

“Civilisation” of the EU

A way for the EU
to do more for world peace?



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to do more for world peace?

A report from Cogito

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and Per Gahrton



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive summary	6
What does the EU do for world peace?	
1. Introduction	15
2. The Civilian Peace Operations of the EU	17
2.1 The Common Foreign and Security Policy	18
2.2 The European Security and Defence Policy	19
2.3 The Rapid Reaction Mechanism	22
2.4 External Policy and Conflict Prevention	23
2.5 Economic Cooperation, Trade Policy, and Diplomacy	24
2.6 Humanitarian Aid	27
2.7 Peace Building in the Post-Conflict Phase	28
2.8 The ESDP Operations	29
3. Civilian and Military Dimensions of the Peace Operations	32
4. The European Civil Peace Corps	36
5. Costs and Funding of the Civilian Peace Operations	40
6. The Civilian Peace Operations of the EU: Successful or not?	45
7. Further Reading	51
8. Bibliography	53
Electronic sources	56
Articles	61
Personal Communication	61
Appendix 1 – Abbreviations	62

Peacemaker or Military Superpower?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

By Per Gahrton, chairperson of Cogito

The promotion of world peace is high on the EU agenda. Some even suggest that the EU as such is a “peace organisation.” Nevertheless, ever since the meeting of the European Council in Cologne in 1999, the military dimension of the Common Foreign and Security Policy has rapidly expanded. The same year, the European Parliament adopted a recommendation, proposed by the Greens, to carry out a pilot study with a view to establish a European Civilian Peace Corps (ECPC). In 2005, after a long delay, the pilot study was made. In the spring of 2009, however, nothing tangible had come out of it and the European Parliament repeated its demand that the ECPC be established.

Because of these and other facts there is a strong feeling among peace organisations and other NGOs, as well as among segments of the public, that oral agreement to make the EU into a serious promoter of world peace have less support in real policies than in ambitions, expressed by some groupings in the EU, to develop the EU into a military superpower, similar in kind to the USA.

The Swedish think tank Cogito belongs to a tradition of thought that tends to regard idealistic promises by those in power with some doubt and scepticism. At the same time, in our capacity as a think tank we are ready to give even traditional members of the power elite the benefit of the doubt. Our mission is to critically scruti-

nize the credibility of official statements and to provide alternative facts, which enable the public to make its own assessment.

In this particular case, we are aware that the EU is a highly multifaceted organisation with numerous policies and strategies, which sometimes even contradict each other. We know that both civilian and military programmes and policies are in use. Thus, the aim of this report is to provide a factual picture of the contributions to peace by the EU, with an emphasis on civilian aspects, their status, impact, and possibilities for development. Our ambition is also to promote a discussion of the EU as a peacemaker.

It is, of course, not possible, based on this study, to finally conclude whether the EU is developing into an international peace-promoting organisation or primarily into a military superpower. The policies and institutions of the EU contain aspects and fragments of both, and we believe that the final outcome is not yet settled but still possible to influence by democratic political activity.

However, it is clear from this study that those who oppose the role of the EU as a military superpower and favour its role to foster peace will have to mobilise and escalate their activity in order to promote effective new policies for peace as well as to strengthen and develop the peace programmes already in use.

Civilian and military at the same time – mission impossible?

This study shows that a major problem with international peacemaking is that when both civilian and military

means are employed in the same area, there is an urgent need for both a clearer distinction and more cooperation between the military and civilian spheres. Two Swedish experts are quoted in the study – one expert on civilian assistance, one professional military – who agree that Sweden’s mission in Afghanistan is an example where the vague distinction and low level of cooperation between civilian and military operations have had a direct negative effect on the population and on the success of the whole operation. It must therefore be questioned whether an organisation is capable of both making a clear distinction between military and civilian aspects and at the same time carrying out efficient cooperation between these two competing, if not contradictory, aspects of the peace mission. Isn’t it a mission impossible? Wouldn’t the conclusion be that, if both military and civilian aspects are considered necessary in a peace mission (and we do not deny that military aspects sometimes are needed), then the most visible, credible, and efficient method would be to let two clearly distinct organisations each take care of one of these aspects and then introduce the needed cooperation by joint planning on the level of headquarters? The problem to solve would then be – who should do what?

A military expert quoted in the report states that he believes that “all hard security work should be dealt with by NATO.” The alternative, he says, is that NATO would disappear and “that the EU then is the future since its actions are in tune with the times, like taking care of the human needs.” Although we agree neither with the notion that NATO should become a major military “peace-

maker” (for reasons not developed here), nor with the notion that the EU should do what NATO is doing today, the idea that the “hard security work” should be removed from the EU (and taken over by the UN) and that the EU should “take care of the human needs,” is interesting. The corollary here is, as we see it, that the EU should concentrate on civilian, non-military aspects of peace making. If the EU had such a profile, while the military peacekeeping interventions would be undertaken by the UN or the OSCE, which used to be the case, the major dilemmas of distinction and cooperation between civilian and military aspects of peace-promoting missions would be greatly simplified.

A civilian EU

The most far-reaching conclusion then would be: the EU should desist from military activity (which of course does not imply that member states should disarm, which is quite another issue). Instead the EU should significantly develop its civilian peace-promoting activities and grow into the world’s foremost civilian contributor to peace. The military peacekeeping missions considered necessary should be undertaken by others, primarily by the UN or possibly the OSCE. If this were done, the symbols and labels of the EU would eventually become equivalent with “civilian and non-military.” Once more, we would like to emphasize that such a choice would not prevent any of the EU member states from contributing to military peace missions, as all of them are members of both the UN and the OSCE.

All of this consequently begs the crucial question: Is

there today any civilian peace-promoting EU activity that could be developed? The answer is: Yes, there is, even though it is underdeveloped, lacks efficiency, and suffers from several serious flaws.

EU civilian peacemaking in action

Some major examples of EU civilian peace-promoting policies are the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and the Instrument for Stability. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism is a main tool for civilian crisis management under the ESDP, designed to function as an immediate reaction tool before, during or after tensions, as well as to enable rapid decision-making and planning. The Instrument for Stability is a general framework for crisis management, whose main goal is to strengthen states defined as “fragile.”

Beside such rather well-defined civilian peace-policies, there are also a great number of non-military dimensions related to peace making which are integrated into other spheres of activity of the EU.

Human rights clauses

One example is the partnership and association agreements with third parties, which contain a human rights clause allowing for trade benefits and development cooperation to be suspended in case of abuse. The major problem with this type of policy is that the EU has not been capable of implementing its own principles. Unfortunately, there are several cases where the other party to an agreement containing a human rights clause has violated human rights – as reported by reliable human

rights organisations – without any reaction from the EU. A currently well-known case is of course Israel. Even in 2002, the European Parliament and the European Commission alike wanted to suspend the association agreement between the EU and Israel owing to Israeli violations of human rights principles. But the Council chose not to act, which shows the urgency to discuss how to guarantee that the human rights clause as an instrument for civilian EU peace promotion can be saved from being mere posturing devoid of a serious intention that the principles should be implemented.

