity, and friendship at work in thought.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. R. ...". The signature is stylized and cursive, with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

ABSTRACT

My research pivots on questions about the nature of making, its importance to all of life, and the challenges it faces in the age of the anthropocene. In the last century, both industry and academia have filtered making through the conceptual rubric of writing. Methodologically, I use systematic combining to investigate the problems that belie this model and offer drawing as a counter-thesis. My central claim is that while writing is committed to a principle immensurability drawing is grounded in touch—both theoretically and operationally. I use phenomenology to recover drawing as a mode of ontological sharing and tactile making. Next, I turn to architecture—where drawing and making are directly aligned—to test this theory of drawing. Finally, I circle back to the questions of making in the modern world and sketch out new horizons for digital media.

1.1 RECTO: MAKING AND LIVING

- 1.1.1 Making is inextricably tied to living. From a daily perspective, their connection underlies an unarticulated sense that we are always “making” something (e.g. time, love, friends, or even room). Their link is even more apparent in the all-pervasive question: “how do you plan to make a living?” It is notable that this economic demand does more than solidify the bond of making and living. It testifies to their universal scope and significance. It brings together the seemingly unrelated lives of the academic, the entrepreneur, the day-worker, the wage-laborer, the parent, and even the child. But making is more than a fiscal rubric that organizes daily life. “Making a living” reaches beyond merely making money. Various academic disciplines corroborate this claim and even go further by placing making at life's core. For example, anthropologists have long investigated the relationship between civilization and the development of tools.¹ It seems that we humans are alive because we made our way in this world, so to speak. Lest we assume that making is only a human endeavor, disciplines that focus on non-human interactions also note that “making” is critical to the emergence of organic and cybernetic forms². In addition to these, history and sociology testify to the ongoing development of the pair.³ So the story goes: tooling gave way to craft, craft transformed into fabrication, and fabrication has evolved into constructing and collecting information. Altogether, both our

daily routines and our disciplinary research confirm a simple truth: as life goes on—in whatever form—making persists. Making is integral to life not only because it is pervasive throughout but because it binds life together.

1.1.2 Nevertheless, the integrity of life and making has been deeply ruptured in the age of the anthropocene. The anthropocene is a geological designation for an age—our age— in which humans have chief influence on the earth and its inhabitants⁴. That influence has compromised living and making in two specific ways—climate crisis and class conflict. In anthropocenic terms, living and making are at risk because human dominance has led to a decaying earth (climate) and human subjugation (class). On the one hand, the consequences of the climate crisis on making and living are almost self-evident. Forms of making like industrial drilling and clearing, agribusiness techniques, and even building digital infrastructure strain the earth and threaten its viability. Meanwhile, the effects of class on our pair are less conspicuous but no less critical. Class stratifies lives—humans and their resources—and thus compartmentalizes making. Making had historically been an exercise common to all. But when it became commodified as labor and productivity only certain people would retain the privilege of making⁵. Under the aegis of class, some humans work and some humans earn but only a few engineers and artistic geniuses make. And while few make even fewer have lives that are better than all the rest. In the anthropocene, climate and class may orbit living and making but they benefit neither.

1.1.3 By fracturing living and making, the climate crisis and class conflict foster a destructive feedback loop. As making threatens life in ecological destruction, we become more selective about the makers and back our way into classism. To put it simply, we try to preserve life by elevating certain makers and marginalizing others. On the other end of that spectrum, so long as our personal efforts to make feel futile we resign ourselves to imposed class limits and maintain inequality. That surrender turns us towards the comfort of industrial goods and services offered by those at the top. This sequence reinforces the destructive forms of making that harm the earth. The solution to one threat always seems to put us into the vicinity of the other problem. Beyond its obvious threat to survival, the anthropocene ruptures and reconfigures the bond between living and making into this internecine destruction.

1.1.4 The incoherent strategies of the anthropocene have even matriculated into our day-to-day commercial way of life and amplified doubts about our intentions and capacity to make. While we keep on making amidst these crises, we carry forward the fragmentary approach of the anthropocene by further differentiating making according to scale. On the one hand, making is grandiose, collective, and remote. It is the purview of entrepreneurs,

- 1.1.5 companies, and nation-states. Making becomes suspect at this scale because we are constantly confronted with the consequences of corporate making. In lockstep with the climate crisis above, this scale has produced—and continues to produce—an almost uninhabitable world. We make bombs. We make prisons. We make waste. We make war. Such large scale products configure and compromise small scale life. On the other hand—perhaps in light of these “big” dangers—making is taken to be very small, personal, and strictly practical. Both scholars and laypersons largely reduce the general notion of making to specific art practices or shrink it to fit into other fields. For example, making might be limited to the technics of painting or treated as a constituent feature of economics. At this scale, making becomes an inert side effect of other material processes. This parallels the consequences of class noted above. Both scales intend to energize and preserve making in the anthropocene but actually enervate it. In this fragmentary mode, making either becomes so big and unwieldy that only a few skilled actors have access to it; too constrained to effect change; or is inevitably destructive.
- 1.1.6 Curiously, these dangerous factors and fragmentary strategies have not suppressed our desire to make. Commercial control and ecological consequence notwithstanding, we keep finding new forms of creativity. In defiance of our fears, uncertainties, and social states, we keep trying to make a difference, make a mark, make something out of ourselves, or at least make ourselves heard. It would be negligent and irresponsible to not inquire into this paradox. What accounts for this inconsistency? Why do we make when we know the disaster or despair that awaits? What accounts for our oft-unrequited desire to make?
- 1.1.7 Anthropology outlines a possible answer. It begins by calling the received paradigm of making into question. The British cultural anthropologist Tim Ingold presents making as a perceptive and participatory mode of living rather than a mode of production⁶. In this way, making is not an aspect but the very means of living. In an unadulterated state, humans do not make things in order to sell them. We make things in order to navigate and locate ourselves in space and time. Our creativity gives shape and measure to the world around us and provides a way to interact with it. This framework challenges the presupposition that making is an action taken by a powerful agent over and against a material plane. Neither is it for the purpose of acquisition. For Ingold, making is a cooperative event. It is a way of “inter-twining,” “corresponding with,” or meeting any “body”—human or otherwise⁷. It is a befriending that remains buried—but active—even within the commercial model noted above. When we speak, make films, build cars, or construct homes we are negotiating with space, time, form and bodies through a kind of call and response. To extend the bodily analogy, making is an outstretched arm, a welcoming embrace, or joining hands. These meet-

ings that Ingold is calling making endure as constructed habits and habitats wherein bodies share⁸. Without this coordinating gesture, human making would run headlong into solipsism and self-destruction. Andre Leroi-Gourhan, the French anthropologist, offers a seminal instance of this perceptive and participatory approach to making⁹. Humans had a long-standing perceptive relationship with space and time when we crawled along the surface of the earth with our hands. By standing upright, perhaps our first creative act, we transformed our dimensional perception and extended our life through those same hands. We developed a new relationship with the earth and its inhabitants. After we set our newly liberated hands to making, our correspondence and consultation with reality grew exponentially. That is until our industrious efforts reversed the primacy of perception¹⁰. Formerly, any transactional form of making was only a residual artifact of a perceptive operation. When industry promised power through separation and the consolidation of wealth, transactional making took precedence. Now, the tail wags the dog. This has had consequence for perception. As indicated in the problems above, when we only take making to be a function of acquisition, then our perceptive lives become disoriented and even destructive.

1.2

VERSO: SURFACE AND AGENT

1.2.1

It would be understandable to despair in the face of such complexity. These conditions can make our compulsion to make feel futile, dangerous, or perhaps nostalgic and antiquated. But the problems of making have an unintended, but fortuitous, consequence. When they align, they help us recover and crystallize the critical elements which are common to all forms of making. When all of the fault lines rub together, two elements emerge. Surface and agent appear as the irreducible components of any making. To begin with, the surface is a key feature because making is an interaction¹¹. Making is a transformation. And transformations and interactions take place at the boundary of one thing or on the border of another. These boundaries and borders are present even amidst infinitesimal interactions. For example, if making happens within an object, it is because that object has internal “parts,” and those parts converge on one another. Those parts—to be a part at all and not the whole is to—have an edge¹². But just as surface is established as critical for making, in this very way, it implies agency. It raises the questions of what or who is acting at this intersection? These two features always cooperate in the event of making. They are present in industry, art, virtual planes, and more. Their ubiquity affords new analyses and new answers for the questions facing making.

- 1.2.2 Identifying surface and agent has a twofold benefit. First, they give us reference points to navigate the sea of uncertainty and confusion that currently underlie theories of making. To wit, the former anthropocenic difficulties can be read, processed, and addressed precisely as crises of surface and agent. Ecological plights can be read through the surface. The surface can designate both the earth's crust or the interactions occurring at the edge of molecules. In accordance with the abstract description given earlier, this surface is an edge, the threshold, or limits where any two material or immaterial things interact. So, climate problems, human illness, and even agriculture can be studied as modalities of surface. But surface also implicates agency. Something or someone is acting on that surface whether an industry producing waste, a day laborer consuming material goods, a particle bearing on another, or a mind painting the local landscape. Likewise, class conflict can be evaluated by the same pair of surface and agent. In our current system, access to materials is restricted by capital flows. Classifications delimit agency in two inversely proportionate ways. For one, it controls the amount of making surfaces available to agents. But it also identifies those restricted agents by their surfaces. Groups that are often marginalized are typically associated with a certain history or ideology. But an invisible ideology or history is manifested on the surface in colored or wrinkled skin or as genitalia. Those bodies—as micro-surfaces themselves—are estranged from the material surfaces of making. To conjecture further, these marginalized agents are the same people who inherit the ecological waste of the chosen and privileged makers. It is a dizzying feedback loop. But in spite of this complexity, surface and agent help us navigate and chart a correction course.
- 1.2.3 The second, and most important benefit, of surface and agent is that they provide the raw materials for recovering a theory of making that is generalizable, unifying, and invigorating. Dare we ask: could we reverse these flows precisely by leveraging surface and agent? Could they open the possibility of a making that nourishes the ground, heralds pigment, and can maintain purposeful agency and distinction without terminating in a power relation?
- 1.2.4 My research takes up this very challenge. I want to recover a theoretical model of making that restores surface and agent and revives the mutual beneficence of living and making. To do so, I let the more general issues of life and making act as the atmosphere for a more nuanced investigation into surface and agent. To effect a reversal, it is not enough to meander around in the consequences of a broken theory of making. Climate and class, though provisional, should recede in the face of more acute examinations. I must home in on the pivot, the fulcrum, the turning point of making. I want to go to the ground and root out the specific problems and possibilities that contour making. I want to understand how the current trajectories and

difficulties are entangled in a specific, and quasi-unified, theory. To locate this theory, I examine how surface and making are configured within the current matrix of making and living.

