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STUDY GUIDE NATO

It's time to be UNique!



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Welcome Letter

Racha and I welcome you to PragueMUN 2020's NATO. We are extremely excited to meet you this coming February. This will be my first time participating in a non-UN committee and what attracted me to this one in particular is the unity behind it. Back from where I come from we have a saying "Humanity couldn't agree on God and he is the almighty, so how can you expect humanity to agree with you?" and in NATO this rule breaks as every communiqué requires the full support of all NATO members and that enthralls me.

This year's edition of NATO will be an intermediate committee which means that some will already have experience in their bag however for others it may be their first experience. Regardless of your experience, we strongly recommend that all of you read this study guide as carefully as you can and use it as a starting point to begin your research adventure. The first step to properly representing your assigned nation is to have good research, furthermore, as we are a non-UN committee, we strongly recommend that you closely examine the rules of procedure. The quality of the any MUN is determined primarily by those partake in it so try your best to prepare!

This committee will be discussing the security of space and the INF treaty. Both very important topics to the NATO that will need lots of thinking, diplomacy, discussions to resolve and bring forth good impactful solutions. We both hope that you enjoy your time and have an amazing experience and discover why MUN is such a unique and very addicting experience that very few activities can match. It is an opportunity to test your critical thinking, public speaking, and teamwork skills and help you tone them to the max.

Please feel free to contact me or Racha before the conference for any inquiry you might have.

Looking forward to seeing you all this coming February!

Sincerely,

Abdelrahman Babiker and Racha Cherrat

Introduction to the NATO

On 4 March 1947, France and the United Kingdom signed a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, known as the Treaty of Dunkirk. Both parties were “determined to collaborate in measures of mutual assistance in the event of any renewal of German aggression” (Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and France, 1947). A year later, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands joined were added to the other nations, creating the Western Union, established by the Treaty of Brussels. Talks for a new military coalition incorporating North America resulted in the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty on 4 April 1949, by the Member States of the Western union plus the United States, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland, therefore creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO Alliance). Since its founding, the acceptance of new countries had increased the alliance from the original 12 Member States to 29.

NATO’s main goal is the protection of the freedom and security of its 29 Member States through political and military means. It promotes democratic values and encourages cooperation on security matters. Its commitment is the principle of collective defense or *casus foederis*, which means that an armed attack against one of its members is considered as an attack against all of them as specified by the 5th Article of the Treaty. The first and only invocation of this clause was after the 11 September 2001, in response to the four coordinated terrorist attacks against the United States. Since NATO summit in Lisbon the organization now focuses on countering threats by utilizing collective defense, managing crisis situations and encouraging cooperative security, as outlined in the 2010 Strategic Concept.

NATO’s structure is complex and multi-faceted, it is also not an UN-body, which means the decision-making process and its outcome are different. The primary political decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council, located in Brussels. The Council can assemble on different levels; thus, it can be held at Permanent Representative Level (PermReps), or can be composed of Member States’ Ministers of Defense or Heads of Government. In essence it is a body which brings together high-level representatives of members whose pressing issues and policies are then manifested in the communiqué. As a matter of fact, unlike other UN committees, the outcome of NATO negotiations is a communiqué. Since a “NATO decision” means the expression of a collective will of all member countries the decisions require consensus.

Topic A: The final frontier: The future role of the Alliance in space security

Introduction to the topic

Since its founding, 70 years ago, NATO has mainly focused on the threat posed by conventional warfare, but nowadays, conflicts have drastically changed. Defending the sea, land and airspace of NATO members, may soon no longer suffice.

Outer space has always been an important area of antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union since the Cold War. Space security has always been crucial element of strategic balance, shaping American and Soviet national security policies. The world's two great superpowers each spent large portions of their GDP on developing military technologies, starting the Space Race.

Nowadays space-based systems support our modern environment by providing communication, weather forecasting, tracking, navigation, targeting capabilities and much more. NATO command structures have not issued any public military policy regarding space operations, the only published document so far is the Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations. Unfortunately, the paper only underlines the role of space support in operational planning, instead of outlining defensive and offensive space tactics, research or development. It is important to note that NATO's space-based capabilities are solely dependent upon national inventories or private space companies. The five Member States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, provide most of these resources. Alliance's efforts are more focused on the Russian-NATO situation and other challenges in Eastern and Southern Europe.

As an example, space can be used in external security missions such as the EU military Crisis Management Operations EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic, that rely on satellites for secure communication between the Operation Headquarters and the units deployed on the field, and also satellite imagery for mapping. Intelligence satellites can also be used to provide internal security, to risk map during environmental disasters or detecting terrorist camps.