Sanctions

Another example is the possibility to impose targeted sanctions on states, organisations and individuals. At the beginning of 2009, the EU had, all in all, some form of targeted sanction in use vis-à-vis more than twenty countries, either directed at the state as such or at individuals, organisations or certain types of relations (financial, political or commercial). However, there are no clear rules for how and when and against whom sanctions can and should be imposed. This has often resulted in ad hoc implementation, for example when the democratically elected Hamas government of the Palestine administration in 2006 was the victim of extremely severe financial sanctions by the EU because of its alleged refusal to accept certain demands of the peace process, while, in 2009, the Netanyahu-Lieberman government of Israel, which also does not accept the basic demands of the peace process, has not been the subject of any sanctions nor even of threats of sanctions by the EU. Regrettably,

the ad hoc implementation of the instrument of sanctions may give the impression that the EU imposes sanctions not in order to contribute to peace and the rule of global law, but in order to promote certain biased and partisan interests on the global arena.

Military dominance – the focus of the EU

That the EU can play a significant role in civilian activities is underlined by the fact that there are **more civilian than military EU missions**, a total of 13 civilian EU missions and only a total of six military EU missions. The main part of the missions comprises capacity-building of security reforms, i.e., education of the police and monitoring police missions, among other things.

Nevertheless, this study maintains that regardless of the EU's new agenda on a transformed security thinking in relation to the changed character of conflicts today, **the focus on the civilian aspect in the regulations and practices of the EU is still narrow** and often eclipsed by the supporting military action.

A major example that shows that the civilian approach is weak in reality, although rather forcefully articulated verbally, concerns to attempt to establish a **European Civilian Peace Corps** (ECPC). The proposal to create the European Civil Peace Corps was introduced even in 1994, by Alexander Langer (Italian Green member of the European Parliament). In 1999, the EU Parliament passed a recommendation (A4-0047/99) to the Council, which “recommends the Council to produce a feasibility study about the possibility of establishing an ECPC within the framework of a stronger and more effective

Common Foreign and Security Policy.” Such a study was finalized six years later on 29 November 2005, concluding that “the original thinking behind ECPC is still valid” (Robert, Vilby, Aiolfi and Otto, 2005). The latest update on what has or has not been done regarding an ECPC is mentioned in the European Parliament's resolution of 19 February 2009 regarding the EU's Security and Defence Policy and its Security Strategy. The resolution states that the Parliament believes that the peacemaking partnership should be developed to a European Civil Peace Corps.

This shows that despite repeated demands by the European Parliament and despite the grand phrases about civilian peacemaking, there is absolutely no trace of an ECPC in real life ten years after the first EP recommendation. On the other hand, during the same ten-year period, since the first hard decision about the establishment of a military dimension to the CFSP, the EU has established a military apparatus in Brussels and has dispatched EU soldiers on a number of military EU missions.

The civilian option needs developing

Nevertheless, it needs to be emphasised again that there is considerable basic infrastructure and experience in the EU system for civilian peace work in many different forms and aspects. This should be considered the basis from which to accelerate the transformation of the EU into an exclusively, or at least primarily civilian promoter of peace on the global arena. As this report shows, there are many practical problems to cope with, one major difficulty being the lack of speed and personnel. For example, the EU can often not deliver what is required ac-

ording to UN estimates when it comes to the amount of police needed for different operations. Also, the staff of the Council Secretariat has not yet been fully adapted to the function as coordinator of the cooperation between operational planning of a mission and mission support.

This study shows that there is a need to strengthen missions support and to improve the capacities of the staff in charge of civilian operations in Brussels regarding strategic and operational planning and mission support.

Although we propose the “civilisation” of the peace policy of the EU, we are of course aware that this may not transpire, at least not in the short run. Even so, the findings and conclusions of this study are still valuable. As long as the EU performs both civilian and military projects, there must be an effort to accomplish the “mission impossible” of achieving both distinction and cooperation. The strategic planning for joint civil/military operations must be improved. The recruitment mechanism of civilian personnel for crisis management capabilities is another aspect that must be advanced in order to improve the civilian peace work of the EU.

Finally – whatever happens to the military activity of the EU – this study recommends the EU to continue to develop and reorganise the civilian part of its peace operations.

Stockholm, May 2009

PER GAHRTON,
CHAIRPERSON OF COGITO

What does the European Union do for world peace?

The Civilian Dimension in Peace Operations

This study was made by Assistant Researcher Carin Berg at the School of Global Studies, Gothenburg University, Sweden, in dialogue with Associate Professors Fredrik Söderbaum and Michael Schulz, both of the School of Global Studies. The study presented here is an abridged version, edited by Cogito in agreement with the author.

Cogito, May 2009

1. Introduction

This report is part of a project, initiated by the Swedish green think tank Cogito, whose objective is to describe and analyze the civilian dimension to EU peace operations, since the establishment of the Union. The project is carried out by the Green European Foundation.

The study is prompted by the need to examine more closely the fact that EU policies on peace, security, and conflict management contain both civilian and military dimensions while the civilian dimension often lacks a holistic approach and tends to be narrow in relation to its actual performance. Furthermore, there is a general view among European Green Parties that the EU primarily focuses on military tools and that these traditional strategies are no longer adequate given the changed situation concerning security threats around the world to-

day. In these respects, there is a need for a different kind of peace operation and greater emphasis on the civilian dimension in order to make such operations more successful.

Since the establishment of the EU in 1992, conflict prevention and peacekeeping have been tangibly prioritized. According to the High Representative of the EU, Javier Solana, the EU is a global great power and it shares the responsibility for global security in all major conflict zones as well as in possible conflict and disaster zones around the world.

The military effectiveness of major interventions frequently brings civilian chaos in its wake. Therefore, a larger measure of civilian resources is needed during and after crises, as are greater cooperation and a clearer distinction between the military and civilian dimensions.

The defence programme of the EU consists of interstate cooperation, where France and Britain are among the key advocates of increasing the military capacities of the EU, while countries like Germany and Sweden seek to promote increasing civilian investments (Åkerström, 2008). The differences between the countries most heavily invested in the civilian aspect of the defence programme and those who are not, is usually related to their own foreign policy, which they do not want to contradict (Biscop and Andersson, 2008, p. 5). In general, there is considerable need for the EU to become more ambitious in achieving its objective of peace, stability, and development in regions and countries of conflict, that is to say, to help build a solid foundation at the civil society level.