1.2.5

Upon close analysis, I submit that they are arranged according to a specific philosophical model that can best be described as writing¹³. Directly or indirectly, writing is taken as the exemplary model of making. This does not mean every act of creativity includes a pen, keyboard or dictation device. It means that writing provides the conceptual umbrella for modern making. While it has been the explicit creative concern for the academy over the last century, it is not only an academic or esoteric assumption. Writing also underlies the authorial attitudes that inform industrial and personal forms of making. If we had the space to read this observation back into the descriptions above, we would see authority embedded in the “makings” that contribute to climate and class conflicts. Therefore, the crux of my analysis turns on the philosophical principles of writing that arrange surface and agent.

And yet, my research would be of little consequence if it only put forward subtle alterations to remote philosophical systems. If making is to turn towards life both conceptually and existentially, I must identify the material corollary of my philosophical transformations. I am obligated to find a practice, an operation, or an instrument for making that will bring it back to life, so to speak. Therefore, I propose drawing as remedy. My thesis is not a simple counter-thesis or foil to writing. Rather, drawing can engage, encapsulate, or exceed writing. Drawing restores writing as a mode of intercourse rather than discourse, of connection rather than control, of touch rather than trauma. Drawing’s value is not limited to its juxtapositions with writing. It fulfills and exceeds all of the criteria noted above (surface, agent, life, making, etc.). Like writing, drawing can be both a concept and operation. It is both descriptive model and prescriptive instrument. It gives conceptual clarity to the made while also providing procedural guidance for making. In sum, drawing is the sine qua non of making and living.

2.1 RECTO: ECRITURE

2.1.1

Over the last century, academia has understood living, making, surface, and agent through the lens of writing¹⁴. Writing is not just a manual operation but is a theoretical model for all creativity. It arranges living and making into a certain kind of relation by conceiving of surfaces and agents in specific and paradigmatic ways. As a result—or even as a root—writing conceptually sustains the fragmentary approach to making outlined above. But how did

we get here? And what makes writing so ubiquitous as a conceptual mode of making?

The linguistic turn

2.1.2 Writing did not set out to be a preeminent craft. It did not arrive as some kind of sinister disruptor lurking in the depths of thought. Writing has clearly been part of human history, communication, and thought for quite some time. But writing—taken as a comprehensive model for making—only emerges at the tail end of a linguistic transformation within philosophy, art, and even the sciences.¹⁵ Up to the turn of the 20th century, metaphysics was still operative in most conceptual fields. For example, science studied cause; philosophers, meaning; and artists, nature. These were investigations through or beyond the empirical. Undoubtedly some practitioners and theorists were shifting away from this approach but it was not until the early part of the 20th century when language would supplant a focus on substance, form, or essence. Instead of passing through the medium of language to understand permanent properties, the academy turned its attention to the medium itself. This shift did not only emphasize the importance of words but initiated a rethinking of how language operated in itself. In the foregoing metaphysical framework, words simply carried given essence or meaning to and fro. But, in the budding linguistic era, language itself would come under question. Language would be a field, a network, an appearing of meaning. After this, for an artist, intellectual, or scientist to ask about the “nature” of something was to ask about its linguistic form and usage within a horizon of words, texts, and compositions.

2.1.3 Both continental and analytic trends in philosophy found their language gurus during this time. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s shift from a logical approach to meaning and on to linguistic ones is the most notable.¹⁶ Continental strands also saw a linguistic re-focusing in the phenomenological tradition. Phenomenology served as a critical segue from substance to syntax specifically because phenomenologists wanted to investigate the nature of objects from-or-within the consciousness of subjects. The threshold between subjects and objects, in that phenomenological sense, turned out to be linguistic. This emphasis continued in the well-known work of Martin Heidegger and Hans Georg Gadamer.¹⁷ There are countless figures on both sides who took up the mantle of language in hopes of securing meaning and understanding in a world mediated by the word. But one development, structuralism, distinguished itself. Beyond the seemingly strict subjectivity of phenomenology, structuralists were in search of the full network of meaning in which any subject always already operates. The subject appeared to be an emerging constituent of the linguistic matrix rather than its

author, so to speak. Structuralists embraced the linguistic matrix of the world but extended it beyond subjective concerns and in turn hoped to map it.¹⁸ The combined effect of this shift was to no longer think of making in material or mechanical ways but to approach it as a hermeneutical exercise. Under this new structuralist umbrella, when an agent was making something, they were approaching an astral network of linguistic possibilities. The subject is part of something larger and that something was language. The maker became an interpreter more so than a craftsman.

Post structuralism

- 2.1.4 The structuralist approach laid the groundwork for its own critique (or culmination depending on perspective). Jacques Derrida famously pointed out the instability and undecidability of this newfound linguistic network.¹⁹ If every word was part of an unfolding and seemingly interminable web of linguistic signs then every word displaces itself with every other word. This word is always that word because we cannot understand this one without that one. A word is never what it is in front of me. It is never what I even intend it to mean—phenomenologically or colloquially. The post-structuralists, then, were moving from the “subject” of phenomenology, through the matrix of the structuralist, and onto the phenomenon itself. It was no longer enough to celebrate the expanse and pliability of words. According to this shift, the phenomenon of language itself may have been pervasive but it was intractable and never fully present.²⁰ We could only chase language’s traces but never tame it.

Maurice Blanchot

- 2.1.5 Jacques Derrida may be the most well-known proponent of this attitude but its seeds appear a decade earlier in the work of Maurice Blanchot. Blanchot took up the popular French question: what is literature?²¹ He sought to establish an account of language and literature that could emerge from the pen of a human agent without being restricted by it as a form of external control. If language was indeed language without needing definable structure or defining agent, then Blanchot’s account of literature and its corollary, language, should avoid boundaries at all costs.
- 2.1.6 Specifically, Blanchot is not just interested in what language is but how it gets here or there. Despite its undecipherable force we seem to be using it and this suggests it also has an overwhelming nearness. His approach, then, can be characterized as a question of finitude and limits. He does not only want to know how to erase the boundaries which we have used to contain language but he wants to know where the edge of the subject, author, or

speaker lies. This immediately implicates writing. Writing starts. It ends. It evokes meaning and relies on linguistic formation. But language is without bounds and is ineffably other. So Blanchot wonders, can capacious and boundless writing occur if there are conditions of meaning or even authorial intent? Or, put differently, if the writer has edges and writing doesn't how does the written (literature) ever come to be? He concludes that writing could not be, in itself, directly present in or as any life.²² Writing was an opening that permitted limits to emerge but it itself was not subject to them. Writing is a disaster, an interruption, solitude, or space.²³ That is, writing is not the act of an authorial presence or purpose. Writing had to be in excess of itself in many respects. It gives the edge but is not edged so to speak. It must exist beyond the confines of the author and the full collection of his/her intents, wants, and parameters. But it must also be nearby in order to be an enabler. So, the natural question was: how then does a finite and limited agent ever even encounter this vast openness and indeterminacy? How does writing even happen? Blanchot's system needed a mode of writing that looked like a perpetual emptying into writing's excess. In a word, writing only occurs when an agent encounters his/her dying.²⁴ The issue of death will be taken up again by Derrida.

2.1.7 For my own conjectures, there are a few critical philosophical tendencies operative in Blanchot's account of writing. First, as making passes through this linguistic turn, and manifests itself in this model of writing, it is becoming increasingly remote and indiscernible. Like the hermeneutic attitude of both phenomenologists and structuralists that came before, the post-structuralist account of making-*cum*-writing that Blanchot endorses has a passive mood to it. Writing is reception. Second, Blanchot links a localized and material practice with these penetrating abstractions.²⁵ These ideas about writing were, for him, not distant or remote conditions. After all, that would undermine his own caution about transcendent principles. Rather, by attending to the specific limits of writing (death), he was suggesting that authentic writing was itself a transgression of those limits (again, death), and that transgression was perpetually occurring in localized and material writing events (what he called dying). This notion of limits and perpetual transgression will become critical for a forthcoming analysis of surface. In my terms, Blanchot was searching for the surface of writing and posited an agency that either retreated from that surface or pierced it. That agent could not act at or with that surface. The agent could only approach it. Either relation to the surface could be characterized as death.

2.1.8 Despite Blanchot's poetic abstractions about dying, solitude, and space, his account of making-*cum*-writing remains within the material atmosphere of living and making. Later in his career, he went on to discuss the implications of finitude, limit, and death in the construction of communities at large. If

2.1.9 writing should have no unifying force then people, their labour, and their connections should not either. His rejection of linguistic structuralism and phenomenological subjectivity as overarching principles would be cross-applied to political connection. A community can only form around the singular events of recognizing one another's otherness. Any total explanation for communities would be the erasure of authenticity in living.²⁶ Consequently, for Blanchot, just as perpetual dying informs writing it should also underwrite living and communal belonging.

2.1.10 As dying, this living community could never be named *per se*. Blanchot's unavowable account was clearly a response to Jean-Luc Nancy's own take on this notion of community.²⁷ Nancy's work offers an account of unity that avoided totality while nevertheless coordinating. Nancy agreed with Blanchot that a community could not have a ruling or transcendental principle, but objected to Blanchot's absence of connection. Blanchot would continue to demur and reaffirm his position that community should not be constrained transcendently or interstitially; it is a dying space. Meanwhile, Nancy maintained that community could have connective tissue. That connective tissue was itself a principle of *withness* where edges of touch both separated and joined any multiplicity. Contra Blanchot, community was for Nancy a singular-plural. This debate over multiplicity and unity will return later in my phenomenological advocacy for an edge or surface that is shared. For now, this short detour highlights the way that living, making, surface and agent coexist in both incorporeal and corporeal reflections on making. Ultimately, for Blanchot, both community and discreet artifact are "made" through this conception of death and through its premier practice: writing.