To summarize, the growing competitiveness in outer space between states on one hand and private companies on the other, present new challenges to protecting our systems from physical and cyber-attacks, showing once more, the relevance of the matter at hand. Due to the complexity of the topic, we will only cover ballistic, kinetic and electronic warfare.

Table 1: NATO space-dependent capabilities and their roles


NATO space-dependent capabilities	Role
Position, navigation and timing (PNT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide information for a precision strike. • Support targeting information. • Synchronize operations. • Provide network timing and communication data. • Rely on GPS for accurate frequency, timing and synchronization. • Track assets and forces. • Provide maritime navigation data. • For instance, PNT is fundamental for combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions.
NATO space-dependent capabilities	Role
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence assessment and support threat intelligence. • Situational awareness in all four domains as well as space. • Targeting information. • Signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection. • Intelligence for the electromagnetic environment. • Use of ISR visual, multi- and hyperspectral radar imagery for command, control and communication (C3) across core domains. • For instance, satellite imagery analysis has been used by military, civilian and commercial organizations to identify North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile-related activities.
Missile defence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assess ballistic missile (BM) attacks. • Support to early warning and assessment of BM attacks or attacks on space systems. • Support to early warning of nuclear detonations.
Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support of command and control (C2) for radio communications. • Support communications in all domains. • Used for unmanned vehicle operations.
Space situational awareness (SSA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explore space debris, space surveillance and tracking. • Observe multiple data types and sources on space to achieve awareness. • Detect threats to space-borne assets, to astronauts and to Earth. • Observe space weather, as it may interrupt services, impact radio signals or damage satellite applications. • Outer space-based observation to detect threats from adversary space-based platforms. • Ensure integrity of systems in light of the increasing amount of 'space junk' or potential adversary space-based weapon systems.
Environmental monitoring (weather forecasting)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide weather forecasting, geospatial and maritime information (both space and terrestrial weather). • Provide space weather information. • Support mission planning and targeting. • Support munitions selection. • For instance, maps developed in Afghanistan helped to predict future flooding: this information was used both for assisting military operations and for humanitarian assistance/disaster relief cases.³⁵

NATO space-dependent capabilities and their roles, Cybersecurity of NATO's Space-based Strategic Assets

NATO's role in space security

Ballistic and kinetic warfare

The first artificial satellite Sputnik 1 was launched by the USSR in 1957, the US follow soon after by deploying Satellite 1958 Alpha, the Explorer 1, in 1958. By the end of the 1960's both countries regularly sent satellites. Multiple projects were then proposed by both dominions, the USSR led with the Almaz program, a highly secret Soviet military space station in the early 1960's. Three military reconnaissance stations were then launched between 1973 and 1976. The Manned Orbital Development System or MODS was created by the US Air Force Space System Division in June 1962. It was a type of military space station that used Gemini spacecraft as ferry vehicles. The Outer Space Treaty signed on 27 January 1967, forms the basis of international space law, and bans using, testing or storing nuclear weapons in Space. The Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by space objects, is a treaty signed in 1972 to expand the liability rules previously created in the Outer Space Treaty. In 1978, the crash of Kosmos 954, a nuclear-powered Soviet Satellite, on Canadian territory led to filing a claim under the Convention. Finally, the Registration Convention requires states to furnish to the United Nations with detail about the orbit of each space object. In the Cold War context, space warfare was seen primarily as an extension of nuclear warfare, for sake of example, the Strategic Defense initiative proposed by President Ronald Reagan on 23 March 1983 to protect the United States from attacks by ballistic strategic nuclear weapons, general known as ballistic missile defense or BMD.



Ballistic Missile Defense System Overview. 2010 Missile Defense Agency, USA (www.mda.mil)

Most of space defense and warfare is composed of space weaponry and anti-space weaponry. Ballistic warfare ranges from simple measures as simple as ground and space anti-missiles to rail guns, space-based laser, orbital mines. Almost all the weapons are meant for an Earth to space use such as anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) designed to incapacitate, damage or destroy satellites for strategic military purposes. China, Russia and the US all possess the capabilities. Furthermore, India's recent development of a layered missile defense system indicates that it is likely to acquire the competence of direct ascent ASAT. Japan, France and Israel can likewise be considered important parties. Space-to-earth and space-to-space weaponry do not currently exist, but any satellite can at least theoretically be converted into such a weapon.