2. The Civilian Peace Operations of the EU

The UN defines peace operations in different ways depending on the phase of the conflict and what task is to be carried out (e.g., peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, and peacemaking) The most general term is probably peacekeeping, which is sometimes used as a synonym for the wider term peace operation. According to Paul F. Diehl, there are roughly four major phases of a conflict: the pre-violence phase, the actual armed conflict, the cease-fire phase and, lastly, the phase following a peace agreement. What specific mission should be performed under what phase varies according to the needs and circumstances (Diehl, 2008, pp. 17-18).

In this report, the term peace operation contains three phases: conflict prevention (prior to the eruption of violent conflict), peacekeeping/enforcement (during violent conflict) and peace building (when a violent conflict has subsided).

The EU is one of the largest organisations in the world enabled to act as a peacekeeper and peacebuilder (regulated through its Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP, and the European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP). The EU's decision-making procedure for conflict management is very complex and changes constantly, which makes it difficult to provide a consistent description of its functions. But some parts, which are more or less invariable, will be explained here. The responsibility for peace missions lies mainly with the Council. The foreign and security policy of the EU is one of the two areas where member states do not delegate decision-making. Rather, the member states cooperate in this field, which can therefore be said to be-

long to the second and third pillars.

The Commission is involved in conflict prevention and crisis management tasks in the EU's peace building missions through its external policy areas. The external policy related to the peace work consists mainly of international development, but also of trade. In this area, the Commission can be involved in "conflict prevention through a wide range of external assistance policy frameworks and special programmes for human rights, gender and democratization."¹

2.1 The Common Foreign and Security Policy

The CFSP was established in 1993 as the second pillar of the EU, the result of a strong need for a separate institution dealing with new and changing security threats in the world. The principles and general guidelines of the CFSP are defined by the Council as well as by the common strategies of the EU and its member states. CFSP work is carried out on an interstate level, its aim being to promote democracy, peace, and security through five main objectives:

1. to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principle of the United Nations Charter;
2. to comprehensively strengthen the security of the Union;
3. to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principle of the Helsinki

¹ <http://www.eplo.org/index.php?id=91>

Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those pertaining to "external borders";

4. to promote international co-operation;
5. to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms²

The CFSP provides member states with the possibilities to act jointly in different international contexts. The EU deploys both civilian and military resources in crisis management, which does not mean that all joint actions concern peace operations. The EU civilian crisis management comprises seven instruments, which are not exclusively used in peace operations:

1. Humanitarian assistance;
2. Emergency and rescue services and border control.
3. Police deployment and training;
4. Mine clearance and demining;
5. Arms control and destruction, the fight against illicit traffic and terrorism;
6. Post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction;
7. Support for human rights and democracy, and election monitoring.³

2.2 The European Security and Defence Policy

The ESDP is the main element of the EU's second pil-

² http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm

³ http://spiderman.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Navigation.nsf/index2?readform&http://spiderman.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf/7732def81ddd7ac1256c240034fe65/b8af9ade01c7caf6c1256c700056b5b7?OpenDocument

lar. The CFSP mission is carried out through the Council Secretariat. Furthermore, the ESDP is politically controlled and strategically directed by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU. The ESDP has four principal instruments for its use: the PSC, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). The CPCC, which was established in 2007, is “a new entity in charge of the planning, deployment, conduct and review of civilian ESDP crisis-management operations.”⁴ The CPCC’s main task is the responsibility for the civilian crisis management (which can be carried out either by civilian means exclusively or by a combination of civilian and military means). In 2008, the CPCC had eight missions in six countries in the areas of the police, border assistance management, rule of law, and security sector reform (ESDP Newsletter, 2008). To ensure consistency in ESDP missions, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Policy Unit) monitors and analyses developments in all areas relevant to the CFSP together with the Commission (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997). Another unit working closely with the Policy Unit is the Situation Centre, which is the joint body of the EU for collecting and processing early-warning information with regard to conflicts, which it receives from member countries, the EU Satellite Centre or its surveillance missions.⁵

4 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/pages24-25-CEU8003ESDP6final_vers.pdf

5 <http://www.eu-upplysningen.se/Amnesomraden/Utrikes-och-sakerhetspolitik/Institutioner-och-organ-inom-EU/>

The peace work of the EU along with the ESDP missions includes civilian as well as military crisis management. The military category includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and peacemaking⁶ while the civilian dimension of the ESDP is advisory, including training and monitoring, as well as executive tasks. The executive tasks have four priority areas: police training, strengthening of the rule of law, improvement of countries’ civilian administration, and protection of civilians. Furthermore, civilian ESDP missions include support for the special representatives of the EU. These priorities have shaped the approach of the EU to the development of civilian capabilities (Øberg, 2006, pp. 22-23). It is the responsibility of the Civilian Crisis Management Committee (CIVCOM) to improve the non-military crisis response or conflict prevention capabilities. In 2001, an EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts was adopted by the General Affairs Council, originally developed by the Swedish Presidency. This programme helped to improve the strategies of the EU related to conflict prevention when it comes to cooperation with international organisations and priorities, political areas and regions (Barnes, 2002, p. 2 and 7). The largest civilian ESDP mission as of today is the rule of law mission, EULEX in Kosovo, launched in December 2008. The mission includes three components: justice, the police and customs. The operation comprises 1,900 EU experts as well as 1,100 local staff, and it is projected to operate during 16 months on a budget of 205 million EUR

6 http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/conflict/index_en.htm

(ESDP Newsletter, 2009).

2.3 The Rapid Reaction Mechanism

The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) is a key tool for civilian crisis management under the ESDP, aimed to function as an immediate reaction before, during or after political tensions as well as to enable rapid decision-making and planning of missions. The RRM “provides flexible short-term support to safeguard or re-establish conditions of stability in the partner countries. It can intervene immediately, prior to, during and after a crisis.”⁷ For example, the RRM may fund mine clearance, technical assistance, training of the police, election monitoring, mediation and peace talks, the establishment and consolidation of civilian administrators, and the reconstruction of houses and institutions. How the RRM is to be put to use is regulated by the Commission, in consultation with the Council. The mechanism is designed to work in conjunction with NGOs, international organisations and individual experts, and the duration of RRM missions is set to a maximum of six months, with the justification that long-term aid should take over after that. The RRM can support over 60 operations at a time all over the world and has been used in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, among other places.⁸ In order for countries to not revert to conflict, the RRM includes “a rapid restoration of economic activity and the build-up of civil administration, the police and

7 http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/conflict/rapid_reaction/index_en.htm

8 <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12701.htm>

judiciary”⁹ while aiming to “support the EU’s political priorities and seek to defuse crises opening the way for the political process and longer-term support.”¹⁰

2.4 External Policy and Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention is given the highest priority on the foreign policy and security agenda of the EU, which is justified by the fact that “it is generally recognised that the human rights of all concerned are best protected by the prevention of serious communal violence or armed conflict of any kind” (Hadden, 2009). The EU does not need the authorization of the UN to act before situations deteriorate and, therefore, there is greater scope for the EU to act without a UN mandate. Still, the UN and the OSCE are the most important partners for the EU in conflict prevention operations. When the EU interferes in a conflict, which is deteriorating, most of the missions are carried out through a UN mandate and thus often have a military character. Stability is a keyword in EU policy, which is primarily aimed at avoiding and preventing conflicts. Moreover, a key aspect for successful conflict prevention pertains to understanding the causes behind violent conflict and the means through which prevention is most efficient. Such means could be, for instance, the preventive deployment or technical assistance of civilian or military personnel, mediation or external advice (Hadden, 2009).