Jacques Derrida

2.1.11 Just a decade after many of Blanchot's publications, Jacques Derrida would expand, exploit, or explain some of his insights regarding the edge. While Blanchot took up the abstract questions of spatial openings for writing, Derrida narrowed that question into an issue of origination. A limit was not only something waiting as an end but was already a formal feature of any beginning. Making assumes a ground, in this sense. And a ground is a surface. Specifically, this meant that language was always a decision—or more accurately, an incision—applied to language's ineffable undecidability.²⁸ Writing was itself a cut in the uncuttable provisions of that excess. To start was to put flesh on a ghost. So writing always starts and never starts because the undecidability remains. This is evident in every word, every meaning, even sense of presence. When we decide on here, this, we do so by summoning there, that, and you. We may assume to be speaking from a present surface but we are actually drifting to other into other semantic

worlds. This dizzying condition problematizes all beginnings and origins. It has especial significance for any account of making.

2.1.12 Derrida shared Blanchot's conviction about an excess that is in-finite.²⁹ Whereas Blanchot speculated about the disasters and solitary moments within our life that might open that excess which lies before, behind, with, and beyond our writing, Derrida's distinction lies in his reversed perspective. We do not require a disaster. Excess is already here and its boundary confronts us. He saw that same edge and threshold from within language. In fact, this is what makes writing what it is. Writing is both an internal witness to that edge and the facilitator of that edge.³⁰ In my terms, our pen and speech are always "making" and relocating the surface. Writing is undoing itself by making surfaces where there aren't any. This nature can be witnessed in each word. A word reaches beyond itself at every position. As it approaches the "limits" of meaning, it recedes from—or exceeds—that edged enclosure because it points away to other words for meaning. What, for Blanchot, becomes visible in the dying horizon of solitude, for Derrida, resides in the very words of the writing themselves. This deconstructive force leaves traces to be discovered or followed by readers but never strictly repeated or even fully understood in a nominative way.

2.1.13 These explorations may seem indirect or abstruse at best. But Derrida's own work points the issue of instability back to the anthropological and the political. For him, writing did not arise from, nor did it directly target, concerns about death and community. Rather, they begin in attempt to secure presence in social language. The bedrock of Derrida's critique of speech lies in Plato's famous critique of writing in Phaedrus³¹. There, the Socratic character bemoans the invention of writing as something that will corrupt memory and displace authority because writing will no longer have its voice present. Writing, for Plato, will defer and delay what should have been present and timely in orality and speech. Derrida overturns this by showing those delays and deferrals which lie at the heart of even vocal utterances. Therefore, our daily acts—contracts, statements about love, celebrations about friendship, et al.—delude us into thinking there is strict symmetry between what we say and what we mean. We mistakenly assume that meaning is present.³² For Derrida, it is not. We can anecdotally confirm Derrida's point when our lover does not seem to sense the same loving presence in our verbal declarations that we take to be given. We notice it when our artwork is taken to mean something completely at odds with our intent. This lack of presence is the very nature of authorship as such. Writing is the first witness to this absence and thus is the most real form of communication. Writing's undecidability and deconstructability informs the very phenomenon of speech which it is assumed to follow.

- 2.1.14 Even though his interest was more narrowly focused on the internal features of a text, Derrida's categories displayed further resonance with Blanchot's notion of dying as a writing's critical edge and excess. Though writing evinced a kind of deconstructed trend in all of life, for Derrida, there remained a horizon of undeconstructability.³³ In other words, writing offered no lower limit of presence or singular meaning but it was conditioned by limit nonetheless. Derrida's own account of linguistic instability conjured this far realm and often depicted it as a ghostly haunting. Messianism was also a motif used to describe this unapproachable beyond. Ghosts, death, and messiahs are figures of (or they secure) the limit, the edge, and the final.³⁴
- 2.1.15 Derrida's work is vast, complex, and challenging. But his ongoing interest in origins and positions has profound implication for making. To begin with, we can substitute the word making for the term origination. Then, more specifically, we can see that this undecidability has direct impact on both surface and agent. In simplest terms, making struggles to get off the ground when there is no ground. Origination is bound to the issues of edge. Questions of origin are ineluctably tied to questions of starting points and surfaces. Like Blanchot before, Derrida affirms that the limits and excesses that writing evokes and evades provide for the very deconstructed instability of language at every moment.³⁵ But, though this lurking excess and beyond is nearby and provisional for writing it is also never quite present amongst it. It is a surface that itself never surfaces. This also destabilizes the subject as an inherited and assumed basic limit. The presumably lower limit of the self, subject, or agent has no beginning even in its internal life. Origination, or making, is extremely hard to locate without the skin of a subject or the ground of an object. If there is an original—undeconstructable—horizon, then we only approach it and never arrive or set out from it. As we proceed to the edge, the written emerges and differentiable textuality proliferates. Thus, making *cum* writing is always uncertain while supposedly fecund. This not only challenges our simplistic notions of making but further confirms the importance of agency and limit—or in my terms, a surface.
- 2.1.16 These models of writing have implications not only for what we have been making but also what we will make. That is, most of making does not occur on anvils or even in factories but on screens. The model of writing as making has passed virtually uninterrupted into the digital era. In fact, some scholars and theorists uphold the digital as the final corrective to the problems presented above.³⁶ The logic goes: class conflict can be re-written in digital ethnographies and climate crises can be assuage by less material consumption and more digital networks. Coding, programming, and digital creativity tools, according to this logic, announce the triumph of writing.

- 2.2.1 Before I exposit the impact of writing on making, I want to return to the impetus of the study. Simply put: how am I, we, or you going to make a living given that we can barely live with what we are making? To redraw my research diagram, I began by focusing the difficulties of modern life into two categories: climate and class problems. I configured them as issues of making and examined the implicit daily strategy of scaling up or scaling down making. These axes gave us insight in making's internal components: surface and agent. I then show how the modern theory of making is attributable to language and specifically the formations of writing. Now, these features of making do not only appear in writing as if epiphenomenal. They are writing's fundamental elements. The issue of making, in this case manifested as writing, has been framed as matters of life, death, surface, and agent. They all align in writing. And writing, has been treated as an image of life and a matter of community construction. What is more, that freedom of life and death that was and is writing was always in relation to some kind of limit. That limit may have been a transcendental principle, an economic pressure, an other, or even a personal focus. The edge, the limit, the surface always provided the framework for writing's excess. And we have arrived at the most difficult question. So what? What's the problem with writing? Hasn't it worked? I appeal directly to the anthropocene and answer resoundingly: no, it has not.
- 2.2.2 But this does not explain what it is about writing that is so objectionable. The questions raised by climate crises and class conflict still demand a hearing and a solution. How then, does this account of writing have any effect on my daily experience? What does writing have to with me making a treehouse or fixing my car? How does it correspond to the kind of making that is destroying the world but looks nothing like pen and paper? How do esoteric conversations locked away in restricted journals and academic wine parties have any efficacy for our lived problems?
- 2.2.3 This is a perfectly fair series of questions. They are my founding concerns. They are not a "gotcha" moment. These are the precise questions which initiated and now guides my research. In a manner of speaking, the very existence of the questions are their answer: writing does not have much relevance. The reason that this account of writing feels removed from daily life is precisely because it is. But this admission does not alter my study. It confirms it. It is supremely important to me that those who feel this irrelevance and alienation not dismiss my research simply because I also resonate with their instincts. I want to show that this instinct has in fact been

formed by writing and not in spite of it. The distance, death, undecidability at work in writing has bifurcated reality, induced a creative retreat, and aroused a kind of malaise. We can only see the force, effects, and weakness of writing by looking closely at it. Under such an inspection, I will propose a model of making that “comes up to the surface” (rather than just being a commentary on that hypothetical and idealized edge). To find that, I must show that writing has done just the opposite. It has buried itself in obscurity while maintaining conceptual priority over our forms of making.

2.2.4

So where did writing go wrong? As I intimated, writing’s distance from daily life begins in the elevation of language. Writing’s vulnerability starts when it accepts language both as total and fragile. Language joins us to the world when it is passively present but when it appears to us we become increasingly skeptical about our ability to wield it. When it becomes a subject of analytical scrutiny we sense a gap of understanding emerging between us and other language-users. That rift creates problems. This concern is not entirely unfounded. Many have leveraged word, presence, and written code as a way to “classify” human subjects, validate contractual obligations to exploit the soil, or to brandish power in a courtroom. These types of linguistic abuses run in the background of Blanchot and Derrida’s accounts of writing. By describing the solitude and undecidability of writing, Derrida and Blanchot hoped to give conceptual currency to a kind of making that was not hostile, presumptuous, and pure presence. In other words, writing vacated the power assumed in language. But, while these obscure and profound accounts of writing may have elided key dangers, they also fragmented agency and surface along the way. So much so that writing cannot provide its own corrective.

2.2.5

Writing’s fragmentary drift derives from a fundamental premise at work in both Derrida and Blanchot’s account. The cornerstone of fragmented philosophies of writing is quite simply the principle of incommensurability.³⁷ Unlike non-contradiction, this principle allows any two things to cohere, coexist, or converge but never to contact each other. This underlies writing as both excessive dying and as undecidable. Because writing is edged, surfaced, and limited it is always next to a “something else.” But whether on one side of the edge of that something else or the other, there is no contact or crossing. Writing can haunt or herald its other but never hold it. In Blanchot our writing may be summoned outside by dying but we never die. We never touch the boundary. For Derrida, *differance* is the nature of undecidability in every moment of language so while we can grope and grasp, we cannot touch, caress, or embrace that which “gives.” The social and human consequences are explicit in Blanchot. A community defined by writing’s excessive principle is bound by an interstitial distance. This grants the appearance of a Levinasian other but it prohibits engagement. Derrida’s

own social reflections leave us perplexed about the consequences of undecidability. If we can never touch and engage this or that then how do we ever distinguish gift and threat, love and hate, or oppression and support? Incommensurability is isolating and idiotic.