Member States of NATO such as the United States of America and France already have multiple anti-missiles weapons. For example, the United States contributes the NATO BMD through its EPAA or European Phased Adaptive Approach, Turkey hosts a US BMD Radar in Kurecik, meanwhile Romania and Poland host Aegis Ashore sites in respectively Deveselu Air Base and Redzikowo Military base. Spain also hosts four multi-mission BMD capable Aegis ships in its naval base in Rota.

This shows again the need for NATO to have its own BMD's, even if Member States and allies' own ground-based air and missile defense systems, or other complementary ships as a force protection especially with the Russian and Chinese threats.

Electronic warfare and cybersecurity

Cyber threats to the security of the Alliance are becoming more frequent, complex, destructive and coercive. Electronic warfare concerns domains such as surveillance, communications and positioning systems. Non-kinetic warfare is more likely to involve the dismissal of vital information flows and control an enemy's forces, rather than the destruction of its space-based assets. Different techniques can be used. The first one is called "jamming", it consists in an intentional interference in signal transmission and reception through use of radio noise and electromagnetic signals: global navigation satellite system signals are more vulnerable to jamming attacks. "Spoofing" information through cyber means is a more sophisticated form of jamming. It resides in manipulating the information about the location, position and condition of a satellite. Finally, "dazzling", is blinding a satellite with a laser, if it is powerful enough it can burn satellite sensors and disable them.

NATO has been active in space since the 1960s, starting with its own communication satellites, weather and intelligence activities, its main focus in cyber defense is to protect NATO's networks and enhance across the Alliance. SATCOM (Satellite Communication) Post 2000 program provides NATO with satellite communication capabilities ends this year. To upgrade the actual SATCOM system, NATO can address eight allies currently developing or in possession of the satellite capacity necessary for military communications: France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Cyber protection is part of NATO's essential task of collective defense. The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability based at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters of

Allied Power in Europe) in Mons, Belgium protects the Alliance's own networks by providing centralized and round-the-clock cyber defense support. In order to increase its cyber defense capacities, NATO continues to improve the state of cyber security education, training and exercises. Regular exercises are conducted, such as the annual Cyber Coalition Exercise, aiming to integrate cyber defense elements and considerations into the entire range of Alliance exercises. Other facilities like the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE) in Tallinn, Estonia conducts research and training, with cyber defense education, consultation, research and development. Finally, personnel from Allied nations get training from the NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS) in Latina, Italy. NATO also works with the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Important steps to prepare NATO to proceed with space operations:

1. Develop a NATO space policy by agreeing to a common set of military objectives and operational requirements, and also by creating a cooperative architecture that links civil and military space capabilities and allow their access by Member States.
2. To increase the level of cooperation with other organizations such as the European Union. NATO doesn't have its own satellite, but the EU has the Galileo satellite. In this perspective, EU space capabilities should be seen as complementary rather than competitive to NATO's structures.
3. The establishment of a Space Operations Coordination Center at NATO headquarters.
4. Ensuring integrated military planning in order to achieve an optimal level of operational support, knowing that the NATO's main challenge would be to incorporate the use of its Member States' national assets into its outlining.

Questions to be addressed by the committee

1. The 5th article of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security


of the North Atlantic area”. Therefore, does an attack on one country’s satellite or space-based systems triggered this article on collective defense?

2. How can NATO assure access to the space domain and make better use of it?
3. How can Galileo be of use to the Alliance?
4. What could be NATO’s role among the European security organizations?
5. In case of future space warfare, how can we deal with space debris?

Topic B: (De)nuclearized future: post-INF world

Introduction to the topic

It's hard for us who were born in the 90s to imagine living in a world where you are constantly under the threat of a nuclear attack. At some moments such as the 1960s Cuban missile crisis nuclear war seemed imminent. Cartoons such as "Duck and Cover" were shown in schools to prepare children for attacks that were looming over the horizon. The members of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists created a clock named the "Doomsday Clock" to signal how close humanity was to achieving a global catastrophe with the Clock represents the hypothetical global catastrophe as "midnight" and The Bulletin's opinion on how close the world is to a global catastrophe as a number of "minutes" to midnight. For numerous instances, the clock would tick closer to "midnight" for many of the conflicts that the Cold War had brought upon the world with the Clock's closest approach to midnight since its inception being at "2 minutes till midnight" (Eugene Rabinowitch, 1953).