9 http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/conflict/index_en.htm

10 http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/conflict/rapid_reaction/index_en.htm

A general development framework for crisis management, developed by the EU, is the “Instrument for stability” for 2007-2013. This instrument of financial aid was established in order to improve the stability of countries with regard to “human and economic development and the promotion of human rights, democracy and fundamental freedoms in the context of the external relations policy of the European Union.”¹¹ The primary goal of the instrument is to strengthen states defined as “fragile.” Its short-term component aims at preventing conflicts and supporting political stabilisation in post-conflict phases, during a maximum of 18 months. The instrument’s long-term component mainly concerns international, regional, and national capacity building of exposed countries, which are threatened by globalisation in a negative sense.¹² Preventing crisis and violent conflicts at an early stage is effectuated through stabilising measures such as development co-operation and external assistance, economic cooperation and trade policy, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies and diplomacy (for example, political dialogue, mediation, and different kind of sanctions).

2.5 Economic Cooperation, Trade Policy, and Diplomacy

The policies of the EU in the fields of economic cooperation, trade, and diplomacy contain elements which function directly or indirectly to promote peace. The diplomatic mechanism of the EU, for instance, operates on

11 <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l14171.htm>

12 <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l14171.htm>

two main levels: the community level and the intergovernmental level. On the community level the EU and different EU delegations together implement the external activities of the Union, such as the relations with third countries, economic matters, development, and humanitarian assistance.¹³

2.5.a Human Rights clauses

It is of great significance to the EU that its foreign and development policy be permeated by human rights in accordance with the Vienna Convention, Article 60:3:b.¹⁴ Human rights and human security are essential to the crisis management work, an important aspect given the fact that human rights tend to decrease tensions in the country in question. In this regard, exerting hard pressure on countries to implementations of human rights can be used as a means to prevent conflict. The EU insists that all agreements with third parties concerning trade, cooperation, dialogue, partnership and association, contain a human rights clause, which allows trade benefits and development cooperation to be suspended in case of abuse. Since there are multiple EU agreements with third parties that violate human rights in the form of torture, political arrests or censorship, the Parliament urges the EU member states to take strong political action to pressure the countries of concern. Instructed by the Parliament, the Commission has devised a mechanism for im-

13 <http://textus.diplomacy.edu/textusBin/BViewers/oview/eudiplomacy/OviewFullText.asp?IDxlink=43389>

14 The entire Convention can be found at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf

plementing the human rights clause. As a result, human rights have been systematically included as a crucial element of the external agreements of the EU since 2005. The human rights clause was developed in order for the EU to encourage sanctions rather than to have to suspend agreements. Nevertheless, the EU has “the ultimate right to suspend all or part of an agreement if a partner country does not fulfil its human rights obligations” (Miller, 2004).

2.5.b Sanctions

The sanctions that the EU may employ comprise reducing cultural, scientific and technical cooperation, postponing or suspending bilateral contacts or new projects, imposing trade embargos or suspending all cooperation in a particular sector. However, the human rights clauses do not in themselves explain how sanctions should be used. To justify the use of human rights clauses, the EU frequently refers to the Cotonou Agreement of June 23, 2000, which is also alluded to in several respects in the 2003 EU annual human rights report.¹⁵ The EU Commission prefers, what is called, “positive sanctions” rather than “negative sanctions.” Positive sanctions are those that should not affect humanitarian assistance to non-governmental channels and whose suspension and termination should always be used as a last alternative. The Commission advocates diplomatic activities such as dialogue and negotiations with the government of concern.

Since 2006, different types of sanctions have, for ex-

ample, been carried out against Burma and its government due to the lack of democracy and human rights. Sanctions against Lebanon were decided on in 2005 as a result of the bombing that killed Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 23 other people. In 2006, further sanctions were implemented as a result of the war between Hezbollah and Israel. Other countries affected by EU sanctions are Iraq, Iran, Liberia and Sudan, among others (European Commission, 2001, and Miller, 2004). Taken together, at the beginning of 2009 the EU had some type of targeted sanction in use vis-à-vis more than twenty countries, either with regard to the state as such, individuals, organisations, or with regard to certain types of relations (e.g. financial, political or commercial).¹⁶

2.6 Humanitarian Aid

Humanitarian aid is per definition a civilian undertaking, and most humanitarian aid agencies prefer to work without armed protection. Nonetheless, there are at times obvious threats to international aid workers who need the assistance of military personnel. When civilian and military personnel work closely within the same mission, separating the two dimensions tends to be confusing, and civilian personnel might get unintentionally involved in military tasks (Hadden, 2009).

The EU is the world’s largest source of humanitarian aid today. The Council Regulation of July 5 1996 is the primary document defining the capacity of the humanitarian aid action and the forms of cooperation between the Union, the member states, international organiza-

15 The complete report can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/doc/report03_en.pdf

16 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm

tions, and NGOs.¹⁷ The Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) of the European Commission acts all over the world where there are serious humanitarian crises, whether man-made conflicts or natural disasters. According to the EU, “experience shows that attempts to make people, places and property less vulnerable do work: fewer human lives are lost, less material harm is done, and when a new disaster does strike, the level of humanitarian aid required is lower” (Humanitarian Aid and the European Union, 2001, p. 10).

The EU’s humanitarian aid has three main elements, which concern both situations in the wake of natural disasters and man-made conflicts: emergency aid, food aid, and aid to refugees from conflict areas and migrants displaced within a country or region at war. The humanitarian aid programmes can be used during crises as well as in post-conflict phases, and both of these types generally run in the short-term (maximum six months).