2.2.6 This principle of incommensurability requires close scrutiny. It is deep in the DNA of this kind of writing. As a result, it is the fundamental focus of my research. It explains why we cannot cross over into other things. It explains why we are uncertain about our relationship with matter. It explains why writing's abstractions and speculations feel irrelevant. It explains why our efforts to make are reduced to the fluidity of capital. We cannot cross over but money can. It explains why we sense daily limits to our own efforts at making. In our experience we adopt limits and even celebrate divisions. In our understanding, we have unwittingly canonized incommensurability. Why? Why adopt a system that estranges and solidifies impotence? Existentially we hold to this to avoid conflict. Philosophically, we sustain it to avoid conceptual violations that would corroborate or encourage those same existential ones. This reality, of mutually estranged elements, is a sign that we have not abandoned metaphysical categories of substance and essence despite our best efforts. Whether we seek a deep philosophical principle or attest to a zone of undeconstructability, we are still seduced by the promise of a pure and perfect substance. Substances which can pervade and approximate but, once again, never interact.

2.2.7 The problem of incommensurability extends into the digital sphere. Digitality itself is a way of thinking and not merely a form of technology. Digits are discriminated identities. Our fingers, the precursor and namesake of the era, are digits and as such separate and sort. They visually keep things apart by pointing and counting. In the realm of code and programming, this is formalized in the binary numerical system.³⁸ One and zero ensconce the notion of writing as approaching and never terminating at a limit, edge, or surface. It is not incidental or supplemental fact that coding and programming are themselves continuations of writing.

2.2.8 Writing and coding's commitment to incommensurability cannot abate these problems of violence, climate crisis, or class conflict; it aggravates them at a distance. I want to enter into this failure and take up the heretical ideas of antinomy, binaries, and twoness and rework them to recover a way forward in making a new life. If we are going to make and live, we must be able to cross into, share, join, touch, and even become the other. Making must always allow an agent to touch at a surface and to be touched back. This kind of making will never be singular. Because it exists at and with the surface, it is irreducible twofold. Making is twoché.³⁹ The practical burden is to provide a tool and operation, proportionate to writing, that can coordinate

living and making along the axes of surface and agent without repeating the fragmentary swerve of writing. If this tool is to be unifying then it must not leave writing behind. It must address and even reconfigure it. I will show that such a tool is always and already available in drawing. Drawing can propitiate for writing's woes and revive making at all levels.

3.1 RECTO: THEORY GENERATION AND UNITY


3.1.1 I propose a method of study that structurally corresponds to my conjecture about the value of drawing as a synthesizing and constructive practice. Throughout the dissertation, I am trying to unseat writing's commitment to incommensurability and to advocate for a corrective connection. It stands to reason that the form of my study should reflect that trajectory. My methodology should "draw things together." Therefore, it needs to accomplish two things. First, it should unify. Second, it should create. Standard research logics do not quite hit this mark. They often trend in the opposite direction.

Standard research approaches

3.1.2 Most research methods derive from deduction and induction and their force lies in their ability to fragment. With respect to my first need, unity, they are not convergent per se. Deduction whittles ideas as they move downward from a general rule to a specific result. Inversely, induction collects the scraps of various results and arranges them side by side in hopes of establishing an aggregate. Either approach alone would at best risk missing the holistic importance of living and making. At worst, they could annul my claim that when it comes to making things, everything touches everything else. When induction and deduction are taken alone, they divide and conquer.

3.1.3 Whenever they do align they operate in a reciprocity where one method will depend on features from the other. Deduction, for example, often singles out particular results that correspond to assumed and foundational premises. This results in confirmation bias. Meanwhile, presumably innocent inductive curiosities are guided by the same deductive premises that outline what we already assume to be valuable for study. These thinking/research loops can quickly become destructive. When deduction and induction do converge the tend towards a closed circuit. These potentialities are prohibitive. I am in search of a unifying method rather than a codependent one.

Fig 1




In addition, the purpose of induction and deduction is usually restricted to observing, analyzing, and evaluating a phenomenon. My thesis exceeds

these functions for one critical reason: it is inherently constructive. I want to establish a new set of circumstances for living by generating a new theory of making. Deduction and induction are not historically productive methods. They are removed and responsive.

Abduction

3.1.4

Though these logical examples appear to be closed to transformation and change—two of my chief agendas—there is recourse in abduction. I take this method as my own point of departure. Abduction is an oblique and recursive form of logic that resolves the problems of fragmentation and feedback. Abduction applies a set of alternate questions and theories to standard logics like deduction and abduction in order to evaluate the weak spots in their loops and to sketch an exit point.⁴⁰ In the flow from premise to conclusion there are often discontinuities and dysfunctions. With deduction, the premise does not always bring about the desired conclusion. Likewise, inductively, the conclusion (the results of any phenomena) can be an aberration and therefore not easily synthesized into a fundamental rule. In a typical feedback loop, induction and deduction can cover up these weaknesses for each other. Abduction moves to the side of these standard sequences and circles back to critique and redirect their foundational assumptions.⁴¹ In colloquial terms, abduction is not only “to think outside the box” but to ask what if we are not a box at all? Or, what if it is best to be in a box? Abduction hypothesizes alternative and superior premises and conditions which can more properly account for aforementioned aberrations as well as align with empirical norms.



3.1.5

The first step in abduction is to identify the problematic term, definition, or element that turns the received rational sequence against itself and into incoherence.⁴² In this case, that is the incommensurability that lies at the heart of writing which has become the exemplar of making. Before Abduction can supply alternate theories it applies critique and inspection to the received logic much like my foregoing discussion of the anthropocene and writing. It then proceeds by substituting its new terms for that given one and reprocessing the logical sequence. It is then open to testing. The ensuing tests cross-apply the outcome of one theory/term against the other and discern which has superior explanatory power and conceptual congruity.

3.1.6

Abduction is not limited to a retrospective and descriptive function. An alternate theory of making can also be prospective and prescriptive. I do not simply want to look back at writing and find incoherence, apply a new model, and then relish in the finding. I am also trying to anticipate how this new model might reconstruct the logic that has been already ushering in new fields of making. Since writing disciplines have been at the frontiers of

digital and new media, I aim to redeem them rather than remain in judgment. Writing deserves a refreshed and robust theory of making. Abduction's prescribed detour provides that possibility and reinforces the hopes of digital writing, coding, and programming by recasting them under drawing.

Systematic Combining

3.1.7 While abduction may provide an alternate theory or hopeful model, it does not provide the resources to test that model. My study needs to reconcile the newly minted alternative with the empirical circumstances and broken logics that gave rise to it. This requires the help of systematic combining.⁴³ Systematic combining is a procedure that aligns four conceptual fields that circle any research hypothesis. Every hypothesis is multidimensional. A conjecture always says something about the world, the discipline in which it is delivered, corresponding examples, and even its own distinctive perspective. Systematic combining delineates these dimensions in the following four categories: empirical world, theory (c.f. model, approach), framework, and case study.




Fig 3




Fig 4

3.1.8 brief description of each is in order. The empirical world functions as both the impetus and result of a study. It is where the phenomena of the study is first observed and where the new theory will be applied. The theory quadrant is a model which operates on that empirical world. It is what gives shape, clarity, and a clustering nucleus to empirical observations. In this case, the model is the status quo of writing. In a generative research program, like this one, the theory field provides the space for the abductively formed corrective. The framework portion is that philosophical rationale that the researcher uses to guide the study. It provides a shared language for the theory and empirical world. It is neither transcendent nor logically prior. It is constantly amended by the other three fields. Finally, the case links theory and world even closer by providing empirical precedent and material samples.

3.1.9 Since systematic combining is spatially distributed, it looks in multiple directions to test a thesis or logical perspective. It looks to particulars and

universals simultaneously. It looks to the past to witness the failures of the former model while also looking ahead to anticipate the benefits of the new model. The researcher moves freely amongst these directions and dimensions by the formerly maligned deductive and inductive strategies. Within the quadratic stretching of systematic combining, deduction and induction cannot fold in on each other. Though these logics are vehicles for traversing the four regions, the harmony of the quadrants is never reducible to either. The goal is not to single out a line of movement wherein one cause renders a single effect. Rather, the goal is to direct and redirect movement such that the four are in ongoing harmony.⁴⁴ By inserting the abducted thesis, the test is to determine whether it brings this fourfold network to an organismic life or if it gridlocks it. Systematic combining gives the researcher a way to illustrate the weakness of the abandoned theory and confirm the promise of the new one. (See Fig 2)

3.1.10

Systematic combining may be smoothly expressed in a visual diagram but it does not yield to linear writing so easily. In order for this process to be readable in a dissertation, the fields of systematic combining need to be converted into syllogistic form. In other words, the spatial relationship exhibited in the figures above should be distributed into linear relationships for the purpose of this study. In Aristotelian logic, a syllogism is comprised of a major premise, minor premise, and conclusion. These three, according to C.S. Peirce, can be organized according to rule, case, and result.⁴⁵ When we overlay Peirce onto Aristotle, the logical sequence would proceed as follows: a major premise is a rule that is applied to the “case,” or minor premise, in anticipation of concluding in a result. If the categories of systematic combining could be read through this syllogistic structure the theoretical framework would provide the rule, the case would be self evident, and the world would be the field of results. The remaining piece, theory, would be something like the invisible intuition that runs in the background and prompts the logical structure itself. In my work, this theory (given as status quo or abductively provided) pivots around the question of incommensurability. Namely, whether two things can cross into one another. Thus, when systematic combining is rendered as a logical exercise I can unearth, examine, and correct an invisible conception. (See fig 3)

3.1.11

The logical movements noted above—deduction and induction—perform an operation on the four fields called matching. Matching, here, does not mean alignment according to an overarching principle. In fact, the purpose of the interpenetration of these categories is to discover a principle of harmony rather than to apply one.⁴⁶ Furthermore, matching confirms that no one field has priority over the other. When the categories are “matched” through a series of questions and interactions there is a double effect. For example, as the theoretical framework is brought close to the case study then the

latter will shed light on the former and vice versa. They transform each other. This kind of matching, as opposed to establishing a singular line of causality, restores the value of induction and deduction. In my example, the movement between framework (rule) and case exhibits a deductive process. The passage from world to theory is clearly inductive. These two logics serve the overall matching agenda and testify to the fact that all four are subject to each other's transformative power in these movements. The revisions and transformations bring the four into further alignment. Critically, when that alignment cannot be achieved through resonance or transformation, then the study returns to abduction whence it arose (from the deficiencies of the theory). We "go back to the drawing board" so to speak.