However, after many successful initiatives from both sides of the conflict, such as Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which was signed by every nation in the world except for India, Israel, and Pakistan and the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) which was signed by both the United States of America and the Soviet Union, the possibility of a Nuclear War seemed less and less probable. However, the missile systems that the USSR possessed at the time mainly the SS-4 Sandal and SS-5 Slean, seemed to be ageing and were perceived to be of no threat to European nations due to their poor accuracy, limited payload (one warhead), lengthy preparation time, difficulty in being concealed, and immobility (thus exposing them to pre-emptive NATO strikes ahead of a planned attack) (Bohlen et al, 2012). Thus, the USSR began the development of the RSD-10 Pioneer its NATO reporting name was SS-20 Saber. Whereas the Sandal and Saber were considered to be defensive weapons the Saber had the potential to be an offensive weapon (Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 2016). Unlike others of its kind the Saber was

considered to be a medium-range missile thus it did not fall under the SALT I. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany argued in a speech that a Western response to the SS-20 deployment should be explored (Bohlen et al, 2012), a call which was echoed by NATO, given a perceived Western disadvantage in European nuclear forces. This prompted NATO to launch its Double Track position one thousand theatre nuclear warheads, out of 7,400 such warheads, would be removed from Europe and the US would pursue bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union intended to limit theatre nuclear forces (Chronology Federation of American Scientists, 2016). Should these negotiations fail, NATO would modernize its own Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces, or intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). Negotiations started in 1981 and after 6 years of negotiations, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed by President Ronald Reagan and Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev (CQ Press, 2012).

The treaty required both countries to eliminate their ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that could travel between 500 and 5,500 kilometres (between 300 and 3,400 miles) by an implementation deadline of 1st June 1991. And prohibited both parties to possess or produce ground-based launchers of those missiles (US Department of State, 2019). The ban extends to weapons with both nuclear and conventional warheads but does not cover air-delivered or sea-based missiles.

By the treaty's deadline of 1 June 1991, a total of 2,692 of such weapons had been destroyed, 846 by the US and 1,846 by the Soviet Union (Trakimavicius Lukas, 2018). This treaty was seen as one of the major milestones in achieving a denuclearized future peace during the Cold War era. Furthermore, it paved the road for other treaties such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).

INF-Developments

In February 2007, the Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the Munich Security Conference in which he said the INF Treaty should be revisited to ensure security, as it only restricted Russia and the US but not other countries (Financial Times, 2007). The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Yuri Baluyevsky contemporaneously said that Russia was planning to unilaterally withdraw from the treaty in response to the deployment of adaptable defensive NATO missile system and because other countries were not bound to the treaty (BBC, 2007).

On numerous occasions, US officials have accused Russia of violating the treaty such as the SSC-8 cruise missile in 2008 and in 2013 the US briefed its NATO allies with reports that Russia has been testing out 2 types of missiles that have the potential of violating the treaty the SS-25 road mobile intercontinental ballistic missile and the newer RS-26 ICBM (The Guardian, 2014). Further breaches were reported by the US representatives in 2014 and 2017. Eventually in 2018 NATO formally supported the US accusations and denounced Russia for breaking the treaty while Russia has rejected all accusations (NATO, 2018). Putin dubbed it as pretext for the US to leave

the pact, Russia failed to provide any credible response, and took no demonstrable steps toward returning to full and verifiable compliance (BBC, 2019).

The United States declared its intention to leave the pact on the 20th, October 2018, with the then president-elect Trump stating that “they've [Russia has] been violating it for many years” (BBC, 2019). Putin stated that Russia would not launch first in a nuclear conflict but would “annihilate” any adversary, essentially re-stating the policy of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (The Moscow Times, 2018). US officials have stated that leaving the pact wasn't just because of Russian violation but also due to the massive missile build-up of arms in the Pacific thanks to China not being a part of the treaty, Jim Mattis, was quoted stating that “the Chinese are stockpiling missiles because they're not bound by it at all” (Reuters, 2018). It's been estimated that 90% of China's ground missile arsenal would be outlawed if China were a party to the treaty.

The United States suspended its compliance with the INF Treaty on 2 February 2019. On 15 February 2019, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recalled at the Munich Security Conference that “it was on this very stage, at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, this was the place that President Putin first publicly expressed his desire for Russia to leave the INF Treaty. A treaty that is only respected by one side will not keep us safe” (NATO, 2019). Following the 6-month period the US administration formally announced its withdrawal from the treaty on 2 August 2019, with the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stating that “Russia is solely responsible for the treaty's demise”. NATO Allies issued a statement fully supporting the US decision, and attributing “sole responsibility” for the Treaty's demise to Russia. The statement made clear that NATO would respond in a “measured and responsible way” to the risks posed by Russia's SSC-8 system, with a “balanced, coordinated and defensive package of measures,” ensuring credible and effective deterrence and defence. Allies also made clear their firm commitment to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

(De)nuclearized future: post-INF world

The Treaty was a landmark agreement and a cornerstone of European security. Thousands of weapons were destroyed as a result of this treaty. The INF Treaty was one of the main accords that helped define the European Architecture. In this context, the requirements for a credible NATO deterrence and defence posture were significantly lowered, allowing NATO Allies and their former adversaries to benefit from a new and peaceful security environment.

A world without the INF Treaty is not NATO's choice. The Alliance, however, has no other alternative but to address its consequences. The fall of the Treaty brings new challenges from Russia and, therefore, new demands on the Allies to maintain NATO's deterrence and defence posture in a way that is fit for purpose. It also calls for adapting the NATO arms control playbook to the changing circumstances. To a greater extent than before, European NATO Allies have to measure how security in Europe is affected by the increasingly turbulent security environment in the Asia-Pacific. All of this will

create new challenges for Alliance unity – a key factor in NATO’s endurance and effectiveness in the post-INF Treaty world.

The deployment of the new cruise missile offered Moscow distinct political and military benefits. From a military perspective, these weapons became a valuable complement to other capabilities, increasing the number and the credibility of available strike options. What makes the SSC-8/9M729, which is a Russian cruise missile labelled by the United States as a “missile of concern”, so unique is that, compared with Russia’s other intermediate-range missiles, ground-launched cruise missiles are more capable of avoiding launch detection and tracking during flight, thus striking their distant targets with little or no warning (Jacek Durkalec, 2019). If Russia were to launch a surprise attack on key military and civilian targets, the SSC-8/9M729 would be the best choice, especially when compared to the more easily tracked air and sea platforms for land-attack cruise missiles.



As this nuclear-capable cruise missile can reach almost all European capitals, it also provides an option of nuclear intimidation without relying on strategic intercontinental capabilities which can be directed mainly at the United States. In addition, it can hit all the critical airports and seaports of embarkation for Allied reinforcement, as well as other critical infrastructure across NATO territory to deliver a decisive blow with conventional or nuclear payloads (Jacek Durkalec, 2019). Regarding conventional capabilities, the biggest challenge of the post-INF world for NATO is to ensure its ability to reinforce the most vulnerable Allies during a conflict. This is because Russia’s long-range strike capabilities could impede, delay or prohibit the movement of Allied forces into and across Europe. NATO needs to have credible means, including infrastructure, to transport and deploy follow-on forces to be able to convince Russia that a quick conventional military advance in Europe, even initially

successful, would not last long. The effective reinforcement option would also strengthen the deterrent message of the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and in the Baltic states that any Russian aggression would be an attack against the entire Alliance. NATO has already begun efforts to increase its pool of follow-on forces and to enable them to move rapidly across Alliance territory. It might be worth revisiting NATO's nuclear deterrence policy and make sure that it provides strong disincentive for Russia's limited use of nuclear weapons or nuclear blackmail. The primary task for the Alliance is to maintain the effectiveness of the nuclear forces it already has at its disposal.

Further improvements in NATO's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities could significantly strengthen Alliance defences against long-range Russian offensive strike systems. Such capabilities could help NATO to expand its decision-making space in potential crises, reducing the risks of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation. As Russian long-range strike capabilities affect the whole range of Allied activities, a constant task for the Alliance will also be to ensure the coherence of its overall deterrence and defence posture.

It is also important to examine the impact of the INF in the Asian-Pacific region perhaps it is due to the fact that many nations in Asia possess intermediate-range missiles such as India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. Sources have stated that it is China's increasing inventory of missiles that prompted Russia to develop the SSC-8. US officials and military officers have long emphasized the challenges that the Chinese arsenal creates for US extended deterrence in the Asia-Pacific. The "Asia-Pacific factor" will also play a role in any relevant NATO arms control considerations.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the breakdown of the INF-Treaty has created a lot of serious challenges that the NATO must respond to in the most impactful manner possible. For many decades, the NATO has demonstrated resilience, a constancy of purpose and an ability to forge consensus despite initial differences among the Allies. This was the case before the INF Treaty was signed and during the 30 years of its implementation.

Questions to be addressed by the committee

1. How important was the INF to the NATO?
2. Should measures to renegotiate the INF Treaty be taken?
3. What militaristic measures should the NATO attempt?
4. How should the Asia-Pacific region be dealt with?
5. How can the NATO prevent another arms race from taking place?

Further reading

- <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty>
- <https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/text/inf.htm>
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