2.7 Peace Building in the Post-Conflict Phase

The post-conflict work of the EU is regulated by the Council Regulation (EC) No. 2258/96, which deals with rehabilitation and reconstruction issues. Post-conflict missions are aimed at the reestablishment of countries that have suffered serious damage through war, civil disorder or natural disasters. The missions are to be carried out urgently, but they can be either short- or long-term

17 The complete report can be found at :

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996R1257:EN:NOT>

operations. The short-term tasks are: the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, mine clearance, social reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, and the demobilization and reintegration of troops. Long-term tasks are the re-launching of production and the restoration of institutional capacities, particularly at the local level (European Commission, 2003). Furthermore, the EU has underlined the importance that everyone involved in a conflict, victims as well as participants, be reintegrated in society (politically, socially, and economically) and that the main social structures be rapidly rebuilt (the economy, the judiciary, the police, and the civil administration). Among other things, the EU supports ex-combatants by civilian peace workers who implement signed peace agreements. Demobilisation and disarmament programmes are also important aspects of the peace operations of the EU in order to prevent conflicts to flare up again.¹⁸

2.8 The ESDP Operations

The EU currently has eight ESDP missions, and five exclusively civilian missions have already been completed around the world (as categorised by the EU).

The completed civilian ESDP missions are:

- EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT), former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2006)
- EU Police Mission (EUPOL PROXIMA), former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2004-2005)
- EU Rule of Law Mission (EUJUST THEMIS),

18 http://ec.europa.eu/world/peace/geographical_themes/conflict/index_en.htm

- Georgia (2004-2005)
- EU Police Mission (EUPOL RD Congo), DR-Congo (2006-2007)
- Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM Monitoring Mission), Aceh, Indonesia (2006).

- EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform (EUSSR), Guinea-Bissau (since 2008)
- EU security sector reform mission (EUSEC RD), DR-Congo (since 2005).

The ongoing civilian ESDP missions are:

- EU Police Mission (EUPM), Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 2003)
- EU Rule of Law mission (EULEX), Kosovo (since 2008)
- EU Police Mission (EUPOL RD), DR-Congo (since 2007)
- EU Police Mission (EUPOL COPPS), Palestinian Territories (since 2006)
- EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), Palestinian Territories/Rafah (since 2005)
- EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), Georgia (since 2008)
- EU Police Mission (EUPOL,) Afghanistan (since 2007)
- EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission (EU JUST LEX), Iraq/Brussels (since 2005).

The completed ESDP missions, which are in part civilian, in part military, are:

- Support to African Union Mission II (AMIS II), Sudan/Darfur (2006).

The ongoing ESDP missions, which are in part civilian, in part military, are:

Moreover, there are currently three ongoing missions and three completed missions around the world which are exclusively military.

The completed military ESDP missions are:

- EU Military Operation (CONCORDIA), former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003)
- EU Military Operation (ARTEMIS- RD), DR-Congo (2003)
- EU Force (EUFOR – RD), DR-Congo (2003).

The ongoing military ESDP missions are:

- EU Military Operation (EUFOR ALTHEA), Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 2004)
- EU Military Operation (EUFOR), Tchad/RCA (since 2008)
- EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR), Atlanta (since 2008).

This mapping shows that there are a total of 13 exclusively civilian ESDP missions and only a total of six military ESDP missions. The number of civilian missions is higher than the number of military operations because of, among other things, the many police missions. The interesting fact is the actual financial cost of civilian versus military operations, which will be dealt with in sec-

tion five below. It is also interesting to note that there are numerous EU peace missions but few receiving countries, which is due to the high amount of follow-up tasks of earlier missions.

Regardless of the amount of on-going EU operations, few can be categorized as peacekeeping operations considering the type of personnel of the missions and the mandates. The main part of the missions consists of capacity-building of security reforms, i.e., education of the police, monitoring of police missions, etc. This means that the EU's peace policy is primarily targeted toward peace-building in post-conflict phases, which involves security issues and capacity-building. Only infrequently does the EU conduct peacekeeping operations.

3. Civilian and military dimensions of the peace operations

There is an ongoing debate as to whether civilian or military means are the most effective to further world peace. A common opinion is that there is considerable need for a clearer distinction and more effective co-operation between civilian and military performance during peace missions.

Anders Nordström, of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), and Håkan Syrén, Sweden's former supreme commander and currently Chairman of the Military Committee of the EU, have called attention to Sweden's missions in Afghanistan as an example where the low level of distinction and co-operation between civilian and military operations had a direct negative effect on the population. The primary task

of the Swedish military in Afghanistan is to promote security and stability, while Sida's mandate concerns poverty alleviation and development. These two operations are separate, but closely linked on the ground, which creates confusion since it can be difficult for the native population to distinguish between military and civilian tasks. This case could be applied to a great many EU peace missions as well. What might also cause confusion when trying to distinguish between civilian and military responsibilities, is that different tasks are governed by different laws and regulations. Sida's civilian efforts are mainly regulated by international principles, such as International Humanitarian Law (IHL)¹⁹, while the Swedish military authorities follow chapter VII²⁰ of the UN charter (Nordström and Syrén, 2008).

It is interesting that the UN Charter does not mention the term "peacekeeping." For this reason, the term "Chapter Six and a Half" of the Charter was created by UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld in order to place the term peacekeeping between the traditional methods for peacefully settling disputes.

Within the EU, operational coordination is divided between the Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO) and the Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC). The objective of the CMCO is to strategically coordinate the tasks of

19 IHL is a set of rules whose objective is to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who do not participate in hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare.

20 Chapter VII – Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.shtml>

all of the EU units dealing with crisis management for a specific country. The CIMIC manages operative coordination as well as the coordination between the civilian and military parts of EU crisis management on the ground. The organisational structures of the UN and the EU are almost identical in this regard with the exception that, within UN operations, the highest ranked military commander is also responsible for the civilian tasks (Åkerström, 2008).

As examined in section two, through the different phases of a conflict cycle the EU operates on the basis of a combination of civilian (mainly police) and military staff and means. In this regard, Emil Kirschner has adopted the term “civmil,” originally coined by Javier Solana in connection with one of the peace operations of the EU (Kirschner, 2009). Birger Heldt foregrounds the relevance of Solana’s explanation of a constant mixture of civilian and military dimensions, but approaches the issue from a different perspective, arguing that “the criterion is not really what kind of personnel [is being used], but whether the mission has an executive mandate/function, or whether it lacks such a mandate/function, and attempts to build capacity ... of domestic actors so that they can carry out the executive actions” (Heldt, 2009).

Along with the CSDP missions, the civilian tasks are included with the military tasks regardless of the lack of specific guidelines for civilian missions in the UN Charter.²¹ One such example is the EU mission in Bos-

21 Article 309 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: “The tasks referred to in Article I-41 (1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament

nia-Herzegovina, where the EU has been present since 2001 with three major, different missions yet has been lacking successful common strategic planning.²² The EU is aware of its lack of tools for cooperation between its civilian and military missions, and in 2004 the European Council adopted an action plan dealing with the civilian aspects of the ESDP.²³ The plan commits the Council to a larger and stronger cooperation between the instruments for civilian and military crisis management with the aim to develop general concepts and tools and to plan and conduct operations.²⁴

The ESDP prioritizes the capability of civilian peace operations, and its priority areas for civil interventions are congruent with the civilian headline goal for 2008, which underlines the importance of strengthening civilian missions in the field, defined as police operations, the strengthening of the rule of law, civil administration, and civil protection (EU in the World, p. 28, 2005).

operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”

22 http://www.aff.a.se/vf2006_2/Boblin%20sid%2032.htm

23 The European Security and Defence Policy, or the ESDP, is a major component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, covering defence and military aspects. The ESDP is the successor of the European Security and Defence Identity under NATO, but differs in that it falls under the jurisdiction of the European Union itself, including countries with no ties to NATO.