- 3.1.12 My particular work will take the anthropocene as empirical world, phenomenology as the field, drawing as the new framework, and architecture as the case study. This process has already begun in the opening sections here. In the beginning, I established the effects of the material world by highlighting the state of life amidst the anthropocene. For the remainder of the essay, I want to set up two other pieces: framework and case. As for the theory, this must be reserved for the full dissertation itself. Though I will sketch and frame the theory, it really can only emerge and become visible in a full analysis and this prospectus is limited to describing that process rather than executing it.

3.2 VERSO: FROM ENUNCIATION TO EROTETICS

- 3.2.1 It may be clear by this point that the abductive and systematic combining methods operate along the edges of received logic. They are, in that way, already out at the surface in service of a study about the surface. As such, the method parallels the content it organizes. If the content is to recover a model of making that allows elements to touch and pass into one another at a surface, then this method makes touching and connection its primary method of discovery.
- 3.2.2 The long term value of the method is the reintroduction of erotetics not only as preeminent research method but eventually as the primordial mode of existence and perception. Erotetic is that adjective we are looking for when we stumble around trying to describe a thought process that is "questionish." Erotetics are logical forms that are structured as questions.⁴⁷ In a world saturated by enunciations we favor research that is guided by statements rather than questions. Abduction and systematic combining do not simply use questions. They take questioning as an ontological and epistemological condition. They are themselves movements that are gener-

ated in and for questioning. Abduction is none other than asking: is this way possible? Systematic combining requires erotetic dialogue that not only brings fields together but also makes them possible. When theory asks the empirical world what it knows it positions and places the opposing field into view. When the world asks theory what it foresees it draws lines around it to make it visible.

- 3.2.3 At first glance, this may seem like a bootless claim. Are not all research agendas guided by questions? In one sense, yes. But those questions are set up to be resolved by a final statement. In other words, our typical approach to research, just like other forms of making, is already configured by the assumptions of writing. We set out to be an author and have some sort of authority even if it hovers over an abyss. We will approach an excess of possible study topics and make a statement that we hope will make us noticeable. Statements are prized as the final price and market value of a research agenda. Scholars often ask, “what is your contribution?” This kind of thought already elevates statements in a fiduciary way. But this approach will not make a mark though it may “take” many. It leaves scholarly work in the solitude of self at worst or at best it is shared in smaller and smaller fields of applicability. Just as writing participates in fragmentation and silence, research guided by the same principles of making fails to cross over into other lives, worlds, and bodies. Only asking can cross into the other.
- 3.2.4 The questions generated in combining, directional matching, and more are themselves a testament to what they seek to discover or confirm. Namely, that things cross into each other not by establishing presence or by making a statement (à la writing) but through an inquisitive disposition that “draws” near. Systematic combining and abduction treat statements as the ligaments and muscular tissue of the body of research but it takes questions to be its respiration. It is that respiration that goes to and fro into other bodies. And while breathing is always present, it can be exercised to induce clarity and productivity.
- 3.2.5 Not only does this erotetic method parallel the core of my conjecture it also prefigures the instrument and operation I anticipate: drawing. A question is a withdrawal. This is an intentional double entendre. When we draw together we are inscribing, joining, and dispossessing all at once. What are we making when we draw then? In a word, room for something else. This withdrawal fosters a double hospitality. One is invited to dwell in the habits and habitats of another. It is interrogation in the sense that a question is a welcoming outstretched hand. It puts the entirety of selfhood at risk in order to receive it from that other. It is what Maurice Merleau-Ponty identifies when we touch our own hand. We learn that whatever we touch is touching us back. Every engagement is reversible. I am entering the statements of

others just as I am being entered through my question. The very surface of our meeting is always drawn—in every sense. While writing may gesture towards this kind of interaction, so long as it fail to think of itself as a form of drawing and questioning, it will only look and never touch.

4.1 RECTO: PHENOMENOLOGY AS RULE

- 4.1.1 When we pass from empirical observations to theoretical evaluations we always encounter linguistic hurdles. If two regions are to dialogue, then how do we translate one into the other? The researcher is often unsure about what to call or name a specific phenomenon. Systematic combining offers a solution by employing a theoretical framework. This framework offers a shared code. But having such a category does not resolve the translation problem tout court. The study must still decide on which framework to use; which tongue; which lexicon; which disciplinary angle.
- 4.1.2 The stated empirical and theoretical problems above help guide that decision towards phenomenology as a fitting lexicon for the study. First, the climate crisis and class conflicts noted from the outset demand that we find a theoretical rubric that can be applied to this world at this time. Phenomenology fits that billing given its expressed interest in everyday life. Second, since writing—my central problematic—finds its origins in the phenomenological age then one is inclined to return to those roots. The elements that configure writing—subjectivity and language—arise in its soil. Third, Phenomenology's long-standing synthetic approach to theory and practice befits the existential interconnectedness of making and living. Not to mention, this synthetic instinct makes phenomenology amenable to the methods outlined above. Other systems of philosophical analysis might yield highly nuanced and abstract insights into making but they would be inaccessible to most human constituents of the anthropocene. Conversely, quantitative studies of making methods and creative procedures might only offer highly technical or specialized insights which also fall short of the general need to reorder making. In view of these advantages, I propose to examine the issue of writing, and to develop drawing as an alternate theory, by using the methods and concepts of phenomenology.
- 4.1.3 But the academy will not let me embrace phenomenology without critical justification. Phenomenology was, after all the rejected discipline that made room for structuralism and post-structuralism. What is more, phenomenology is often considered to be either a navel-gazing affirmation of facile relativism or a harbinger of Hegelian totality.⁴⁸ Even though the linguistic turn was situated in the ruins of phenomenology, I submit that another more

promising road is still available there buried beneath the rubble of tyrannical agency and statehood. Finding that road and turning towards it requires some critical excavation.

4.1.4 Recently, phenomenology has gained some approval in the academy but only after it has willingly submitted to the filter of critical theory.⁴⁹ In its earlier stages, whether hermeneutic or ontological, phenomenology tried to secure its conclusions without the distractions of status, desire, or history. The days of thinking of the agent or state in stripped down and ideal terms are gone. Every study in this era must learn from the findings of Marxism, feminism, and critical race theory. To take up phenomenology today is to examine a phenomenon which is always situated as a material and socially organized event. Thus a return to the beginnings of the linguistic moment, to revisit phenomenology, is to investigate shared materiality rather than private consciousness.

4.1.5 But I am not simply retreating back into phenomenology by necessity or for nostalgia. I am advocating for it due to its accessible, profound, and precise affordances. To begin with, since it does coincide with the evolution of writing, it gives us a way to retrace our steps and identify wrong turns. Before writing was *écriture*, *differance*, or solitude we might be able to see writing as co-perceptive and experiential rather than authoritative. Phenomenology brings us to the critical juncture wherein the conceptions of writing and drawing were originally convergent and where they began to diverge. Second, as I mentioned, phenomenology has always been guided by deep concern for daily experience. The question of perceived appearance is not a buffer against the empirical. It is an attempt to draw close to the things and thoughts of everyday life. Third, unlike ontology's focus on substance or psychology's interest in the self, phenomenology is not limited to the thing or the ego. By asking the question of "appearance" it concerns itself with the interaction between all things. It is discretionary without being obsessed with the discreet or dissolute. Phenomenology's final advantage for my research is that it already has an innate commitment to systematic combining—both methodologically and substantively. It is not forced to choose between estranged dimensions of thought as is affirmed in writing's central assumptions. In other words, it is not concerned with simple observations or remote abstractions. It always traverses both. Phenomenology has a historically verifiable focus on experience coupled with reflection.

4.1.6 These advantages can be summarized as a disciplinary attempt to hold any two perspectives, dimensions, or entities together whether in union, overlap, or exchange. In this way, it is analogous to the concept of touch and crossing that underlie my conjecture. This fact puts phenomenology in direct relation with writing's tendency towards philosophies of pure experi-

ority and estrangement. Phenomenology challenges the crude dichotomy of exterior and interior by drawing towards life, drawing forth new ideas, and drawing things together. Alternatively, it avoids homogeneity by drawing lines. In this way, phenomenology helps outline the twofold nature of reality which is best satisfied by drawing; which has a resilient capacity to hold two things in common. Under phenomenology, drawing can be both a concept and operation. It is both descriptive model and prescriptive instrument. Nevertheless, in true phenomenological fashion, these claims must be examined materially and experientially.

Procedure

4.1.7 Procedurally, my phenomenological investigations begin with the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. While Merleau-Ponty's work touches on the linguistic basis of writing, for my purposes, it is his affirmation of the surface in all visible and invisible encounters that is critical. His chiasmic account of touch gives me the first insight into how an agent interacts with a surface.⁵⁰ Before writing, and before retreating from an ineffable limit, the agent draws towards others along a surface. The agent's own history is the evolving awareness of separation and connection. However, I will show that Merleau-Ponty's explanations swerve towards the exterior. His notion of shared contact and mutuality exists "on the outside."⁵¹ Jean-Luc Nancy, most notably, has adopted Merleau-Ponty's chiasmic model in his own advocacy of touch and *witness*.⁵² Regrettably, both systems still think of things and their connections as defined by their outsides. I will show that this external account only meets half of the demands of making. The lurking threat to surface and agency is that such an ontology of the perpetual outside can devolve into a monism (c.f. Deleuze below). Luce Irigaray's critique and question opens up: what about the inside?⁵³ If things touch and reverse, how far in can they go? Can two things remain distinct even when they are sharing in the "flesh?" These become central concerns for a theory of making based in drawing.