24 <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Action%20Plan%20for%20Civilian%20Aspects%20of%20ESDP.pdf>

Regardless of the new EU agenda for a transformed security policy in relation to the changing character of today's conflicts, the civilian focus of the regulations and operations within the EU is still narrow and often considered secondary in relation to military action.

4. The European Civil Peace Corps

In 1994, a proposal to create a European Civil Peace Corps (ECPC) was introduced by Alexander Langer (Italian Green member of the European Parliament) as a result of the international community's failure to deal with the Balkan crisis. At this time, the instruments of the EU for conflict prevention and crisis management were not greatly developed in terms of a civilian strategy. The aim of the proposal was to engage professional civilian forces (European NGOs) in actual political conflicts and during military intensification. The ECPC is organized independently from military bodies, but cooperates with them in peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the proposal underlines the importance of a larger involvement of civilian capacity in EU missions before the outbreak of violent conflict as well as during such situations in order to successfully sustain de-escalation and peacebuilding through local capacities.

On February 10 1999, the EU Parliament passed a recommendation (A4-0047/99) to the Council regarding the proposed ECPC, "considering that the military response to international conflicts often has to be combined with political efforts to reconcile belligerent parties, to put a genuine end to violent conflicts and recreate

conditions of mutual confidence."²⁵ This recommendation explains that the ECPC should only work under the mandates of the UN or regional organizations. The recommendation was based on the need for a stronger and more effective common foreign and security policy after the end of the cold war, as new conflicts erupted in complex formations. The purpose of the ECPC was, furthermore, to strengthen the civilian capabilities of peacebuilding such as humanitarian aid, the strengthening of human rights, reintegration, mediation, and rehabilitation (Gourlay, 2004).

The ECPC was to be comprised by a full-time staff managing all the administration as well as by a pool of specialized staff (including skilled and unskilled volunteers), ready to undertake part-time or short-term tasks. In practice, however, the priority of the ECPC was originally the prevention of escalation of man-made violent conflicts as well as the disarmament of ongoing conflicts by civilian means. This were to be done by creating the necessary connections between diplomatic efforts and civil society, by strengthening the relations between, on the one hand, humanitarian aid and, on the other, actors promoting economic development and increased inter-state dependencies. Since rebuilding missions are very costly, the majority of the efforts are strategically designed to deal with conflict prevention. During a conflict, the peacekeeping operations of the ECPC are geared towards, among other things, mediation, humanitarian aid, reintegration, rehabilitation, rebuilding, the stabili-

25 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A4-1999-0047+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

zation of economic structures, the monitoring of human rights, the temporary exercise of public authority, and information campaigns.²⁶

The 1999 European Parliament recommendation advises “the Council to produce a feasibility study about the possibility of establishing an ECPC within the framework of a stronger and more effective Common Foreign and Security Policy.”²⁷ Such a study was finalized six years later on November 29 2005, its aim being to analyze the possibilities to establish an ECPC for pre- and post-conflict situations (excluding humanitarian aid and development assistance). The study thoroughly describes how the most successful recruitment system of civilians for crisis response work might look like in a future ECPC. It makes comparisons with the US Peace Corps and other organisations in general (mainly NGOs) and their recruitment processes in particular. Moreover, it discusses the national recruitment systems of European countries and the pros and cons, with a view to the recruitment process of staff to the ECPC. The study also deals with how ECPC staff should be trained for its specific mission and how different missions may be financed. The conclusion drawn is “that there is no common European uniform model for national registration and/or recruitment of volunteers and professionals for international short and long term missions” (Robert, Vilby, Aiolfi and Otto, 2005). Even so, some structures could be high-

26 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A4-1999-0047&language=SV&mode=XML>

27 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A4-1999-0047+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>

lighted for the benefit of establishing an efficient ECPC, such as the deployment of mission-specific professionals rather than inexperienced volunteers. Of further importance for the establishment of a successful ECPC is a series of questions pertaining to structural management, e.g., whether it should be centralized or decentralized, whether it needs a central management unit, what the management function should look like, and what costs are to be expected. The study offers several recommendations to the basic plan of the ECPC. Such recommendations are, for example, that the term Peace Corps needs to be revised since it is too similar to the US Peace Corps. The semantic similarity is misleading since the US Peace Corps provides qualified experts for crisis management interventions all over the world. Overall, the feasibility study shows that “the original thinking behind ECPC is still valid. ECPC can be a flexible and effective instrument to respond to crisis situations world wide. In addition, the establishment of ECPC is likely to support the development of EU-based civil society activities on peace and conflict” (Robert, Vilby, Aiolfi and Otto, 2005).

The EU Peacebuilding Partnership (PbP)²⁸ is thus far the initiative that comes closest to the establishment of Langer’s idea. The PbP, which aims at mobilizing and consolidating civilian expertise for peacebuilding, has been involved in implementing the idea of the ECPC as the right instrument to tackle today’s crisis by civilian means. In 2007-2008 the PbP took a step towards the implementation of the ECPC in the form of a practical

28 The full PbP document can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ifs/pbp_en.htm

decision within the framework of the Instrument for Stability. Nevertheless, the proposal has still not been carried into effect and the military mechanism of European Security Policy continues to dominate the agenda. Several problems must be solved before a full implementation of the ECPC is possible. Some of these problems are, for example, what role the ECPC would have within the overall EU framework and how the ECPC can be institutionally integrated into it. Another question is what differences and improvements the ECPC might entail compared to the civilian work of the EU in place today. If the EU continues to develop its monitoring mission system and opts for including professional non-state experts to tackle today's types of conflicts, a European Civil Peace Corps might very well be the most effective and successful way.

The latest update on what has and has not been done regarding the ECPC is mentioned in the European Parliament's resolution of February 19 2009, which concerns the Security and Defence Policy and its Security Strategy. It is stated that the Parliament believes that the peace-making partnership should be developed to a European Civil Peace Corps. What that practically means for the future remains to be seen.²⁹

5. Costs and Funding of the Civilian Peace Operations

There is a key difference between the financing of civilian operations versus military operations within the EU. Civilian missions are mainly funded through the annual

Commission budget, which has its basis in the relative contributions from all the member states and, in some cases, from the member states directly.³⁰ The financing of military missions, on the other hand, is voluntary and paid by the nations which will take part in a planned operation. This type of financing operates through the special EU financing mechanism ATHENA (Hadden, 2009). The CFSP budget is a subsection of the Community budget classified under "external relations" of the Community funds. But, again, it is the Commission that makes contracts and distributes the budget in accordance with the planned action.

The ongoing or completed ESDP operations funded by the Community budget are:

- EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)
- EU Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (PROXIMA)
- EU Police Advisory Team in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT)
- EU Police Mission in DR Congo (EUPOL)
- EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX)
- EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (EUJUST Themis)
- EU security sector reform mission in the Demo-

30 Further information on the financing of the EU civilian crisis management operations can be found in the Commissions Communication of November 28, 2001.

29 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0075+0+DOC+XML+V0//SV>

cratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC)

- EU Support to AMIS II (Darfur)
- EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh (AMM)
- EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)
- EU Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah crossing point (EU BAM Rafah)

(EU Council Secretariat, 2007).

The staff recruited by the member states for civilian missions are funded by the member states themselves. Furthermore, the education of the staff sent on civilian missions is funded by the country in question, or by the countries responsible for the education/training. There is also frequently a major interest in third countries wanting to contribute staff and equipment for EU operations. Usually the keenest interest is shown by European NATO member countries that are not members of the EU, or countries from the region where the operation will take place.³¹

About six cents per euro of the annual budget are allocated to “the EU as a global player”, i.e. to emergency aid (natural disasters) or long-term assistance (prosperity, stability and security). In 2008, 7.6 billion EUR was spent on such matters (see table on next page³²).

It might not be that difficult to explain how the budget of the civilian peace operations of the EU is compiled, but finding the exact figures of the total expenditures is very complicated and includes more than one aspect of the budget. This in turn leads to further complications in

31 <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/9199/a/83224>

32 http://ec.europa.eu/budget/budget_detail/last_year_en.htm

EU budget 2008 in figures

Expenditure estimates for EU policies (in billion EUR)	Budget 2008 initial adoption	Budget 2008 Final
Sustainable growth	58.0	58.3
Competitiveness	11.1	11.1
Cohesion	46.9	47.2
Natural resources	55.0	56.6
Freedom, security and justice (including fundamental rights and justice, security and liberties, migration flows)	0.7	0.7
Citizenship (including culture, media, public health and consumer protection)	0.6	0.6
EU as a global player	7.3	7.6
Administration	7.3	7.3
Compensations to new EU countries	0.2	0.2
Total	129.1	130.3

All figures in commitment appropriations

terms of comparing the budgets of civilian versus military operations, which would be a relevant and interesting finding for this report. Unfortunately, a comparison of the actual total cost between civilian and military operations cannot easily be made due to the different funding systems of the EU. It has therefore been left out of the report.

However, some figures have been found. Among them is the estimated total budget for the EU for 2009, which amounts to 133.8 billion EUR, of which 6% will be spent on the “EU as a global player.”³³ Furthermore, the specific financial figures of civilian operations for 2001-07 can also be found. The figures available for the costs

33 http://ec.europa.eu/budget/index_en.htm

of military operations have been found for the years 2004-2008. Detailed information on the amounts spent on different military operations is not accounted for. Such information is difficult to compile since the major costs of military operations are sometimes allocated in an ad hoc manner where they are most needed at the time (Hadden, 2009). These figures have been found at the European Commission website (more updated figures are not available). The budget is divided as follows (amounts in EUR).

CFSP Budget of the European Communities (2001-06):

- Conflict prevention: 4,186,482
- Non-proliferation and disarmament: 23,591,565
- Conflict resolution, verification and stabilisation of peace processes: 533,908,730

CFSP (Commission) RRM (This is a separate budget item within the regular budget of the European Communities) (2001-06):

- Different activities which include support to: peace processes, reconstruction assistance, electoral assistance, rehabilitation support, mediation, policy advice, truth and reconciliation support, media support, early conflict mitigation, Rule of Law packages, border assistance, and AIDS action plans.

Instrument for Stability (Budget of the European Commission) (2007): 116,653,764

- Crisis response and preparedness: 98,979,669
- IsF long-term components. (Actions related to chemical, nuclear and biological materials or agents): 26,040,303
- IsF long-term components. (Transregional actions related to crime, trafficking, protection of critical infrastructure, public health threats, and anti-terrorism activities): 11,013,435.

ATHENA Budget of the military operations (per year):

- 2004: 11,537,197
- 2005: 55,544,997
- 2006: 40,435,828
- 2007: 26,046,437
- 2008: 29,266,839

(Hadden, 2009, pp. 39-40).

6. The Civilian Peace Operations of the EU: Successful or not?

The EU ensures its capacity to handle the multifaceted character of conflicts through its ESDP missions, which comprise a range of military, civilian, economic, political and institution-building tools. According to the Coun-

cil, civilian crisis management is the most commonly used tool in ESDP missions. This might very well be the case, but as argued before, what is more interesting is to highlight the specific and narrow form of the civilian instruments deployed rather than the fact that civilian instruments *per se* are the most frequently used means. This does not mean that the EU itself is not aware of problems and challenges associated with its civilian undertakings, which the operations in DR-Congo, Darfur, Bosnia, Georgia, Aceh, and Rafah have demonstrated. To analyse the outcome of the crisis management missions of the EU, a full understanding of the institutional apparatus and of the bureaucratic constitution of UN peace operations is needed. This is not an easy research task. In the fall of 2008, the capacity of the CPCC was seen as fully operational. Even so, the “civmil” cooperation still needs to be further developed, as the French Presidency has proposed. One outcome is the establishment of four working groups at the Council Secretariat, which integrate civilian and military dimensions. These working groups cover intelligence, policy, planning, and operational implementation.

The most significant deficiency of the civilian operations of the EU is the lack of speed and personnel. For example, when the UN estimates the number of police needed for different operations, the EU can often not fulfil the requirement. The same goes for the time of implementation of operations, i.e., getting the staff to the actual location and making the mission fully operational. The Balkans is one example where the EU lacked the tools for recruitment and training of personnel, as well as for

achieving institutional consistency and tackling the “integration versus stabilization” dilemma. In the first ESDP mission of the EU (which took place in Bosnia) the lessons learned demonstrated precisely that there was a lack of staff and that a wider range of experts, rather than only the police, was needed. After the police mission in Bosnia, a number of civilian missions followed, which dramatically challenged the internal coordination of the EU. In this regard, the Civilian Headline Goal was a very helpful tool for improving institutional capacity and human resources for civilian crisis management operations. Nevertheless, even with an expanded and relatively well-integrated CPCC with better operative functions, civilian operations still need to be improved and expanded.