4.1.8 The second phenomenological move is to examine the work of Michel Henry. Henry offers an inverse account of the world with respect to Merleau-Ponty. In his model, life is not occurring on the exterior of surfaces but on their interior.⁵⁴ His account of affectivity gives a new look at the agent's relation to the surface. He also explicitly positions his immanent account of life against what he calls "ontological monism." But Henry's interior is not a retreat from the surface. His material phenomenology is a description of interactive and affective lives that share in suffering and joy through the

body.⁵⁵ Henry's interior insights reshape making in a way that can avoid the pitfalls of more popular externalized materialisms (e.g., OOO, Deleuze, etc.). In effect, in Henry, the surface draws life outward.

4.1.9 The third step is to synthesize phenomenologies of surface (Merleau-Ponty) and agent (Henry). To do so, I lean on the work of Renaud Barbaras. Though Barbaras is critical of both Merleau-Ponty and Henry, he reinforces their shared concern for life.⁵⁶ As such, his is a philosophy of action and movement. For Barbaras when perception encounters the surface, it encounters an edge and initiates a movement to overtake it. Thus the surface and agent are not only cooperative but they are conceived in an action of desire. Surface and agent do not precede making, they are its twofold manifestation. Barbaras gives the study a desire that draws things together.

4.1.10 But these phenomenological stages are not, and should not be, restricted to concepts. The final step is to extend their insights and use them to construct a model of drawing. This is not an imposition on their work given that they Merleau-Ponty often interacted with art and artistic methods.⁵⁷ His sensitivity to the surface of life supplies an image of drawing that is always bringing agents to the chiasmic moment. Michel Henry also considered painting as phenomenological exemplar. His work on Kandinsky celebrates color as a means of accessing the invisible interior.⁵⁸ Drawing must somehow enable this passage. Jean-Luc Nancy, though not explicitly a phenomenologist, follows this trend in showing how connection and witness are upheld in various art forms. His work in the *Pleasure in Drawing* brings Henry and Merleau-Ponty's insights together in the creative moment of the line.⁵⁹ Though Renaud Barbaras does not write about drawing, I extrapolate his theories of movement and desire to bring agency and purpose to the creative act.⁶⁰ By filtering the surface and agent through phenomenology, a refined and materialized model of drawing can be further cross-applied to the merits of writing.

4.2 **VERSO:** REPRESENTATION, REPOSE, REPETITION

4.2.1 Drawing and writing will always be phenomenologically related. One is often implicated in the other. But the way they configure surface and agent separates them. Writing positions itself against a vanishing surface. The author and his muse are increasingly remote as the surface drifts out of reach. The substance and affordances of writing lie at the edge of death and difference while the agent is an author who also recedes into obscurity.

- 4.2.2 Drawing configures the surface as superficial and lateral. There is no lurking depth which remains hidden or “presabsent.” Every surface is the presence of another thing. The agent—whether object or subject—is always implicated in this superficiality. It is near, active, and visible. This is why making, under the guidance of drawing, is always reversible but never homogenous or monistic. Drawing is always the moment of bringing another into relation by both making them and meeting them. This configuration of agent and surface has significant impact on the three traditional elements of making: representation, purpose, and repetition.
- 4.2.3 Writing has always wrestled with the question of representation. For writing, representations refer to or bring back some self-identical given. This is in according to its presuppositions about surfaces. Something must. Lie beyond the edge of the present if it is to be indicated the material of now. This is where the difficulty begins. If writing is preeminent and elusively undeniable then writing can never be fully present in the written. Every representation is dubious at best. Sinister at worst. The persistence and problem of representation led writing to erase the idea of presence and subject altogether. The author died. In a word, presence is unrepeatable or unrepresentable simply because it never “is.” But, again, this is because writing favors an incommensurable depth over a superficial touch. Drawing inverts writing’s assumptions of—and procedures for—representation. Drawing assumes a shared plane wherein things are always co-implicated in each other. Drawing does not call back or refer to a remote given. It makes whatever “it” is or can be. If the phenomenon cannot be here and no because it will not submit to writing’s limits in space and time, then drawing reverses the process. It starts with space and time and opens them. It creates something that grows, ages, and matures into ineffability. It does not try to contain or constrain but construct. Drawing is giving birth to the present and thus it is always already a crossing over. It is not coming to a surface after that surface has receded into a *khora*.⁶¹ It always touches its other because drawing is Both the creation of self and other. It does this again and again—it re-presents—in the bleeding of ink or by sonic questions that reverberate in the ears or lungs of another.
- 4.2.4 Drawing is purposeful in the sense that it puts things into place. This is, after all, the etymological history of the term. Under the rubric of writing and authorship purpose is suspiciously violating. This is because it assumes the incommensurability of two already given entities. But under the rubric of drawing, entities are made in the event rather than preceding it.⁶² Purpose, or to put there, is the moment of appearance. Popular ontology of today would have it that all things are folded into a flow of force and an individual is a momentary emergence thereafter. Purpose is putting a stone in that river such that *here* and *there* appear. It individuates what is otherwise

indistinguishable. In this way, purpose can be characterized as repose. Things come to rest in a place. They come to rest as a place. But purpose is not singular. It is always twofold. Putting something into place is also making room for that something else to come into being. Repose is a mutual inviting—a drawing forth—of those two at a surface. At the moment, at that surface and as that surface, they can touch and remain different because they are always two. So purpose is not the enforcement of a preconceived agenda. It is an ethical and life-giving moment.

4.2.5 But life is also continuous and therefore drawing must also be repetitious. But repetition faces a twofold problem. According to writing's assumptions, the idea of repetition has been tied to the notion of representation. It is seen a futile attempt at a return to a divine origin. For writing, repetition is a shuttling of a transcendent self-identity into the world of material. Drawing, instead, as repose only cycles and repeats a surface. It is not trying to bring back a lost object. So like Deleuze's own account, drawing's repetition is more akin to rebirth than return.⁶³ This presents the second problem. Since I've mentioned him, Deleuze's model of repetition stems from a monistic account of substance.⁶⁴ This is well expressed in the concept of folding and invagination. As a deflating balloon is pressed, it folds and creates pockets. Those pockets are not new things but modalities of the same balloon skin. There are no two agents but only the appearance of two. Repetitious growth can be reduced to the folding and creasing of the same unitary substance. Drawing's repetition separates itself from this kind of monism because it is committed to the twofold nature of making. It aligns more properly with Kierkegaard's recollection of the future.⁶⁵ It enables distinct lives and possibilities that are never foldable into a totality. It always engenders two indissoluble agents or touch-points. In light of erotics, Drawing's repetition is best understood as a re-asking. Re-petitioning is a re-asking. Its questions invite novel others rather than manifesting a monistic modality.

4.2.6 Because drawing is both purposeful and repetitions, it is therefore habitual. For both Kierkegaard and Felix Ravaisson,⁶⁶ habit is a movement of desire and matter. It is, in a word, living. It is perpetuated in actions and aged as institutions. But habit rote or blind necessity. It is itself making protracted. This is why buildings are habitats and living conditions are inhabited. In this way, drawing is once again linked with life through making. Through phenomenological analyses drawing is prescinded and then restored to daily life in a robust and fecund way. This philosophical excursus transforms Heidegger's famous assumption that we are always building, dwelling, and thinking.⁶⁷ Under the aegis of drawing, we are always crossing, sharing, and living.

5.1 RECTO: ARCHITECTURE AS CASE

- 5.1.1 Architecture provides an ideal case study to cross-examine the features of drawing that have been presented in my phenomenological analysis. Perhaps more appropriately, Architecture is not only ideal but almost inevitable. The elements prescinded in my analysis already operate as a unity in architecture. It is anthropological in that the origins of human making coincide with the emergence of human dwellings. It is concerned with surfaces in its attention to the earth, building materials, and facades. It is interested in agents whether they be formal architects or vernacular builders. Its ornamentation raises the question of repetition. And its expressed purpose is to take up the issues of habit, habitats, and inhabitation. But for my purposes, its necessity lies in the fact that it brings all these together in the explicit practice of drawing. Not only does its history supply a case study for how drawing can give way to writing, coding, and programming but it also offers a template on how to survive those shifts.
- 5.1.2 When juxtaposed to architecture's anthropological origins, drawing proves to be deeply resonant. Architecture's association with drawing did not arise by happenstance. Nor is it strictly a perfunctory relationship. They are joined by their phenomenological affinities. Architecture is fundamentally tectonic in the same way that drawing is ultimately an act of contact at a surface. Tectonics hints at the geological register which underlies architecture. Geological tectonics do not refer to the earthen plates which move into or away from one another but a description of the movements and junctures themselves. The *tek* syllable refers to a Proto-Indo-European phoneme used in association with weaving.⁶⁸ Even our vernacular synonyms for architecture, like construction, imply an act of weaving or togetherness. As a term, then, architecture should be understood as a first joining. What is more, its joints make two surfaces touch—whether touching the ground, the sky, or another material. A noted theorist Gottfried Semper considered architecture to be a kind of geological combinatorics.⁶⁹ From metal to mud, it configures and combines surfaces into distinct architectural structures. These structures, for Semper, testify to a material metamorphosis (*stoffwrechsel*) wherein one material pass into one another to comprise a new thing.⁷⁰ Drawing follows from this quite naturally given everything I have already postulated regarding lateral connecting, commensurability, and crossing.
- 5.1.3 Because it is a visual, projective, and combinatoric exercise, drawing moves to the center of architecture as it thinks more and more of itself as a perceptive discipline. Bringing things together is an attempt to frame the world. As noted above in anthropology, we make because perceiving reality is coexten-

sive with situating it. We could say: as we make, so we draw, and so we build. As Semper pointed out, the architectural metamorphosis (*stoffwrechsel*) derives from humanity's cosmic impulse to poetically perceive the world. These perceptive operations pivot on a shared fulcrum: bodies. Bodies are perception's coordinates regardless of their density, shape, or intensity. As such, architecture gives rise to the perceivable structures and dimensions of living by building bodies (with bodies and by bodies). Well known architectural thinker John Ruskin transposed this same perceptive capacity into drawing. For Ruskin, drawing allows us to meet the world.⁷¹ This building and drawing converge on perceptive and constructive ambitions. As Robin Evans famously quipped: architects do not make buildings, they make drawings for building.⁷² My central concern is to show how drawing has been an essential step in becoming human, inhabiting a world, ritualizing habits, and enabling future life. It behoves us to recognize drawing as the chief instrument of a discipline—architecture—that has been called earthcraft.

5.1.4 But this affirmation is not a given. While drawing seems to be solidified by architecture, it is significantly threatened by that very discipline. Throughout the history of architecture drawing's star has faded. We might expect drawing to have begun a retreat amongst the modern architects but they were some of drawing's greatest cheerleaders.⁷³ It was the advent of computing and coding that began the displacement of drawing. Specifically, it was a theory of making and building rooted in speculations about writing that marginalized drawing along with unused letterforms. In light of writing's elevation and erasure of the author, Peter Eisenman, Greg Lloyd and eventually Patrick Schumacher would imagine building by computing code alone.⁷⁴ The computational boom extended beyond theory and into instruments, materials, and modeling. Recently Mario Carpo has been one of the more significant voices to announce the end of drawing.⁷⁵ He does so by likening drawing to features of writing like the alphabet. But this is not a death sentence for drawing. It only testifies to drawing's captivity to writing.

5.1.5 Post-digital drawing notwithstanding, architecture also maps a way out of captivity. The last stage of the case study is to turn to the work of Louis Kahn. Kahn not only shows the particular resilience of drawing amidst machines and computers but he also proleptically guides current disciplines who are beset by a fixation on code and programming.⁷⁶ Though Kahn built amongst modernists who were broaching the questions of computation, his questions of room and space evinced a concern for habitation and human interaction.⁷⁷ This is not to say that he eschewed contemporary methods or avoided conversations about the meaning of architecture. It is to say that he was able to synthesize the deep memory of architecture with evolving forms and ideas. He retained an interest in the life of the building, the twofold

nature of interactions, and the function of drawing in facilitating both.⁷⁸ Kahn joined materials that would both liberate them from a narrow telos and also bring them into the service of light. Kahn's insights need to be applied once again as materials and light have converged in the computing screen. His ability to think about light, meaning, and humanity amongst novel materials was guided by his chief architectural language: drawing. This way of thinking has tremendous purchase in the digital era wherein very few users recognize the architecture, luminescence, and materiality of the machine on which they operate and inhabit.

- 5.1.6 This ongoing transformation of architectural design—from perceptive engagement to algorithmic code—has led to an intradisciplinary debate about the function, mode, and nature of building (i.e., making). Still, drawing continues to be an essential (though often unseen) current of this conversation. The specific discussion between architectural computer advocates and phenomenologists takes up many of the elements mentioned above. All of which orbit drawing. Materials, surfaces, agency, labor, perception, ecology, and more frame the future and viability of drawing. With the help of Semper, Ruskin, and Kahn drawing is not an epochally specific practice that has been supplanted but is a way of living that will continue to evolve in forthcoming eras and under new technological regimes.

5.2

VERSO: FROM GEOMETRY TO GEOGRAPHY

- 5.2.1 Architecture is critical for charting a passage from geometry to geography. Geometry has been both the subject of scorn and promise. In its Cartesian variety, philosophers bemoan it as an act of egotistical sovereignty and are cautious about the way its uniformity has been imposed on the world. In its Deleuzean variant, theorists celebrate a kind of geometry that introduces the folding complexity of curved space because it perpetually affords new material forms. Either way, it has been central to human perceptions of the world. In architecture, through drawing, it is further elevated to the central means of human making and construction. But in architectural drawing, geometric making does not die out in planar abstractions. Nor is it folded into an uninhabitable and monistic curve. It is converted in geography. The drawings become lines on the earth that organize and guide human movement. Perhaps this is why architecture has been called earth-craft.
- 5.2.2 Geometry quite literally means to measure the earth.⁷⁹ Man's plane of existence lies between the earth and sky. His horizon constrains his life. It conducts his perceptive field. This field is expanded and enriched when man introduces new horizons—buildings, monuments, and other bodies. In this

sense, man is giving the earth measure and in so doing coming into a more acute perceptive relationship with it. In my terms, geometry is the first step in developing new surfaces. To draw lines and shapes is not to impose but to imagine new forms of life within and through the plane of the earth. Of course, geometry has not always operated so altruistically. But I submit that this only occurs when it is taken as separable, autonomous, and transcendent. As Tim Ingold pointed out above, perceiving, measuring, and making the world should be kind of correspondence or communication. In this vein, geometry must never be abstracted from the irreducible twoness of reality. Every measure, every line, is the introduction of an edge and the introduction of an edge bears witness to that twoness, touching, and being-with outlined above.

5.2.3 Geometry is not fulfilled until it matures into geography. Like geometry, if taken literally, geography means to “represent the earth by lines.” Humans do not just stand on the crust of the earth and observe it. They mark it, scratch it, and change it. The primordial mode of human drawing then is moving along the earth. According to Ingold, our first lines on the earth are the ones we make when we walk on it.⁸⁰ Ingold quickly points out that the paths we tread and retread become our habits.⁸¹ Our histories are precisely these lines. The geographic instinct then is always already architectural because it forms habits and habitats through lines. Architecture proper formalizes the instinct to organize the perceivable geological plane by building on it, with it, and for it. In so doing, architecture establishes perceptive coordinates or dimensionality.

5.2.4 Architecture encapsulates both geometry and geography. It specifically coordinates them in the act of drawing. It speculates geometrically on paper and then draws out the lines of the imagination in building. The constructive movements multiply benefits by extending and enriching life. James Gibson’s theory of affordance, which informs Ingold, confirms this. For Gibson, when an agent acts to construct a new surface then they are expanding their capabilities towards perception and living.⁸² Still, according to popular scholarship, these two movements—geometry and geography—are violent and indicative of privileged force. But, in architecture and drawing, these two movements are exonerated as ways of giving to, sharing with, and living on the earth and with each other.

6.1 RECTO: NEW MEDIA AS RESULTS

6.1.1 Drawing emerges from the case study as both viable and ripe for new forms of making. But at first glance, it might to be late to the party. What advances

does this theory of making bring when drawing seems to be already all around us? We are saturated with iPads, Adobe creative tools, and even drawing options in our text threads. So, is this supposedly novel recovery of drawing dead on arrival? To answer, I want to examine the relationship between writing's model for making and current new media theories. I submit that writing's assumptions about incommensurability and excess have passed into digital creativity virtually uninterrupted. So, despite having drawing operations, the proposals of new media theorists and its practitioners are still configured by writing's assumptions.

- 6.1.2 New media theory is born in the questions of writing. New Media's earliest stages were defined by social aspirations: what organizes society?⁸³ Can electronic media do it? To what extent? But social organization had largely been the product of writing and had inherited writing's norms. For example, those political affirmations like the sovereignty of individuals, the need for representation, or the idea of a corporate body as a person are linked to the ontological assumptions at work in writing. These carried over into the questions of electronic media. Even McLuhan acknowledges that advancements in technology absorb, rather than overcome, prior forms.⁸⁴ So if writing absorbs drawing and new media absorbs writing then what is lost or gained in a return to drawing? And what did new media inherit from writing? And what will it learn from drawing?
- 6.1.3 New media's absolute dependence on computing links it to the notions of separation and incommensurability that have been at work in theories of writing. Thresholds, edges, incommensurable surfaces, is the backbone of digitality. A one or zero, an up or a down, an on or an off are all manifestations of a discreet mindset. This kind of thinking separates unified processes into smaller functions and then aggregates them to simulate that former operation on command. It simulations are akin to representations that powerfully evoke the excessive beyond and immanent fecundity of writing's acclaimed theorists. I contend that digital structures that are suffused by writing might propose new possibilities but they all too often achieve them by leveraging death, opening distance, and concealing hierarchies of violence.
- 6.1.4 Though the concepts of new media have continued to rely on incommensurability and distance, its materials and hardware still strive to develop connection. As was the case in architecture, glass, silicon, plastic, and aluminum are brought together to create sensory habitats and to foster repeat actions. The machines and materials unwittingly resonant with Kahn's interest in the materiality of light. Screens, their power, and their design all orbit the movement of light.

6.1.5 The conceptual background and material foreground of new media need further examination if they are to avoid the pitfalls of their predecessors. On the conceptual side, if code and programming fails to think the surface and the agent, then we may be confined to representations. Of course, for some media theorists this is not so bad. But for my purposes, this would forestall most attempts at making. Representations would evacuate confidence, numb the sense of touch, and close the perceptual horizons that has enabled life on earth. Likewise, according to Jussi Parikka, if the materiality of new media ignores the surface of making then it may speed up the dissolution of its own resources.⁸⁵ But others, like Benjamin Bratton, propose that a deeper merger between program and planet might be salvific.⁸⁶

6.1.6 For my purposes, I see these debates about new media as standing on the edge of a precipice. They anticipate a copernican moment wherein we shift our thinking from writing to drawing and in so doing reimagine forms of digital making that benefit and befit both the earth and its inhabitants. This is not a magic bullet nor a dismissal of the time it would take to redress the anthropocene. Rather, my claim is that we have the resources for living amongst us and recovering them takes only the slightest turn in attitude and form. Nevertheless, a subtle turn would unravel into a series of larger consequences. This kind of shift is akin the one Deborah Levitt sketches in her work, *The Animatic Apparatus*.⁸⁷ She argues that for some time, film had dominated visual media and set the parameters for how visual media thought and was thought of. It also inscribed a certain kind of expectation about life and the body based on its machines, viewing methods, and more. She suggests that an animatic apparatus would not only shift the ways we make visual media but would set new understandings about the body and life. Similarly, I propose that by returning to drawing, we may be able to shift our understanding of what it means to make and to be human. What might new media might look like if the tyranny and privilege of writing were traded for the collaborative potentiality of drawing? I conclude that any surface of making, including the digital, can invigorate the earth and its inhabitants when they are drawn to life.

6.2

VERSO: WHEN THE POWER GOES OUT

6.2.1 From class conflict to climate, through architecture and on into new media, making seems to rely on one thing: power. Whether the word refers to access or to electricity, making needs some kind of external force or movement. Access to making could mean the redistribution of wealth to the disenfranchised. Access to power could mean the extension of an electrical or telecommunication grid to remote villages. Empowerment could refer to

any number of scenarios but one condition seems inevitable: power depends on fuel and maintenance. What if the climate crisis, itself caused by the need for power, converges on the electrical grid and heat corrupts the wiring infrastructure? What happens to access and power if the electrical banking network suffers a hack or a dysfunction? How will we redistribute power a la wealth then? How will we grant ethnographic voice to those who are illiterate or are estranged from the internet? What does making look like when pollution floods our streets and backyards? These potential hazards are summarized as a simple problem: what do we do—how do we make—if the power goes out?

In a word, we draw.

6.2.2 Drawing is not rooted in power. It partakes in energy. Martin Heidegger famously described technology as reserve power.⁸⁸ We might extend that thesis and say all power is itself a kind of reserve. It is taking the shared energy of living, bottling it, and dispensing it on command. But, energy, before this powerful act, is always and already available as life. Making is ideally a synergetic act that multiplies life. This is why drawing is primordial. Prior to industrial forms of making, drawing was a passage of energy; between people drawing unto each other, between objects withdrawing to make room for one another. Drawing unleashes and engages energy rather than constraining and containing it. The chief contribution of my research rests in this single fact: regardless of what happens to electricity infrastructures or despite what may happen to intellectual access and expression, drawing can always resurface and in so doing it resurrects our capacity to make.

notes

¹ André Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993). For a lighter read in a similar vein see Agustin Fuentes, *The Creative Spark: How Imagination Made Humans Exceptional*, (London: Penguin, 2017)

² Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine*, 2nd edn, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1961).

³ Richard Sennett, *The Craftsman* (London: Penguin UK, 2009).

⁴ Erle C. Ellis, *Anthropocene: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

⁵ In many respects, this is Marx's key point. His central category for humanity is *faber*. For more see: Karl Marx, *Das Kapital: A Critique of Political Economy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012) and Michel Henry, *Marx: A Philosophy of Human Reality* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983)

⁶ Elizabeth Hallam and Tim Ingold, "Making and Growing: an introduction," in *Making and Growing: Anthropological Studies of Organisms and Artefacts*, (London: Routledge, 2016), ch 1.

⁷ Tim Ingold, *Correspondences* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2020), 108-120.

⁸ Tim Ingold, *Making: Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture* (London: Routledge, 2013)

⁹ Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech*, 61-86.

¹⁰ Tim Ingold, *The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill* (London: Psychology Press, 2000). Large sections of this text are dedicated to his idea. See particularly ch. 17-21.

¹¹ This claim is not explicit in any one resource. Rather, it is my own derivation synthesized from the insights of several of the names that appear below. The most substantial contributor is Luce Irigaray. Though her work was en vogue in the 90s and 2000s, it has become increasingly important with respect to what I see as digital monism. I specifically lean on her ideas in Luce Irigaray, *To Be Two* (London: Routledge, 2017); Luce Irigaray, *Democracy Begins Between Two* (Oxfordshire: Taylor & Francis, 2001); and Luce Irigaray, *To Be Born: Genesis of a New Human Being* (Basingstoke: Springer, 2017).

¹² Edward S. Casey, *The World on Edge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017).

¹³ The most significant text is Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). The notion of writing as seminal, though, extends beyond his influence on into pedagogy, feminist criticism, and even architecture.

¹⁴ This section operates as a "literature review." In systematic combining this would be called the "theoretical framework." After a conceptual field has been established, and concerning phenomena have emerged, the researcher looks to see how those phenomena cluster. Do they seem to aggregate around certain principles or ideas? In this case, the issues that beset making point to the issue of authorship and text. Thus, I take up writing as the "field" of the study.

¹⁵ Claire Colebrook, "The Linguistic Turn in Continental Philosophy," in *The History of Continental Philosophy. Poststructuralism and Critical Theory's Second Generation Volume 6*, edited by Alan D. Schrift (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 279-309.

¹⁶ His own transition from logic to language is largely outlined in part I of Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2010).

¹⁷ See the upcoming Chad Engelland, ed., *Language and Phenomenology* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2020) and also the more established Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics; Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1977); Rodney R. Coltman, *The Language of Hermeneutics: Gadamer and Heidegger in Dialogue* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998).

- ¹⁸ The most famous of these, and the most cartographic, being Ferdinand D. Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
- ¹⁹ Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 82-87.
- ²¹ Denis Hollier and Jeffrey Mehlman, eds., *Literary Debate: Texts and Contexts: Postwar French Thought* (New York: The New Press, 1999).
- ²² Maurice Blanchot, *The Space of Literature* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015).
- ²³ Maurice Blanchot, *The Writing of the Disaster* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015).
- ²⁴ Blanchot, *The Space of Literature*, 85-107.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, 24.
- ²⁶ Maurice Blanchot, *The Unavowable Community* (Barrytown/ Station Hill Press, 2006).
- ²⁷ Leslie Hill, *Nancy, Blanchot: A Serious Controversy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).
- ²⁸ This notion is manifested in several examples. Two, which will be important to my account of the twofold and life, are Jacques Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship* (Brooklyn: Verso, 2020) and Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
- ²⁹ See Derrida's essays "The Double Session" in Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016) and his commentary on ideality in Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989).
- ³⁰ Jacques Derrida, *The Animal that Therefore I Am* (New York: Fordham UP, 2008), 29-30.
- ³¹ Derrida, *Dissemination*, 61 ff.
- ³² Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 32-47
- ³³ Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1977).
- ³⁴ Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International* (London: Psychology Press, 1994).
- ³⁵ Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2016).
- ³⁶ See specifically the work of Bernard Stiegler and Peter Sloterdijk in Bernard Stiegler, *The Neganthropocene* (London: Open Humanities Press, 2018); Bernard Stiegler, *Symbolic Misery- Volume 1: The Hyperindustrial Epoch* (Cambridge: Polity, 2016); Peter Sloterdijk and Wieland Hoban, *Bubbles: Microspherology* (Semiotext, 2011); and Peter Sloterdijk, *Globes: Spheres Volume II: Macrospherology* (Semiotext, 2014).
- ³⁷ This is my own term but it appears in other places and in different philosophical milieus. For example, see Gaetano Chiurazzi, "Incommensurability and Definition in Plato's Theaetetus," *Epoché*

18, no. 1 (2013): xx, doi:10.5840/epoche201318114 or the issue of correlationism as outlined in Graham Harman, *Speculative Realism: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity, 2018).

³⁸ Martin Campbell-Kelly, *Computer* (New York: Routledge, 2018); "Digital." OED Online. February 2020. Oxford University Press. <http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/11125> (accessed February 26 2020); Bernhard Siegert, *Passage des Digitalen: Zeichenpraktiken der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaften 1500-1900*, (Berlin: Brinkmann & Bose, 2003).

³⁹ This a neologism. I wanted to be able to express the notion of touch, the non-identity and communion of two, and connote a manual gesture.

⁴⁰ Charles S. Peirce, *'Studies in Logic' by Members of the Johns Hopkins University* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 1983).

⁴¹ Jo Reichertz, "Abduction: The Logic of Discovery of Grounded Theory - An Updated Review," *The SAGE Handbook of Current Developments in Grounded Theory*, 2019, doi:10.4135/9781526436061.n15.

⁴² Kristian Philipsen, "Theory Building: Using Abductive Search Strategies" in *Collaborative Research Design: Working with Business for Meaningful Findings*, edited by Per V. Freytag and Louise Young, (Basingstoke: Springer, 2017).

⁴³ Anna Dubois and Lars-Erik Gadde, "Systematic combining: an abductive approach to case research," *Journal of Business Research* 55, no. 7 (2002): doi:10.1016/s0148-2963(00)00195-8.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 556-557.

⁴⁵ Peirce, *Studies in Logic*, 140-150.

⁴⁶ Philipsen, "Theory Building: Using Abductive Search Strategies," 62-67.

⁴⁷ "Erotetic." OED Online. February 2020. Oxford University Press. <http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/64082> (accessed October 10 2020);

⁴⁸ Tom Sparrow, *End of Phenomenology: Metaphysics and the New Realism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).

⁴⁹ Gail Weiss, Gayle Salamon, and Ann V. Murphy, *50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2019).

⁵⁰ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).

⁵¹ This is discussed at length in Dorothea Olkowski and James Morley, eds., *Merleau-Ponty, Interiority and Exteriority, Psychic Life, and the World* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999).

⁵² Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2000)

⁵³ Irigaray, *To be Two*, 40-48.

⁵⁴ Michel Henry, *The Essence of Manifestation* (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012).

⁵⁵ Michel Henry, *Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2015).

⁵⁶ Renaud Barbaras, *Desire and Distance: Introduction to a Phenomenology of Perception* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2006).

- ⁵⁷ See especially "Eye and Mind" and "Cezanne's Doubt" in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Merleau-Ponty Reader* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007).
- ⁵⁸ Michel Henry, *Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky* (London: A&C Black, 2009).
- ⁵⁹ Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Pleasure in Drawing* (New York City: Fordham University Press, 2013).
- ⁶⁰ Barbaras, *Desire and Distance*, 108-128.
- ⁶¹ Jacques Derrida, *On the Name* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1995).
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- ⁶⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper Collins, 2001).
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- ⁷⁴ Andrew Goodhouse, *When is the Digital in Architecture?* (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2017).
- ⁷⁵ Mario Carpo and Frédérique Lemerle, *Perspective, Projections and Design: Technologies of Architectural Representation* (London: Routledge, 2013).
- ⁷⁶ I am thinking here of the insights of Vilem Flusser who sees the digital age as fraught with images and lights—both guided by code and program. See Vilém Flusser, *Post-History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015). See also, Lev Manovich, *Software Takes Command* (London: A&C Black, 2013). With respect to light, I have in mind Sean Cubitt, *The Practice of Light: A Genealogy of Visual Technologies from Prints to Pixels* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014).
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⁸⁶ Benjamin H. Bratton, *The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016).

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