6.1 The Civilian Peace Operations of the EU: Possible improvements

Several elements could be changed to improve the success of the civilian peace operations. The staff of the Council Secretariat has not yet been fully adapted to the role as coordinator for the cooperation between operational planning of a mission and mission support. As for military operations, operational planning and support lie on a national level or within NATO, while civilian operations are run by a special EU unit located in Brussels. Some planning and administration is shared with the Commission, but detailed planning of civilian missions is delegated to the head of mission or to different specialized parties. There is a considerable need to strengthen the missions support and to further educate the staff in charge of civilian operations in Brussels when it comes

to strategic and operational planning and mission support, as it has little or no alternative to external planning bodies. Establishing a mechanism with this aim was one of the key elements of the recommendation behind the ECPC, discussed above. However, since the majority of EU operations at least appear to be civilian or a mixture of civilian and military tasks, it is important to improve the strategic planning for joint civil-military operations. Most of the operations would probably benefit from efficient civil-military cooperation, in particular the police missions.

Related to the above-mentioned success or failure with regard to the recruitment and implementation processes, the recruitment mechanism of civilian personnel for crisis management capabilities is another aspect that could be advanced in order to improve the civilian peace work. Civilian crisis management mainly depends on personnel seconded from EU member states, of which there tends to be scarce supply. Their effective and timely deployment requires that states increase the numbers and encouragement for service abroad, in order to make it a reasonable option for people to voluntarily participate in operations. Presently, there is no common recruitment standard for civilian ESDP missions. A common recruitment system would most likely increase the quality and availability of personnel as well as decrease delays and shortfalls during the recruitment process.

Similar problems can be found in the recruitment of civilian experts to UN and OSCE missions. Therefore, the EU might fruitfully learn from the experiences of these organisations when it comes to methods of staff recruit-

ment. After completing the recruitment of personnel for the specific tasks and operations, improvements of common training before missions might also be beneficial as shared core skills and training ought plausibly to improve the co-ordination between civilian experts of member states in the operations. Another means for improvement is the engagement of non-state experts in civilian crisis management. Their participation is likely to be valuable in numerous respects, including the work done in the Commission's rosters of experts and in the process to establish a civilian voluntary-type corps as well as their engagement with non-governmental organisations. In terms of the practical improvements of the operations, a more integrated approach to conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict peace-building would be desirable.

Lastly, and to reiterate a point already made, a general recommendation is that the EU continues to develop and re-structure the civilian part of its peace operations and carefully evaluates the necessity of potential military interventions in the future. This is said in light of the fact that military presence increases tensions in zones of conflict and sometimes also gives rise to actual violence. Moreover, military systems are inherently hierarchical and require strict obedience, which may obstruct a dialogue and mutual understanding (Åkerström, 2008). In the same vein, Willem Honig has pointed out that there is a need to change responsibility when it comes to operations and work in the area of security. He also states that the lack of results which sometimes characterises the work of the EU stems from the fact that the Union tries

to bite off more than it can chew. For example, NATO and not the EU should deal with hard security work, Honig maintains. At the same time, however, he argues that NATO might disappear in the future, a scenario in which the EU would have a much more prominent and crucial role, especially in view of the fact that the orientation of its security work would be more congruent with the needs of the current global security situation (which especially foregrounds human needs) (Honig, 2009).

The Commission states that “there will be more and more demand for civilian crisis management missions. In the future, we will probably experience a development of multi-dimensional missions with the need for greater coherence and coordination in the use of the various EU instruments on the ground.”³⁴ Since the EU has committed itself to developing civilian capabilities, the organization must move beyond its traditional institutional framework and carefully address the conceptual and practical vagueness of the concept of civilian crisis management.

7. Further Reading

1. Diehl Paul F. (2008) *Peace Operations. War and Conflict in the Modern World*, Cambridge

Content: For a comprehensive understanding of conflict management it is vital to understand the construction and function of the UN and regional organizations. This book is an excellent introduction to these issues, bringing together academic research for the development, operation and effectiveness of the UN and other organizations. It also analyzes the possibilities and limits of today’s peace operations as well as historical changes.

2. Smith Karen (2008) *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Cambridge

Content: This specialized book deals particularly with the EU as an international actor, scrutinizing the international relations it maintains and its foreign policy. It primarily explores five foreign policy objectives, furnishing a comprehensive understanding of the EU as a global player and how it has worked trying to achieve its goals. It is, moreover, organized according to themes such as regional cooperation, human rights, democracy and good governance, and conflict prevention.

3. Björkdahl Annika and Strömviik Maria (2008) *EU Crisis Management Operations. ESDP Bodies and Decision-Making Procedures*, DIIS Copenhagen

34 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EN_PESC.pdf

Content: This report addresses the difficulties and dilemmas of the decision-making process concerning EU-led peace support operations. It analyses the main structures of ESDP decision-making, raising questions like: What factors shape the way EU operations are formed and how can these complex decisions be better understood? It also deals with one of the main challenges for the future of the European Union, namely the ESDP's capacity when it comes to operations, personnel, and funding.

4. Hadden Tom (2009) *A Responsibility to Assist. Human Rights Policy and Practice in European Union Crisis Management Operations*, Oregon

Content: This book analyzes the current decision-making processes within the EU and in member states regarding the military, the police and civilian crisis management missions in non-member countries. It also explores the relatively new phenomenon of EU interventions in the global arena, especially in countries stricken by violent conflict. This book should not primarily be consulted as a guide to the pros and cons of EU actions/operations but, rather, as a description of the world's multifaceted structures today and of how the EU handles international crises.

5. Paris Roland and Sisk Timothy D. (2009) *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (Security and Governance)*, Oxon

Content: Paris and Sisk discuss today's peace operations

as a new phenomenon, ranging from peacebuilding initiatives to post-conflict rebuilding missions. The book seeks to understand the contradictions of postwar statebuilding and the problems with transforming cease-fires into lasting peace agreement (ultimately arguing that this is impossible).

6. Desch Michael C. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*, 2001, Baltimore

Content: This book is relatively dated, but is an interesting take on the questions of military-civil relations. The author argues that the civilian dimension should only be present during times of peace and vice versa. The book deals with the military-civil nexus from the time of the cold war onwards. It argues that at that time, there was much optimism in the world concerning an increasing influence in the future of the civilian dimension on the military.

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Appendix 1 – Abbreviations

		OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations	OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy	PSC	Political and Security Committee
CIVCOM	Civilian Crisis Management Committee	Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
CMCS	Civil-Military Coordination Section	UN-CMCoord /CMCO	United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability	UNSC	United Nations Security Council
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy	WFP	World Food Programme
ECHO	European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office	WTO	World Trade Organisation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy		
ESS	European Security Strategy		
EUMC	European Union Military Committee		
EUMS	European Union Military Staff		
EUSR	Support for EU Special Representatives		
GAC	General Affairs Council (EU)		
IHL	International Humanitarian Law		
MERCOSUR	El Mercado Común del Sur (Södra Gemensamma Marknaden)		
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization		
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation		