

TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
THE ROLE PLAYED BY GLOBAL CIVIL
SOCIETY

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by Tilly Hampton

University of Canterbury

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Abstract

On 7 July 2017, the United Nations General Assembly voted in favour of adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The negotiations which took place leading to this historic agreement marked the first time in over twenty years that international negotiations on nuclear disarmament had taken place. Amongst several states that supported the adoption of such a treaty, a significant number of civil society organisations were also involved during the process, some of whom can be described as being part of ‘global civil society’. Of particular note, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons were the principal coordinator for civil society. Using the international relations approach of constructivism, this paper explores the role of global civil society in the period leading to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The ‘norm life cycle’ from *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* by Martha Finnemore and Katherine Sikkink, provides a framework to answer this question. This is applied to two distinctive periods leading to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons; the Humanitarian Initiative and the negotiations for the treaty itself. Following analysis of specific engagements undertaken by global civil society during these periods, this paper finds that global civil society played the role of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ for the emerging norm of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. This paper concludes by providing policy recommendations for future global civil society organisations to assist in the development of this emerging norm to become an international norm.

KEY WORDS: constructivism, global civil society, humanitarian initiative, international norm, nuclear disarmament.

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Table of Contents

Abstract.....	2
Acknowledgements	3
Acronyms.....	6
List of tables and figures	7
Chapter 1: Introduction and research design	8
1.1 Research problem and question	8
1.2 Objectives & relevance.....	10
1.3 Literature review	11
1.3.1 The theoretical evolution of civil society.....	12
1.3.2 Role of global civil society.....	15
1.4 Theoretical framework.....	19
1.4.1 Constructivism	20
1.4.2 International norms and ‘the norm life cycle’	20
1.4.3 Global civil society.....	22
1.5 Methodology.....	22
1.6 Ethics and limitations.....	23
1.7 Structure of thesis.....	24
Chapter 2: Global civil society and the nuclear weapons debate	25
2.1 Relevant historical background	25
2.2 International legal framework of nuclear weapons.....	27
2.3 The contribution of global civil society.....	29
Chapter 3: The humanitarian initiative and ‘norm emergence’	32
3.1 Norm entrepreneurs and organisational platforms	32
3.2 The humanitarian initiative.....	34
3.2.1 Conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.....	34
3.2.2 Global civil society engagement during the humanitarian initiative.....	37
3.2.3 The events following the humanitarian initiative.....	41
3.3 The emergence of a norm.....	42
3.3.1 A comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons	42
3.3.2 Global civil society as norm entrepreneurs	43

3.4 Conclusion	44
Chapter 4: The ‘tipping point’ and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.....	45
4.1 The nuclear ban treaty negotiations	46
4.1.1 Civil society participation	47
4.1.2 Engagement of global civil society during negotiations	48
4.2 Adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	54
4.2.1 Discussion of the role of global civil society during negotiations	54
4.2.2 The normative status of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons	57
4.3 Conclusion	59
Chapter 5: Conclusion and policy recommendations.....	60
5.1 Policy recommendations for global civil society	61
5.1.1 Support ratification and implementation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	61
5.1.2 Garner further civil society support in ‘critical states’	63
References.....	64

Acronyms

CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
IALANA	International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms
ICAN	International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ILPI	International Law and Policy Institute
IPPNW	International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NWS	Nuclear Weapon States
OEWG	Open-Ended Working Group
RCW	Reaching Critical Will
UN	United Nations
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
VERTIC	Verification Research, Training and Information Centre
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

List of tables and figures

Figure 1: Norm Life Cycle.....	21
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Chapter 1: Introduction and research design

This chapter will act as a means of generally introducing the dissertation topic and accordingly the research design that will be utilised to answer the research question. In order to do so, the first section will provide relevant background to the research question and illustrate how this was attained from the research problem. Accordingly, the objectives of this study and its relevance will be outlined. Following this, a literature review will explore the current academic literature on the relevant areas that will be focused on in this dissertation. More specifically, in relation to the evolution of civil society and the general role that they play. The theoretical framework will then outline the specific concepts that will be utilised in answering the research question. Namely, this will include that of constructivism and international norms, as well as global civil society. After doing so, the methodology of this dissertation will be established, as well as the ethics and limitations of the study. Finally, a brief explanation as to the structure that this research will take will be given.

1.1 Research problem and question

There has been a significant reduction in global stockpiles of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. However, an estimated 14,930 are still possessed by nine states today (Federation of American Scientists, 2017). Collectively, these weapons hold enough force to destroy all life on earth, which illustrates the grave threat they continue to bring to humanity (Kütt & Steffek, 2015). Historically, nuclear weapons have been recognised as a means of international security and seen by states that possess these weapons as a deterrent (Kmentt, 2015). This has been the case despite the widespread acknowledgement of the physical destruction and scale of human suffering caused by nuclear weapons testing and detonations. It was not until the ‘Final Document’ that arose from the 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference, that States party to this treaty formally acknowledged the grave humanitarian consequences associated with these weapons in an international multilateral document. The Document expressed ‘deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the

use of nuclear weapons’ (Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2010). This reference soon became acknowledged as the beginning of what is known as the ‘humanitarian initiative’; a re-shaping of the diplomatic discussion surrounding nuclear weapons from the parameters of security to the unacceptable consequences of nuclear weapons (Minor, 2015). This has ensued as the most serious challenge to the nuclear deterrence orthodoxy to date through disputing ‘the acceptability and legitimacy of nuclear weapons’ (Kmentt, 2015, p. 682).

The humanitarian initiative was made up of a series of conferences hosted by countries determined to bring increased awareness to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. The pace at which the nuclear weapons debate was reframed by this initiative and the international and domestic political momentum it gained, was unprecedented. Within a short period of time, a reference in a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference outcome document turned into a series of conferences and Joint Statements ‘expressly supported by over three quarters of the international community’ (Kmentt, 2015, p. 704). An event which can be attributed to the momentum gained from the Humanitarian Initiative was the passing of United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 71/258. This was passed on 23 December 2016 and aimed to begin negotiations on ‘a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination’, in March 2017. Despite the fact that eliminating the nuclear threat has been at the top of the United Nation’s agenda since the organisation was founded in 1945, the negotiations that took place during the course of 2017 marked ‘the first time in over two decades that multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations have taken place’ (Wright, 2017). Consequently, on 7 July 2017, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by 122 states. This is the first legally binding international agreement that acts to prohibit nuclear weapons in a comprehensive manner, with the explicit goal of leading towards the total elimination of these weapons.

Undoubtedly, great public controversy has existed since the development of nuclear weapons and their use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Yet, these events occurred over seventy years ago. Fittingly, it is logical to wonder why after such a long period of time these weapons of mass destruction have now finally been recognised as illegal by the majority of the international community. Despite significant efforts by civil

society in the area of nuclear disarmament, it is evident that in the years leading to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a new momentum was gained by civil society, on a global scale. As a result, these efforts saw greater involvement in the process of negotiating this treaty, an area which had historically been limited to decision-making by ‘government, military, and commercial officials’ (Rappert, Moyes, Crowe, & Nash, 2012). Such efforts were coordinated by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which eventually grew to operate in over 100 countries throughout the world (ICAN, n.d-a). From the outset, ICAN (amongst other organisations) coordinated a number of events and other means of sharing information in support of a ban treaty. However, it would be useful to understand what they did as a collective group and how their role can be described. Accordingly, this leads to the question of ‘what role did global civil society play in the process leading to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons?’

1.2 Objectives & relevance

This section provides a further understanding of the research problem and question at hand. This is done so by firstly listing the objectives of this study, which aim to be answered throughout this dissertation. Following this, the relevance of choosing this research question will be explored. Namely, the ways in which this research will be beneficial following its conclusion.

Objectives

1. To explore the historical and international legal context of nuclear weapons and the disarmament movement;
2. To examine the engagement of global civil society during the ‘humanitarian initiative’ and accordingly understand a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons as an emerging international norm through the use of constructivism;
3. To illustrate how global civil society were involved in the negotiations for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and understand whether

the adoption of this treaty can be seen as the ‘tipping point’ as discussed in the ‘norm life cycle’ framework;

4. To provide recommendations on what role global civil society can play in advancing the international norm on a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons from the current phase it is in.

Relevance

Due to the contemporary nature of this treaty, this dissertation will be a beneficial piece of research for a number of different interested parties. Firstly, it will contribute to the academic conversation and literature surrounding concepts explored in the dissertation such as ‘global civil society’, as well as the increasingly popular international relations approach of constructivism. More specifically, this dissertation will provide a contemporary application of the norm life cycle framework, developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink in *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*. Furthermore, as new technology continues to emerge, it simultaneously introduces new security threats to the world we live in. This dissertation will provide an overview of a model of action by global civil society that has been successful in establishing a ban on a type of weapon. Accordingly, it may be useful to future movements to ban particular weapons such as the recently initiated Campaign to Ban Killer Robots. Finally, this research will be of use to policymakers, both on a regional and international scale, in developing policy surrounding matters such as the degree of involvement civil society has in law making and the extent to which their expertise is recognised in political processes.

1.3 Literature review

Aforementioned, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the most recent development in multilateral nuclear disarmament agreements. Consequently, the literature on this particular subject area is somewhat limited. Thus, in order to examine literature in relation to the research question, it is necessary to look beyond the scope of this treaty. Instead, looking to research surrounding civil society involvement more generally in relation to emerging international norms and other

treaties of a similar nature. Accordingly, this literature review will be comprised of two sections. Firstly, the concept of civil society itself will be explored, particularly its development into ‘global civil society’. Following this, the role played by global civil society will be examined.

1.3.1 The theoretical evolution of civil society

Edwards (2013, p.3) identifies civil society as continuing to be one of the most ‘enduring and confusing’ concepts in social science. Its widely recognised ambiguity can be partly attributed to the vast literature on the subject providing somewhat conflicting ideas of what constitutes the term ‘civil society’ and the vast changes it has undergone overtime (Edwards, 2011; Kaldor, 2003a; Woodward, 2010). The idea itself can be traced as far back as classical political philosophy, utilised by the likes of Aristotle, where it was introduced as a means of understanding the ‘geometry of human relations’ (Ehrenberg, 2011). However, the concept was understood in a considerably different way than what it is today. Derived from the concept of *societas civilis*, it was originally interpreted as a type of state characterised by a social contract, in other words, advanced enough to have its own legal code (Kaldor, 2003b; Lipschutz, 1992; Woodward, 2010). It was not until the 19th century that philosophers such as Hegel began to acknowledge civil society as separate from the state itself (Kaldor, 2003b). Later taken on by Marx and Engels, Hegel understood civil society as the ‘immediate realm between the family and the state, where an individual becomes a public person and through membership in various institutions, is able to reconcile the particular and the universal’ (Kaldor 2003b, p.584). This understanding underwent a further theoretical development when Antonio Gramscian revived the concept following the end of World War II (Woodward, 2006). This arose from this Marxist’s interest in the reasons ‘why it was much easier to have a communist revolution in Russia than in Italy’ (Kaldor, 2003b, p. 584). During the Cold War, given the state-centred approach to international relations that ensued in this period, civil society remained a largely historic concept (Woodward, 2010). However, following the end of this period, the concept regained popularity in intellectual and political debates, simultaneously with the democratic openings that ensued (Edwards, 2013). Amidst the end of the Cold War, a strong civil society

became recognised as an essential ingredient in several elements of society from maintaining a pluralistic political system to preserving democracy (Edwards, 2011). Furthermore, civil society eventually became seen as a useful tool for social reconstruction, namely of the former Soviet states (Kaldor, 2003b; Lipschutz, 1992; Woodward, 2006, 2010).

Today, the debate around defining civil society can broadly be divided into three groupings (Edwards, 2011). Firstly, several scholars have associated the term civil society being made up of ‘voluntary associations’, a part of society that exists separately from the market and the state (Barber, 1998; Cohen & Arato, 1992; Salamon & Anheier, 2004). Another group of scholars focus their definition of civil society as being ‘a kind of society that is marked out by certain social norms’ (Edwards, 2011). Finally, other scholars view civil society as a public sphere, a space utilised for purposes of citizen action and engagement (Edwards, 2011). Despite these discrepancies in relation to the definition, Walzer (1998, pp. 123-124) provides a more commonly applied and encompassing definition that ‘civil society is the sphere of uncoerced human association between the individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for normative and substantive purposes, relatively independent of government and the market’. Despite the inclusive nature of this definition and the appropriateness of the definition in relation to a regional setting, it is apparent that it does little in terms of acknowledging the civil society groups that extend across different countries, an extremely common element of many civil society organisations today. This has encouraged political thinkers to evolve the definition to be increasingly transnational in nature.

The term ‘global civil society’ emerged in the early 1990s after the break-up of the Soviet Union, reflecting the nature of globalisation (Jaeger, 2007; Kumar, 2007; Mishra, 2012; Woodward, 2006). Simultaneously, a system of global governance arose (Kaldor, 2003b; Woodward, 2006); generally seen as ‘the management and resolution of global issues within a political space that has no single centralised authority’ (Mishra, 2012, p. 209). Woodward (2010, p. 9) understands this system of global governance to include ‘the UN, its organs, agencies and related bodies (UN system) and the public and private legal institutions, regimes and networks governing relations among States, organisations, civil society and other actors across State

borders'. Within such a frame, global civil society is seen as an essential actor in providing accountability (Keane, 2003; Mishra, 2012). Woodward (2010, p. 15) explains why the word 'global' is preferred over international, as it 'conveys a sense of space encompassing activities involving more than interactions between nation-States...and including multidimensional relationships among diverse actors'.

Comparably to civil society, global civil society has attracted significant scholarly debate surrounding different interpretations of the concept (Spini, 2011). Kaldor (2003b) provides a useful categorisation of the three principle contemporary 'paradigms' of global civil society thinking: the 'activist version', the 'neoliberal version' and the 'postmodern version'. Firstly, Kaldor (2003b) describes the 'activist version' of global civil society. This encapsulates the movements which take place in the global forum (Falk, 1995), concerning issues such as women's rights, human rights and the environment, collectively 'strengthening global governance' (Kaldor, 2003b). Furthermore, some understand it to be about 'political emancipation, the empowerment of individuals and the extension of democracy' (Chandler, 2004, p. 1). This definition focuses on 'transnational advocacy networks such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International' (Kumar, 2007, p. 422). Another conceptual understanding of global civil society is that of the 'neo-liberal version', where the key agents are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who resemble the social counterpart of globalisation (Kaldor, 2003a). This definition can be linked to the 'end of history theorists, such as Francis Fukuyama and others who see an emerging global civil society in the worldwide triumph of liberal capitalism' (Kumar, 2007, p. 423). Finally, the 'post-modern version' of global civil society associates itself with 'pluralism and contestation' (Kaldor, 2003a). Kumar (2007) explains this view as including global Islam and other different globally organised networks that other definitions do not encompass.

It must be acknowledged that despite a significant agreement amongst international relations scholars that 'global civil society' is an appropriate term to conceptualise civil society operating internationally, there are still scholars that are sceptical about this concept. By way of example, Anderson (2000) disputes the idea that an 'international civil society' even exists. Instead, suggesting that 'global transnational elites' were operating at the expense of 'genuinely democratic, but hence local,

processes' in the movement leading to the Ottawa Treaty to ban landmines (p.91). Furthermore, Anderson and Reff (2004) illustrate their perceived problems with this concept, namely the lack of a democratic nature inherent in global civil society. However, as the scholarly trend is that a 'global civil society' does exist - albeit the different definitions being contested - this literature review will proceed on the basis that a 'global civil society' does exist.

1.3.2 Role of global civil society

The perceived role that global civil society plays is largely dependent on the international relations theory or perspective that it is approached from. Traditionally, NGOs and other actors that collectively make up global civil society have been ignored by theories of international relations (Ahmed & Potter, 2006; G. Clarke, 1998). Namely, theories such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism are arguably ill suited to explaining the role of NGOs, due to the large focus that is placed on states and their indifference to non-state actors (Ahmed & Potter, 2006). Both of these approaches privilege states to the exclusion of other international non-state actors (Lipschutz, 1992; Rutherford, 2000b). Through application to specific instances where NGOs were *prima facie* influential and maintained a role in the process of emerging norms and international treaties, both neo-liberalism and neo-realism have been found to be an inadequate approach (Ahmed & Potter, 2006; Price, 1998; Rutherford, 2000b).

More specifically, neo-realism posits that the international system is anarchic in nature, thus state behaviour is driven by narrow material self-interest (Rutherford, 2000b). Thus, an international norm will not be followed, nor will the norm affect a state's actions, if it is not in that nation's interest to do so (Rutherford, 2000a). There have been difficulties in previous attempts to apply neo-realism to situations where global civil society has been particularly active, especially in the agenda setting process. By way of example, Rutherford (2000b) found that although neorealism could be applied to explain the decision of some states to sign (or not sign) the treaty, the theory was unable to explain the fashion in which the landmine issue came to arrive on the international political agenda in the first place. This is a result of the ontology of neorealism privileging states over any other actors and assuming NGOs

are reliant upon underlying power distributions (Rutherford, 2000a). Similarly, neo-liberalism assumes that an anarchic structure of international relations exists (Rutherford, 2000b). However, unlike neo-realists, neo-liberals understand that state behaviour may be altered by international institutions and regimes (Rutherford, 2000b). Furthermore, they do acknowledge NGOs to have a role to some degree, but this is limited to ‘serving state needs in facilitating interstate cooperation with certain international institutions and regimes primarily with issues unrelated to national security’ (Rutherford, 2000b, p. 469). Thus, also ill-suited to explaining situations where global civil society has been active in setting the international agenda.

Alternatively, the more contemporary approach of constructivism could be applied. Constructivism has been described as a ‘middle ground’ between rationalist approaches, such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism described above, and interpretive approaches (Adler, 1997). This approach to international relations emerged in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War caused a ‘fragmentation’ of theoretical unity in the study of international relations (Ahmed & Potter, 2006). Such an approach is significantly more suited to studying global civil society as it recognises the role of other actors in international relations, as opposed to merely state-to-state relations. A constructivist analysis posits that ‘interests, identities, and roles are socially defined’ (Ahmed & Potter, 2006, p. 13). This approach allows a space for non-state actors, such as global civil society, to exercise influence over the international system, consequently changing what is seen by states as appropriate international conduct (Ahmed & Potter, 2006).

An abundance of literature has been published on the role of global civil society from a constructivist perspective. These works have largely regarded NGOs (as part of global civil society) having influenced various international norms. Some of these examples have been in relation to security issues, an area where global civil society are demonstrating an increased degree of influence (W. Clarke, 2008). This poses an even greater challenge to theories such as neo-realism, who emphasize that security and weapons issues are among the issues that are shaped solely by states (Rutherford, 2000b). Some prominent examples of influence by global civil society throughout the literature include: the Landmine Treaty (W. Clarke, 2008; Price, 1998; Rutherford, 1999, 2000a; Wexler, 2003; Woodward, 2010), the Rome Statute for an International

Criminal (Glasius, 2001, 2006; Woodward, 2010), Convention on Cluster Munitions (Woodward, 2010), the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (Feakes, 2003) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (Feakes, 2003).

When international relations is approached from a constructivist perspective, it allows space to explore the role and influence of global civil society. Various international scholars have endeavoured to explain what global civil society actually does and how they do it (Price, 2003). It is evident that these scholars essentially agree that global civil society does pertain some degree of influence through their role in the international system (Price, 1998; Rutherford, 1999; Woodward, 2006, 2010). The scholarly disparities rest in the way in which their role is described, namely using different concepts and frameworks to illustrate this role. Scholars have utilised several different terms to describe the organisations and individuals involved in this process, from transnational civil society to simply referring to NGOs. However, despite this difference in terminology, for purposes of reviewing this literature, these can all be likened to applying broadly to global civil society (Woodward, 2006).

For the most part, the literature is centred around the role of global civil society in relation to their influence on emerging international norms (Charnovitz, 1997; I. Clarke, 2007; Woodward, 2010). Generally, norms are regarded as ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891). In this context, global civil society have been referred to as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), ‘moral entrepreneurs’ (Faulkner, 2007) and even ‘teachers’ – as a result of the pedagogical techniques they often undertake (Price, 1998). Given the wide range of initiatives that global civil society is seen as accomplishing, it is difficult to conceptually map them out in their entirety. Another challenge rests in the fact that many of these concepts overlap with one another and several different terms are employed to describe a similar process. Nevertheless, there are several key themes that appear consistently throughout the literature. One of which is the increasingly key role of NGOs in relation to ‘advocacy’ - transnational networks which focus on promoting a particular norm (Keck & Sikkink., 1998). Similarly, scholars refer to this phenomenon as creating ‘networks’ (Price, 1998) and ‘organisational platforms’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). An example of an advocacy network which has been well considered by scholars is that of the International

Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Established in 1992, this is an umbrella organisation representing over 1200 NGOs in some 60 countries (Woodward, 2010), collectively working for a 'world free of antipersonnel landmines' (ICBL, n.d). The ICBL has been considered an instrumental component in persuading states to adopt the Landmine Treaty (Cameron, 1999; W. Clarke, 2008; Price, 1998; Rutherford, 2000a; Short, 1999; Wexler, 2003). Furthermore, this advocacy network has established itself as a model for other campaigns striving to ban weapons transnationally (Woodward, 2006).

Another prominent role of global civil society is that of 'framing' issues (Feakes, 2003; Price, 1998; Rutherford, 2000a). Framing can be described as the 'selection of elements within a particular issue', resulting in people conceptualising something in a particular way (Rutherford, 2000a, p. 78). One frequently discussed example is that of framing the landmines debate from a security perspective to a focus on the humanitarian consequences (Feakes, 2003; Price, 1998; Rutherford, 2000a). The ICBL employed various techniques which aided in framing this issue, such as drawing attention to the victims of detonated landmines and the indiscriminate nature of these weapons (Price, 1998). Furthermore, although global civil society had significantly less of a role, the framing of the chemical and biological weapons debate to 'weapons of mass destruction' and later 'potential terrorist weapons' provides another example of global civil society participation in framing an issue (Feakes, 2003).

Various other roles undertaken by global civil society are that of lobbying different governments in relation to a particular issue (Ahmed & Potter, 2006; Neufeld, 2005); generating issues through disseminating information and educating the public (Ahmed & Potter, 2006; Haas, 1992; Keck & Sikkink., 1998; Price, 1998); grafting an emerging norm onto an already established norms (Barnes, 2010; Kütt & Steffek, 2015; Price, 1998) and pressuring states to justify their opinion on a norm which in turn 'reverses the burden of proof' (Price, 1998).

Finally, through the activities previously outlined, it is evident that NGOs (acting independently or as part of an advocacy network as described above) are prominent participants in the agenda-setting process. This involves 'putting issues on the

political agenda, the list of issues or problems that policymakers pay attention to at a given time' (Ahmed & Potter, 2006, p. 48). Kenneth Rutherford (2000) developed a comprehensive 'agenda-setting framework', which was applied to illustrate the role of NGOs specifically in relation to the norm of a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel landmines. This consisted of 'two levels' – a cognitive level and a norm agenda setting level (Rutherford, 2000a). Within this framework, Rutherford discusses concepts such as 'framing, schema and priming' all invoked by NGOs to place the landmine issue on the international political agenda (Rutherford, 2000a).

The literature reviewed above illustrates the wide variety of informal and formal roles that global civil society play, especially in the area of international norms.

1.4 Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework outlined below will be utilised to answer the research question which this dissertation will address. The terminology of 'global civil society' in the context of a 'global governance system' will be employed to describe the phenomena of persons and organisations involved in the campaign supporting a treaty to ban nuclear weapons. This is based off the 'activist version' of global civil society, in accordance with the definition preferred by Mary Kaldor in *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War* (2003). Further, the model of a 'norm life cycle', developed by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink in *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* (1998), will be applied to explain the emergence of the international norm on a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. This will also provide a framework to examine the role of global civil society as 'norm entrepreneurs', a term derived from this model. Accordingly, the role of global civil society in the emergence of a comprehensive norm against nuclear weapons will be examined through a constructivist perspective of international relations. Collectively, this theoretical framework will allow it to be determined that in the process leading to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the role of global civil society was 'norm entrepreneurs' for the emerging norm of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons.

1.4.1 *Constructivism*

This dissertation will be approached from a constructivist perspective of international relations. This approach provides a suitable perspective in which international norms and the role of global civil society can be analysed. Firstly, this approach is particularly useful when explaining international norms surrounding nuclear disarmament as it illustrates how the normative environment can change over time, as it has with the introduction of new agreements for such issues as reduction of weapons and introduction of verification measures and more recently the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Furthermore, a constructivist approach views non-state actors, such as those who make up global civil society, as having important roles to play in international politics and more aptly explain international relations than merely state to state interaction (Onuf, 1998). It must be acknowledged that whilst constructivism provides an adequate approach to this research question, it is not a ‘theory’ of international relations as is neo-liberalism and neo-realism (Rutherford, 2000b). Thus, it is instead merely providing an alternative ontology to view this research question and therefore the international system (Rutherford, 2000b).

1.4.2 *International norms and ‘the norm life cycle’*

In accordance with the widely accepted definition of a norm, this dissertation will proceed with the understanding that a norm is a ‘standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 891).¹ Thus, when referring to an international norm, the standard of appropriate behaviour will be in relation to nation states as the actors. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s model of a ‘norm life cycle’ provides a framework to study the emergence of international norms, in this case a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. Moreover, it provides a means by which the role of global civil society in the process leading to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons can be determined. As illustrated in the literature review above, the role of global civil society is comprised of a wide range of activities and concepts. This framework was selected on the basis that it is

¹ A similar definition is utilised by Klotz (1995) and Kütt and Steffek (2015).

inclusive and acknowledges several of the activities that made up the role of global civil society, in a unified framework.




Figure 1: Norm Life Cycle²

This model, presented in *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*, is made up of three stages which comprise the evolution of an international norm: norm emergence, norm cascade and internalization (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). At each of these stages, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) provide an explanation of the actors who are typically influential, the motives of these actors and the dominant mechanisms used are explained. Stage 1, described as the ‘norm emergence’ phase, rests on the premise that ‘norm entrepreneurs’ act through ‘organizational platforms’ to persuade a ‘critical mass’ of relevant states to embrace new norms (p.895). Often norm entrepreneurs, critical to this stage, are non-governmental organisations (Kütt & Steffek, 2015). These actions are carried out through the political strategy of ‘framing’ certain issues - using language to ‘name, interpret, or dramatize them’ (p.897). Between the first and second stages, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) propose that a ‘tipping or threshold point’ is reached. Accordingly, this is reached when a critical mass of states is persuaded to become norm leaders on a specific emerging norm; this is unlikely to be reached if less than one third of states adopt the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Following this, a ‘norm cascade’ occurs whereby as a result of socialization through ‘pressure for conformity, a desire to enhance international legitimation and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem’ support is generated rapidly by other nation states (p.902). The final stage of ‘internalization’ involves the norm becoming ‘so widely accepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a ‘taken-for-granted’ quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 904) .

² Figure from Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)

This will result from the norm being ‘increasingly institutionalised in international law, multilateral organisations and in bilateral foreign relations’ (Barnes, 2010, p. 13).

1.4.3 *Global civil society*

After having analysed the literature on global civil society, it is evident that there is both a normative and a descriptive definition. In terms of describing this term, it will be assumed that global civil society is ‘a sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the state, and the market, and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and economies’ (Kaldor, Anheier, & Glasius, 2004, p. 2). However, for purposes of a normative definition, the ‘activist version’ of global civil society will be employed, in accordance with the definition preferred by Mary Kaldor in *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*. More specifically, this definition refers to ‘active citizenship, to growing self-organization outside formal political circles, and expanded space in which individual citizens can influence the conditions in which they live both directly through self-organization and through political pressure’ (Kaldor, 2003a, p. 8). Kumar (2007, p. 422) further elaborates on this definition by stating that the ‘focus of this definition is on the Habermasian public sphere of transnational advocacy networks’. Accordingly, this seemed the logical definition given the research problem at hand involves a major ‘transnational advocacy network’, ICAN.

1.5 **Methodology**

This dissertation will use a qualitative method of research, predominantly through examination of primary and secondary sources. The theory that is identified and utilised will be sought through analysis of secondary sources. Namely, scholarly books and journals. These secondary sources will provide ideas surrounding the main concepts that will be utilised within the dissertation such as ‘global civil society’, ‘international norms’ and ‘constructivism’. Secondary sources will further be utilised in order to examine what previous scholars have discussed in commentary relating to global civil society’s role in relation to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons or other international treaties of a similar nature.

This dissertation will also use primary sources as a means of attaining appropriate material for discussion. The treaty itself, ‘Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, will be examined – especially in chapter three and chapter four of this dissertation. As well as this, other primary sources that led to the creation of this treaty will be examined, such as various UN General Assembly Resolutions. Further, direct statements from civil society organisations themselves will be analysed – such as interviews and statements by members of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.

Throughout the course of this year I will be completing an internship with Angela Woodward in the Office of the Executive Director at the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). This is an organisation that works to support the development, implementation and effectiveness of international agreements and related regional and national initiatives, particularly in the area of weapons of mass destruction³. Thus, I will be exposed to people who are directly involved in the area of nuclear disarmament. I intend to partake in informal discussions surrounding my dissertation topic with these people.

For the large majority of this dissertation (especially chapter 3 and 4) material will be primarily examined from between 7 September 2006, the date in which ICAN was initiated, and 7 July 2017, the date in which the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted. However, this will not be the case for the material which provides general background to this dissertation topic, especially in chapter one and two.

1.6 Ethics and limitations

A limitation of this research will be the fact that it is surrounding a treaty that has only very recently been adopted (July 7, 2017). Thus, the sources, particularly secondary sources, available surrounding the process leading to the treaty and the treaty itself may be to some degree limited. Furthermore, due to the recency of the adoption of the

³ For more information, see: <http://www.vertic.org/>

Treaty, new developments will continue to arise throughout the course of my research. However, I will mitigate this through primarily looking at what occurred in relation to the treaty up until its adoption. Finally, the duration of the Masters of International Relations and Diplomacy is twelve months, thus the research that I am able to undertake will be limited by this timeframe.

1.7 Structure of thesis

This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the research problem and question at hand, simultaneously putting this into perspective with a literature review on the broad subject matter. Subsequently this will lead to an explanation of how the research question will be answered through outlining the theoretical framework and methodology that will be utilised. An informative description of the norm life cycle is given, the framework that will be applied in this dissertation to describe the emergence of the norm on a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. Following this, chapter two provides the necessary background on the broader theme of this dissertation, nuclear disarmament. More specifically, it depicts the historical background of these weapons of mass destruction as well as the international legal regime which exists at international law today. Furthermore, this chapter looks at global civil society in relation to nuclear disarmament and discusses their efforts in a historical context. Chapter three then applies the first stage of the norm life cycle framework in relation to the humanitarian initiative. This covers the period from the re-energising of global civil society on this issue prior to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference 2010, until the adoption of a resolution by the UN General Assembly to commence negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons. Logically, chapter four discusses the second stage of the norm life cycle framework, the ‘tipping point’. This is applied to the two sets of negotiations and subsequent adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Finally, chapter five draws on what has been established in previous chapters and broadly concludes this research paper. In addition, two policy recommendations are provided for global civil society in relation to the final two stages of the framework - ‘norm cascade’ and ‘norm internalization’.

Chapter 2: Global civil society and the nuclear weapons debate

In order to understand the role of global civil society in the process leading to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, it is essential to place this question in context. Accordingly, this section will provide a brief summation of the historical background of nuclear weapons. Namely, this will focus on the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and the instances in which such weapons have been used and tested. Following this, the international law which has been established in relation to nuclear weapons will be outlined. This provides important context, especially as this dissertation is focused on the most recent addition to this framework. Finally, for a thorough understanding of the research question, the contribution of global civil society in the nuclear disarmament context throughout history will be examined. More specifically, this will provide insight into the influence that they have previously shown in matters surrounding nuclear disarmament.

2.1 Relevant historical background

In August 1942, the Manhattan Project was established in the United States of America, bringing together over 130,000 people, with finances amounting to US\$2 billion to assist (ICAN, n.d-i). This project was commenced with the sole purpose of ‘producing fission-based explosive devices before the Germans’ (Siracusa, 2015, p. 14). Eventually, this project led to the first atomic bomb test conducted by the United States of America in New Mexico, marking the beginning of the ‘nuclear age’ (ICAN, n.d-i). Following this successful initial testing of a nuclear weapon, in August 1945, they detonated two nuclear weapons in Japan, in an attempt to end World War II (Tannenwald, 2005). Immediately, these detonations were estimated to have killed 70,000-80,000 and 30,000-40,000 people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively (Tannenwald, 2005). However, several thousand more people died within the following years with various long lasting effects from radiation-related illnesses (ICAN, n.d-i).

The events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ‘propelled’ the Soviet endeavour to create a nuclear weapon and resulted in their launch of a comprehensive nuclear weapons programme (Charnysh, 2010). Consequently, this led to the Soviet Union becoming the second nation to successfully test a nuclear bomb in 1949 (ILPI & Geneva Academy, 2014). During the following decades of the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union considerably enlarged their nuclear arsenals. During this time, the doctrine of ‘nuclear deterrence’ dominated the discourse on nuclear weapons. This idea ‘proposes that the possession of nuclear weapons by some States introduces higher levels of caution into relation between States, lowering the likelihood of conflict’ (Minor, 2015, p. 712).

To date, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the only occasions in which nuclear weapons have been detonated directly upon civilians. However, the arms race that followed on from the original acquisition of nuclear weapons by the United States of America did not spare civilians of their significant effects. Between 1945 and 2015, some 2,055 nuclear explosions have occurred globally - largely ‘for the purpose of developing new nuclear weapons’ (Ruff, 2015, p. 776). The consequences of conducting such tests have been profound in certain areas of the world, causing both health issues for those civilians in proximity to the tests as well as environmental harm to the land involved in the testing. The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) has estimated that around 2.4 million people will have died as a result of atmospheric nuclear tests which took place between the period of 1945 and 1980⁴.

Since the first successful nuclear test in 1945, several countries have gone on to produce their own nuclear weapons⁵. Although there has been a significant reduction in the number of nuclear weapons that existed during the Cold War, most of the weapons have undergone significant modernisation to the point they are much more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in 1945 (ICAN, n.d-h). Thus,

⁴ Cited in ICAN (n.d-g).

⁵ According to the Arms Control Association, nine countries possess nuclear weapons: Russia, the United States of America, France, China, the United Kingdom, Pakistan and India, Israel and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. For more information, visit: <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat>

threats concerning the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons continue to ensue today.

2.2 International legal framework of nuclear weapons

As demonstrated in the previous section, the atrocities which have resulted from the use and testing of nuclear weapons have been grave. Accordingly, since the development of nuclear weapons, there has been a range of bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as various other measures at international law to control these weapons. One of the landmark attempts at doing so was the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, more widely recognised as the 'Partial Test Ban Treaty'. As the title suggests, this treaty prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in such areas, however did not include those tests conducted underground. This treaty, which was initially intended to result in a 'comprehensive' ban on nuclear testing, was signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011) The successor of this treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1996 and prohibits any nuclear explosive testing, irrespective of where it is undertaken. Although this Treaty has been signed by over 183 states, an explicit requirement within the text is that it will only enter into force once the 44 states in Annex 2 have ratified it, including those which possess nuclear weapons (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2016). This has not yet been the case, with China and the United States remaining amongst those who have not taken due steps to ratify it, thus it is yet to enter into force.

In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons went beyond regulating the mere 'testing' of nuclear weapons and explicitly outlined the aspiration for international nuclear disarmament. This arose through a desire by the international community to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and begin the process of nuclear disarmament (Ritchie, 2014). This treaty establishes a safeguard system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency and includes provisions that envisage a review of the operation of the treaty every five years. Of even more significance, Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

explicitly states that ‘each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue in good faith on effective measures relating to...a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control’ (Ford, 2007). Since its adoption, this landmark Treaty has been the principle instrument for the international law surrounding nuclear disarmament. Moreover, it has been the object of much dispute in relation to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as many believe that it has been an insufficient means of achieving the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, some argue that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will undermine this treaty.

Another influential development in international law surrounding nuclear weapons was the ‘1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons’. This opinion, which took place at the height of the polarised debate over the legality of nuclear weapons, concerned both the use and ‘threat’ of using nuclear weapons (Borrie et al., 2016). In this instance, the Court was asked by the UN General Assembly whether the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was ‘in any circumstances permitted under international law’ (Borrie et al., 2016). The Court concluded that the use and threat to use nuclear weapons was generally illegal but included a caveat that it ‘cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in extreme circumstances of self-defence in which the very survival of a State would be at stake’ (International Court of Justice, 1996). This opinion has continued to play a central role in nuclear disarmament discussions over time.

Finally, a noteworthy component of legal measures surrounding nuclear weapons is that of the nuclear weapons-free zones that exist around the world. This demonstrates ‘a regional approach to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms’ as well as de-nuclearisation of a particular area (UNODA, n.d-b). Such areas where a ‘total absence of nuclear weapons’ exists, include; Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa and Central Asia (ICAN, n.d-i).

Through acknowledging these various international agreements and the international law aforementioned, it can be ascertained that there exists a comprehensive legal framework surrounding the use, possession, testing and various other matters relating

to nuclear weapons. Thus, providing an important context to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

2.3 The contribution of global civil society

The aspiration for a world free of nuclear weapons has not only inspired a civil society movement in recent years but has done so since the development of these weapons of mass destruction. To ensure complicity in analysing the history of nuclear weapons history and the international legal mechanisms surrounding such weapons, it is necessary to look at the nuclear disarmament movement that has ensued. This is due to the impact that such a movement has had on the discourse of nuclear weapons use as well as mere possession throughout history.

Wittner (2014) has undertaken research which has comprehensively analysed the contribution of civil society in the area of nuclear disarmament, which provides a useful historical mapping of their efforts⁶. When looking at this movement, Wittner (2014) identifies three periods of ‘great upsurges’ where civil society have been particularly engaged in campaigning for nuclear disarmament. Firstly, as previously discussed, Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused grave consequences for innocent civilians, as well as other factors such as the environment and economy. Subsequently, a ‘wave of public dismay’ was created across the globe in the forties (Wittner, 2014). As a result, a number of organisations throughout the world were created, ‘determined to avert nuclear annihilation’ (Wittner, 2014). Furthermore, the UN has sought to eliminate nuclear weapons since it was established in 1945 (UNODA, n.d-a). Fittingly, a Commission was created by the first UN General Assembly Resolution in 1946, with one of the instructions being that the Commission ‘make proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction’ (UNODA, n.d-a).

Wittner secondly identified an uprising amongst civil society which occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s following the testing of hydrogen bombs, simultaneously

⁶ For more information on the historical contribution of civil society in the area of nuclear disarmament, see: Mulas (2016) and UNODA (2016).

with the escalation of a nuclear arms race (Wittner, 2010). As a result, several ‘ban the bomb’ movements developed throughout different nations (Wittner, 2014). Notably, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was launched in Britain, which was instrumental in the ‘Aldermaston March’, a march in opposition to nuclear weapons (CND, n.d). During these years, numerous governments reluctantly decided not to pursue developing nuclear weapons as they were met with significant protests from various newly created organisations (Wittner, 2014). Furthermore - in response to anti-nuclear sentiments - significant opposition by various states occurred, such as the banning of nuclear warships visiting New Zealand and the refusal by Australia to test MX missiles (Wittner, 2014). With the onset of the Vietnam war, the nuclear disarmament protests slowed down, as there was a greater focus on the anti-Vietnam war movement (Wittner, 2014).

Finally, at the beginning of the eighties when the *détente* ended, another uprising of civil society occurred when the world was seemingly ‘on the brink of nuclear war’ (Wittner, 2010). During the following years, ‘an estimated five million people took part in anti-nuclear demonstrations’, coordinated by a number of organisations throughout the world (Wittner, 2014, p. 31). In the majority of Western countries, this was supported by ‘religious bodies, professional groups, unions and social democratic parties’ (Wittner, 2014, p. 31). A protest of particular note took place in New York City’s Central Park ‘in support of the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament’, to this day it remains ‘the largest anti-war protest demonstration in history’, involving one million people (ICAN, n.d-i).

Another noteworthy contribution of civil society is that of the World Court Project. This campaign acted to persuade the UN to utilise Article 96 to ask the International Court of Justice ‘whether the use of nuclear weapons in war would violate international law relating to health and environmental effects’ (Dewes & Green, 1996, p. 35). Originally started in New Zealand by Harold Evans, the project launched internationally in 1992 with the support of three co-sponsoring organisations: International Peace Bureau, IPPNW and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) (The Peace Foundation, n.d). This project collected over four million ‘Declarations of Public Conscience’ which condemned nuclear weapons and supported the aim of the World Court Project (The Peace Foundation,

n.d). This collection of evidence was accepted by the Court, marking the first time that material had been accepted from a citizen's delegation - acknowledging the public concern for this issue (Dewes & Green, 1995).

As illustrated above, civil society have been an active component of the nuclear disarmament movement throughout history, as shown by this historical mapping of various engagements by civil society organisations. Accordingly, this provides a fitting context to turn to the research questions at hand, which will be done so in the proceeding chapters.

Chapter 3: The humanitarian initiative and ‘norm emergence’

This chapter will examine the period preceding the decision to negotiate the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This will be discussed in relation to ‘stage one’ of the *Norm Life Cycle* (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). As previously established in chapter one, this is known as ‘norm emergence’. More specifically, this chapter will discuss the emergence of the norm on a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons. The first part of this chapter will identify the principle platform for global civil society, ICAN. Following this, the 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference will be briefly discussed, and the significance of this event in initiating the humanitarian initiative. The second part of this chapter will specifically discuss the three conferences on the ‘humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons’, which collectively made up the humanitarian initiative. The role of global civil society will be identified and analysed in relation to each of these three conferences. This will be illustrated through reference to concepts identified in the *Norm Life Cycle*, principally that of ‘framing’ through the dominant mechanism of ‘persuasion’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The final section of this chapter will draw on previous analysis of the Humanitarian Initiative, subsequently demonstrating that a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons can be identified as an emerging norm, satisfying the first stage of the norm life cycle. It will then be determined whether global civil society’s actions during this period are comparable to that of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ for this emerging norm.

3.1 Norm entrepreneurs and organisational platforms

As acknowledged by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 896), ‘norms do not appear out of thin air’. Accordingly, in relation to the successful creation of an emerging norm two common elements (or actors) can be identified: ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and ‘organisational platforms from which entrepreneurs act’ (p. 896). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) describe norm entrepreneurs as ‘agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community’ (p.896) and ‘call attention to

issues' through mechanisms such as framing (p.897)⁷. Furthermore, 'organisational platforms' are understood as being a means of which norm entrepreneurs can promote their norms at an international level.⁸ Throughout the remainder of this dissertation, several global civil society organisations and individuals will be identified who have collectively acted in a way to support this emerging norm. In turn, their actions will be analysed in relation to this idea of 'norm entrepreneurs' as actors in this primary stage.

For the most part, the organisations which were present and engaged during the course of the humanitarian initiative (between 2010 and 2015) were united under ICAN. In accordance with an 'organisational platform' identified by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 899), this provides a way by which organisations are able to 'promote their norms', in this case the norm of a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear weapons. ICAN was established in 2006 in Australia, subsequently being launched in Austria in April 2007. ICAN has emerged as having the 'lead role' in civil society in respect of this movement to ban nuclear weapons (Thakur, 2017, p. 86). To date, this coalition has over four hundred partner organisations spread over one hundred different countries. Despite the variety in organisations involved, from the medical field to various environmental and religious groups, they collectively have all advocated for the goal of 'a treaty banning nuclear weapons' (ICAN, 2014b). Establishing an overarching organisation for this purpose provided an effective platform for several organisations to work from with a unanimous voice. This model had previously been successful in relation to other disarmament campaigns, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. This campaign, which was awarded a Nobel Prize in 1992 for 'their work for the banning and clearing of anti-personnel mines', provided inspiration for the founding of ICAN⁹. Simultaneously whilst working with their partner organisations, ICAN worked closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as worked to establish connections with

⁷ Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) discuss several examples of norm entrepreneurs, such as Henry Dunant (in relation to the norm that medical personnel and those wounded in war be treated as neutrals and noncombatants) and Elizabeth Cady Stanton (in the area of women's suffrage).

⁸ In illustrating 'organizational platforms', Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) use Greenpeace, the Red Cross and Transafrica as examples.

⁹ For more information, see: https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1997/icbl-facts.html

various UN agencies and governments who supported this idea for a treaty to be established which comprehensively banned nuclear weapons.

3.2 The humanitarian initiative

The humanitarian initiative is the most noteworthy series of diplomatic engagements leading to the negotiation of a treaty to ban nuclear weapons. Arguably, it has developed into ‘the most serious challenge to the widely accepted nuclear deterrence orthodoxy’ (Kmentt 2015, p.682). Until this point, the international dialogue surrounding nuclear weapons was largely focused on these weapons in relation to international security and the stability that has supposedly ensued from certain states possessing them. The initiative followed the acknowledgement of the ‘deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons’, which was acknowledged in the Final Document of the 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference (Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2010). Following this significant expression, the idea of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons continued to gain momentum and attention amongst international dialogue. For example, in 2011, a resolution was adopted by the ICRC, which explicitly called for nuclear weapons to never be used by states again in the future and subsequently calling on negotiations for a treaty that prohibits nuclear weapons. Furthermore, a Joint Statement was given at the UN General Assembly’s 2012 First Committee session by Switzerland on behalf of thirty-four other nations, which further emphasised their concern of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously with this Joint Statement, Norway put forward their desire to hold a conference focused on the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, which would come to be known as the first conference to make up the humanitarian initiative.

3.2.1 Conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons

The first humanitarian conference involved Norway hosting 127 states, several UN organisations, the ICRC and several members of global civil society, in March 2013.

The conference focused on the ‘immediate and wider humanitarian and developmental consequences of a nuclear weapons detonation and humanitarian preparedness and response’ (Kmentt 2015, p.689). Due to the political controversy surrounding this issue, the Norwegian hosts ensured that the Oslo Conference remained ‘a facts-based discussion without conclusions of a more political character, such as how progress of nuclear disarmament could be achieved’ (Kmentt 2015, p.690). A key point discerned from the discussions was that it would be ‘unlikely that any state or international body could address the immediate humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation in an adequate manner and provide sufficient assistance to those affected’ (Kmentt 2015, p. 689). It is important to note that the nuclear weapons states (NWS) did not participate in this conference. Instead, they initiated a boycott of the conference, stating that the Oslo Conference would ‘divert discussion away from the practical steps to create conditions for further nuclear weapons reductions’ (Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, n.d). However, this did not act to impede the momentum that had been gained in re-addressing the nuclear debate by the majority of states, with Mexico’s announcement at the close of the conference that it would host a conference as a means of following up what had been discussed in Oslo (Kmentt, 2015, p. 691).

The second conference hosted by Mexico was attended by 146 states, again the majority of NWS continued to boycott this initiative. Such a large number of states actively engaged in this debate added an increasingly ‘political dimension’ that had not been evident in Oslo (Kmentt, 2015, p. 693). This conference built on many of the discussions and acknowledgements from Oslo as well as bringing greater awareness to participants about ‘the different elements of risk’ involved in nuclear weapons, through looking at sixteen instances of ‘near nuclear misses’ (Kmentt 2015, p.692). The conference concluded with a ‘non-negotiated document’ by Mexico’s Chair of the conference (Kmentt, 2015, p. 693). This statement focused on the inconsistency of nuclear weapons with international law and the need to ‘initiate a diplomatic process conducive to the goal’ of a legally binding instrument (Kmentt, 2015, p. 694). At the close of the conference, Austria announced that they would hold another conference to build on what had been discussed in Mexico, at the end of 2014 (Europe Integration Foreign Affairs, 2014).

The conference held in Vienna showed an increase in attendance by states yet again, with 158 states attending¹⁰. Furthermore, Austria made significant efforts prior to the conference to reach out to the NWS, encouraging their participation in the conference. Consequently, the United States and the United Kingdom somewhat changed their rhetoric on the humanitarian consequences initiative and accepted this invitation to participate (US Department of State, 2014). As well as this, India and Pakistan, although not officially NWS under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but still understood to carry nuclear weapons, opted to participate once again (Kmentt, 2015). The participation of some NWS conceding to participate in the Vienna conference was a significant development for the international nuclear weapons dialogue and illustrated the momentum gained throughout the initiative to that point.

The Vienna Conference occurred just months before the 2015 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference. Thus, a principle objective of the conference was ‘to consolidate the outcomes of the previous conferences as input and practical application in relation to this upcoming conference’ (Kmentt 2015, p.695). Further international law was a big part of the discussions, which had not been in the previous two conferences. The result of this final conference was that of the ‘Austrian Pledge’, a ‘set of political conclusions drawn from the Humanitarian Initiative as a whole’ (Kmentt 2015, p.704). This was a pledge by states to ‘fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons’ (Kmentt 2015, p.701). This pledge encourages states to ‘go beyond fact-based discussions on the effects of nuclear weapons to the start of treaty negotiations’(ICAN, n.d-e). This pledge was a significant development in the lead up to the 2015 Review Conference and was eventually renamed the ‘Humanitarian Pledge’ of which 127 countries formally endorsed in the months following the conference (ICAN, n.d-e). Although the conference did not end with an agreed outcome, it was apparent that the humanitarian initiative had impacted the nuclear discussions since the previous review conference which had been held in 2010. This was illustrated through several references being made by state parties in their respective national statements

¹⁰ For a comprehensive report on the Vienna Conference, see:
https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/ViennaConference_BMEIA_Web_final.pdf

surrounding this initiative which stated the fact that discussions of humanitarian impacts and risks of nuclear weapons was a central focus, which it has not been before (Kmentt, 2015).

3.2.2 *Global civil society engagement during the humanitarian initiative*

As previously noted, these conferences were not limited to mere state participation¹¹. In addition, a significant group of individuals and organisations from global civil society were present, subsequently engaging in a broad range of activities both as part of and outside the conferences¹². Allowing and encouraging global civil society to participate offered a platform for their arguments and ideas to be heard. Collectively, global civil society were working to encourage states, as well as the general public, of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and ultimately, striving for support for a treaty which comprehensively banned nuclear weapons.

Firstly, a primary means of engagement by global civil society was through being directly involved in the conference proceedings. This ranged from general participation in the discussions and sessions to formal presentations as part of the conference. Of note, during the opening session of the Oslo Conference, ICAN presented a short video statement which showed explicit images from the aftermath of a nuclear weapon detonation, illustrating their harsh effects¹³. This is a clear example of an entrepreneurial normative role undertaken by ICAN through ‘framing’ the nuclear weapons issue in a way that focuses on the humanitarian effects of nuclear weapons (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Consequently, this overt video shown at such an early stage of the conference immediately humanised the subject matter which would be discussed in the days to follow. Furthermore, amongst other presentations

¹¹ A copy of each of the three conference programmes can be found within the following publication: https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/ViennaConference_BMEIA_Web_final.pdf

¹² For a full list of participants at the Oslo Conference, see: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/oslo-2013/participants.pdf>, For the Nayrait Conference, see: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nayarit-2014/Participants.pdf> and for the Vienna Conference, see: https://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14_participants.pdf

¹³ To watch this video as part of ICAN’s opening statement, visit: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V7t6BmRzDS0&feature=youtu.be>

by representatives from groups such as ICAN and the ICRC, Beatrice Fihn on behalf of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and representatives from Global Zero spoke on various humanitarian related subjects. This participation by global civil society alongside representatives of states illustrated the growing trend of civil society participation in international dialogue surrounding nuclear disarmament; an area which was previously regarded as only being suited to state participation.

In addition to direct participation in the conferences, global civil society worked to garner support outside of the official conference agendas. A principle means of doing so were three events organised by ICAN in conjunction with the conferences. In the days prior to the Oslo Conference, ICAN organised the 'ICAN Civil Society Forum'. This two-day event held in Oslo brought together over five hundred people from over seventy countries (ICAN, n.d-j). Those involved in the forum were from a broad range of civil society organisations, as well as representatives from various UN institutions and a selection of supporting governments. Amongst other things, participants included people from scientific backgrounds, religious leaders, medical practitioners and academics as well as international policy and military experts. The fact that there were people from such a wide range of areas, exemplified the broad realm of areas supporting the humanitarian initiative. The forum involved social functions which allowed participants to network and discuss the common agenda of the forum. Furthermore, various speakers presented and panel discussions took place ranging from the possibility of a ban treaty, to historical campaigns of a similar nature. Again, such events illustrate the role undertaken by ICAN and others involved in these events and can be likened to 'norm entrepreneurs' as they are 'calling attention' to the particular issue of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, in accordance with Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).

Similarly, prior to the Nayrait conference, ICAN hosted the 'ICAN Campaigners Meeting' as well as a debriefing event the day following the conference. Although in some respects this was similar to the forum in Oslo, it was apparent that there was a greater focus on the practicalities of mobilising support of civil society through discussing and organising the ways in which civil society could further the goal of a nuclear ban treaty and increasing the discussion of the humanitarian impacts of

nuclear weapons beyond the conferences. In addition, both mornings prior to the conference ICAN organised meetings for civil society which informed and encouraged participants before the respective day's events begun.

The final ICAN Civil Society Forum, held in the days preceding the Vienna Conference, attracted over six hundred participants, representing over one hundred organisations from throughout the world (ICAN, 2014a). Again, this forum included speakers and participants from a broad array of backgrounds and covered discussions surrounding many aspects of nuclear weapons, from the current international framework to environmental consequences. However, a significant focus of the dialogue during the discussions, presentations and speeches was surrounding the potential of an international treaty banning nuclear weapons and its possible implications. Collectively, these three events all exhibit the extent to which global civil society was involved during the humanitarian initiative. These events provided an environment where like-minded people and organisations could share facts, experiences and ideas for pursuing nuclear disarmament through a focus on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. The increase in participation of some one hundred participants between the first and final forum could be perhaps be attributed to the increased support gathered during this period.

Another way in which global civil society ensured their message was spread and gained further support was through information gathering and sharing with various readerships and audiences. A number of organisations made available comprehensive coverage of the three conferences and corresponding messages arising from them. For instance, Reaching Critical Will (RCW), the disarmament programme of WILPF, provided a comprehensive summary of each conference as well as copies of various presentations and speeches made during the events¹⁴. They also provided statements made by states participating in the conferences, allowing easy access for those who wanted to hold their respective ministers to account and put pressure on them following this initiative. These organisations were not obliged to do so, however were 'encouraged' by ICAN to 'publicize the campaign through their networks and the media' (ICAN, 2014b).

¹⁴ These resources can be accessed via: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/hinw>

IPPNW were one global civil society organisation who provided several resources and scientific evidence during and following the humanitarian initiative¹⁵. Collectively, these provided evidence supporting the humanitarian arguments against nuclear weapons. For example, prior to the final humanitarian conference in Vienna, the IPPNW released a ‘campaign kit’ on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. This condenses evidence which had been given throughout the prior two conferences and generally on what would follow a nuclear detonation, namely the environmental and medical issues that would arise. More specifically, it discusses ‘physical trauma and burns’, ‘radiation’, ‘nuclear famine and nuclear winter’ (IPPNW, 2014). The intention of providing such a kit was to persuade others of the wide-ranging consequences of nuclear detonations, predominantly from the perspective of medical individuals and organisations. This task of collating and distributing information on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons provided direct evidence to support the arguments being put forward at the humanitarian initiative. The broad range of organisations and individuals which made up global civil society meant that the dissemination of information by these groups reached a large and diverse group of people, thus, gaining support beyond those who were directly involved in the conferences.

Another global civil society engagement throughout the course of the humanitarian initiative involved ICAN and other organisations who aided in bringing together survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as victims of nuclear testing throughout the world. This was the case at the ICAN Civil Society Forum in Oslo where Terumi Tanaka (survivor of Hiroshima atomic bombing) and Karipbek Kuyukov (victim of nuclear testing in Kazakhstan) both spoke about their first hand experiences of the direct consequences of these weapons. Further, Setsuko Thurlow, another survivor from Hiroshima, presented a moving testimony on her experience of the nuclear detonation over Hiroshima as part of the ICAN Civil Society Forum in Vienna. For example, Setsuko Thurlow also spoke at both the Nayrait and Vienna conferences, engaging participants in a moving testimony of her experience, this time in front of state representatives themselves. Amongst other things, engaging victims directly in

¹⁵ See: <http://www.ippnw.org/resources-abolition-nuclear-weapons.html>

such a process personified the issues that were being discussed. The forums and conferences gave people whose lives have been affected by these weapons an opportunity to share their stories and persuade others of the importance of implementing further measures to abolish nuclear weapons. This illustrates another explicit example of global civil society acting as norm entrepreneurs through framing the nuclear weapons discussion. Effectively, framing the discussion in such a way explicitly demonstrates global civil society ‘persuading’ others of the need for a nuclear ban treaty, which is a characteristic mechanism of norm entrepreneurs in accordance with (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

3.2.3 The events following the humanitarian initiative

The pace at which the nuclear weapons debate was reframed by the humanitarian initiative and the international and domestic political momentum it gained was unprecedented. Following the end of the humanitarian initiative, an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) was established with the mandate to develop ‘legal measures, legal provisions and norms for achieving a nuclear-weapon-free-world’ (ICAN, n.d-f). This was established to build on the momentum and findings from the humanitarian initiative. This group met at three separate occasions throughout 2015, during which ICAN was present and participated in all three sessions and coordinated the ‘lobbying and advocacy’ (ICAN, n.d-f). During the course of meetings throughout 2015, ICAN and other organisations ensured that information was readily available for organisations and individuals on suggested methods of advocacy and ways to engage in the process at hand. One of the primary undertakings by ICAN during this time was the ‘Global Parliamentary Appeal for a Nuclear Weapons Ban’, coordinated with support by the Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. With the assistance of ICAN supporters and partner organisations, parliamentarians from governments throughout the world were called upon to show their support for a treaty banning nuclear weapons.

Following the recommendation of the OEWG, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 71/258 on 23 December 2016 and aimed to begin negotiations on ‘a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination’. A total of 113

states voted in favour of this resolution, whilst 35 states voted against it and 13 states abstained from voting on the resolution. This was met with great enthusiasm from members of global civil society who had been arduously working since the beginning of the humanitarian initiative for such negotiations to take place. The adoption of this resolution illustrates the momentum gained from this initiative and the result of re-framing the nuclear weapons debate.

3.3 The emergence of a norm

This section will draw prior analysis from this chapter to make relevant determinations on two areas. Firstly, the normative status of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons will be assessed in relation to the norm life cycle (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Following this, the role of global civil society during the humanitarian initiative will be discussed, in a way which determines whether global civil society can be considered ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in accordance with Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).

3.3.1 A comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons

Following the conclusion of the humanitarian initiative, it could be said that the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons became more widely understood. Furthermore, this led to increased support built for an international treaty prohibiting these weapons. This was demonstrated by the international community through the Humanitarian Pledge, which gained the support of 127 states formally having endorsed the pledge by April 2016 (United Nations, n.d). Furthermore, this was illustrated with UN General Assembly Resolution 71/258 which was passed by 122 states. However, as such support had not by this stage been codified in any formal international treaty or law, it is difficult to determine that it has reached a ‘tipping point’, an essential occurrence before this norm progresses from merely being ‘emerging’. Thus, a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons can be understood as satisfying the first stage of the norm life cycle and characterised as an ‘emerging norm’.

3.3.2 *Global civil society as norm entrepreneurs*

Norm entrepreneurs, acting through organisational platforms, are an integral component of the 'norm emergence' stage, acting to persuade a 'critical mass' to embrace a new norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). At the beginning of this chapter, it was proposed that the actions of global civil society would be assessed as to determine whether their actions during this period are comparable to that of norm entrepreneurs for the emerging norm of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. After having thematically analysed their specific actions and engagement during the humanitarian initiative, these can in fact be likened to that of norm entrepreneurs. According to Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) persuasion is the dominant mechanism utilised by norm entrepreneurs in this initial stage. Collectively, global civil society's actions have worked to persuade others of the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, thus the need for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. Some of the key terms which were utilised in the study as being the motives of norm entrepreneurs acting in such a way, can be readily applied to the present study. For example, the motive of 'empathy' is prominent in the activities undertaken by ICAN especially in relation to those directly involving victims of nuclear testing and survivors of nuclear detonations. It was evident that global civil society were motivated by empathy towards these people in so far as the central role that they had in ICAN's campaign, from speaking at their forums to endorsing their campaign. Finnemore & Sikkink (1998) also utilise the term 'altruism' as a primary motive for norm entrepreneurs, again this can be adequately applied. This was evident in the information that global civil society emphasised, namely, that the economic, environmental and health impacts of a nuclear attack would not be confined to within the borders of the country attacked. Finally, it is necessary to exert that even though it can be determined that global civil society were norm entrepreneurs for this norm during this period, they were working alongside several others who could similarly be seen as norm entrepreneurs, such as certain coalitions of states, diplomats and those who do not come within the realm of global civil society.

3.4 Conclusion

As previously established, a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons can be described as an ‘emerging international norm’, in accordance with Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle. It is evident that global civil society were amongst the ‘norm entrepreneurs’, illustrated through their role in the process of the humanitarian initiative. It is important to understand that although this can now be described as an emerging norm, it has not entered a ‘normative vacuum’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Instead, it has entered into a space of several competing norms, theories and ideas. For example, ‘competing against’ the less comprehensive norms such as the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear non-proliferation norms and disarmament norms (Kütt & Steffek, 2015). Furthermore, this emerging norm is in direct opposition with the theory of nuclear deterrence, still at the forefront of NWS justification for possessing nuclear weapons. Thus, before progressing to the following stages of the norm life cycle, it must reach a ‘tipping point’, of acceptance by states. Accordingly, this will be explored in the following chapter, in relation to the negotiations for a treaty banning nuclear weapons.

Chapter 4: The ‘tipping point’ and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

In a world of increasing nuclear dangers, it's time for an international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons. We are told by some governments that a nuclear weapons convention is premature and unlikely. Don't believe it. We were told the same thing about a mine ban treaty.
– Jody Williams, Nobel Peace Prize winner¹⁶

As established in the previous chapter, following the humanitarian initiative and the adoption of Resolution 71/258, a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons could be considered an ‘emerging norm’. However, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) stipulate that between stages one and two of the norm life cycle there exists a ‘tipping point’. This is said to occur ‘after the norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of states to become norm leaders and adopt new norms’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 901). Subsequently, allowing a norm cascade to occur (‘broad norm acceptance’) and the norm to become internalised (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 895). Although they acknowledge that there is no agreed upon ‘theoretical account’ to explain this phenomenon, it is suggested that norm tipping rarely occurs before one-third of states in the system adopt the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 901). Further, it is also significant which states adopt the norm, some of whom need to be ‘critical states’ (p.901).

In the present context, the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could perhaps be likened to the ‘tipping point’ in relation to the norm of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons, which will be analysed in the context of the negotiations of this treaty, again with a specific focus on the role of global civil society during this time. By doing so, the role of global civil society will be determined, as well as an assessment made as to whether this event can be described as the ‘tipping point’. In order to do so, the following section briefly describes the negotiations which took place, before analysing the primary engagements of global civil society during this period. Following this, the next section will act as the

¹⁶ Cited in ICAN (n.d-b).

conclusion to this chapter, subsequently comprising two parts. The first of which will draw upon prior analysis to determine the role of global civil society during this time. In accordance with the previous chapter, the idea of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ will be utilised to illustrate their collective role during this period. This section will also contain a general discussion of the role of global civil society, with a focus on some factors which enhanced the ability of global civil society to play the role of norm entrepreneurs. Following this, the next part will utilise the relevant theory from Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and apply this to determine whether the adoption of this treaty constituted the ‘tipping point’ of this emerging norm on a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. After having established this, a general discussion will be had on the significance of this emerging norm, especially in relation to NWS. Finally, a brief conclusion will draw together relevant ideas which have been established in this chapter.

4.1 The nuclear ban treaty negotiations

The UN conference ‘to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination’ took place over the course of 2017. This comprised an organisational session which was held on 16 February 2017, followed by two sets of negotiations between 27-31 March and 15 June-7 July. Throughout this time, states, international organisations (such as the ICRC) and several global civil society organisations worked alongside one another to negotiate a treaty comprehensively banning nuclear weapons. At the close of the second set of negotiations, on 7 July 2017, 122 states voting in favour of adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

The first substantive session for the Conference which took place in March, attracted more than 100 states and over 220 representatives from civil society organisations and various academic institutions (UNODA, 2017). For the most part, this acted as an opportunity for a general exchange of views for those states participating in the conference. In addition to this, two informal meetings were held by the conference, in which panels of experts from civil society groups, academics and members of the ICRC partook in discussions surrounding various elements of the treaty. Premised on

the discussions from this substantive session, and in preparation for the second set of negotiations on 22 May 2017, the President of the Conference released the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Of note, the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons were explicitly acknowledged in this. Although this draft was widely approved by global civil society, several organisations took it upon themselves to submit papers which suggested areas in which it could be strengthened.

The second substantive session for the Conference similarly engaged both states and non-state actors from civil society and various other international organisations. The focus during this session was the more substantive task of negotiating the ‘legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination’, as stipulated by Resolution 71/258. It is important to note that during both of these substantive sessions, none of the nine states who are understood to possess nuclear weapons were present, instead some boycotting both sessions. However, this did not act to disrupt the momentum which had been gained by civil society and states to negotiate such a treaty, with the adoption of a treaty taking place at the close of the second substantive session.

4.1.1 Civil society participation

At the organisational session prior to the negotiations commencing, there was a significant focus on determining the circumstances surrounding the participation of civil society during the formal sessions to follow. At this session, a number of decisions were made which would govern the degree to which civil society would be able to participate and act in the process to follow. Namely, the NGOs that wished to participate were required to request ‘accreditation’ by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. This would be given to those ‘relevant non-governmental organisations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council’ or to other organisations that were ‘relevant and competent to the scope and the purpose of the Conference’ (RCW, n.d). Despite their accreditation to the conference, civil society and NGOs were unable to vote. The extent to which they participated included at the end of each day’s discussion in the March negotiations, 15 minutes being allocated to respective representatives to make statements on each substantive topic that had been discussed.

Similarly, in the second round of negotiations representatives from NGOs were invited to provide comments on different aspects of the Treaty. In addition, throughout the course of negotiations a conference room was made available for the specific use of NGOs. Ray Acheson, director of RCW, acted as the NGO coordinator for the conference, facilitating different aspects of civil society engagement, such as the speakers who would address the conference.

4.1.2 Engagement of global civil society during negotiations

As illustrated above, global civil society were explicitly invited to participate in the negotiations¹⁷. This is credit to their efforts up until that point in making people aware of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and encouraging negotiations to take place. In so far as direct participation in the conferences, several global civil society organisations made statements throughout the course of the negotiations, many of which made recommendations and criticisms in relation to different articles of the proposed treaty. Another way in which global civil society directly participated in the negotiations themselves was through ‘interventions’ on each of the topics discussed by different states. This provided another means in which global civil society could ensure their views and arguments in support of a ban treaty were shared to conference participants. In addition to this participation, ICAN hosted ‘campaigners meetings’ each day before negotiations commenced as well as sometimes following negotiations too. This provided an opportunity for civil society and those interested to communicate and be briefed on various aspects of the treaty negotiation, including what was in store for that day.

As well as participating directly in the conferences, global civil society undertook a wide range of other activities to support a nuclear ban treaty. For example, global civil society acted as a valuable means of ensuring that participants involved in the negotiations were informed about the need for a treaty banning these weapons. Accordingly, ICAN released a number of publications and working papers during the

¹⁷ For a complete list of NGOs that participated in negotiations, see: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/ptnw/pdf/A%20CONF.229%202017%20INF%203%20List%20of%20non-governmental%20organizations%20AUV.pdf>

course of negotiations. By way of example, ‘the legal gap’¹⁸ was focused on the international legal context of a ban treaty, exploring the current framework and illustrating the way in which a nuclear ban treaty could merge into this. Similarly, other global civil society organisations, such as WILPF, published papers of a like nature. ‘Banning nuclear weapons: principles and elements for a legally binding instrument’¹⁹ was a comprehensive publication by WILPF released prior to the beginning of the March session. This expansively outlined the various obligations and prohibitions that they believed should be included in the treaty. Collectively, these publications and briefing papers focused on different aspects of a nuclear ban treaty, acting to ensure participants in the conference, as well as various organisations, states and individuals, were well informed on the subject matter at hand.

Another engagement by a global civil society organisation was the publication of ‘Nuclear Ban Daily’ produced by RCW²⁰. This acted as a way of consolidating and distributing the conference proceedings each day and the key issues which were being discussed. In addition to this, individuals from a wide range of global civil society organisations wrote articles which were published in the Nuclear Ban Daily. These ranged from articles surrounding specific points of the treaty which were being negotiated, to putting the nuclear ban into the context of international law and other areas. This also acted as a platform for advertising various side events that were being held. Further, as this publication was made available to the public through their website, it was a convenient way for those not participating in the conference to ensure they were kept up to date with what was occurring over this period. Another way used by global civil society to share information to both participants and those outside negotiations was through social media. ICAN regularly updated their twitter account and blog, both dedicated to covering this specific event and other relevant information²¹. In addition to this, the hundreds of organisations which ICAN is comprised of continually shared updates on the negotiations and relevant information

¹⁸ For a copy of this publication and a full list of other ICAN publications, see: <http://www.icanw.org/resources/publications/>

¹⁹ For a copy of this publication, see: <https://wilpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Banning-Nuclear-Weapons-Principles-and-Elements-for-a-Legally-Binding-Instrument.pdf>

²⁰ All Nuclear Ban Daily issues are available at: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-forea/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports>

²¹ ICAN’s twitter account is accessible via: https://twitter.com/nuclearban?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor. Further, ICAN’s blog can be found at: <http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/blog/>

on their various twitter accounts and online platforms, further enlarging the amount of people who were being informed about the negotiations that were taking place²².

From the outset there were specific prohibitions and obligations in which civil society strongly desired to be included in the treaty. Thus, throughout the negotiations, global civil society took several measures to ensure these attracted support amongst participants. For example, the inclusion of ‘victim rights and victim assistance’ in the treaty was an obligation which was widely supported by global civil society. They believed that the recognition of a victim’s rights and victim assistance should be explicitly recognised in the treaty, including both existing victims of nuclear detonations and the possibility of future victims. There was a strong focus on this obligation through the publication of several articles in Nuclear Ban Daily as well as side-events and various working papers submitted²³. For example, a side event was co-ordinated by Article 36, a NGO which forms part of the International Steering Group of ICAN. This event focused on the need ‘to address the rights of victims’, as well as other positive obligations which they believed should be included²⁴. Article 36 was also amongst other NGOs who submitted working papers in relation to the inclusion of this obligation²⁵. Moreover, following the end of the March negotiations, ICAN submitted a working paper to the conference titled, ‘Victim Rights and Victim Assistance in a Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons: A Humanitarian Approach’²⁶. This paper discussed the need for such an obligation, against the content of human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Furthermore, global civil society supported the inclusion of several prohibitions, which they believed would have a direct effect on NWS, despite the fact that no NWS were participating in negotiations. For example, the prohibition of the ‘financing of nuclear weapons’ gained significant support by civil society as well as select states²⁷. A member of the International Steering Group for ICAN ‘PAX’ was prominent in

²² For example see Abolition 2000’s twitter account (<https://twitter.com/abolition2000>) and Article 36’s website (<http://www.article36.org/issue/nuclear-weapons/>).

²³ For example, see: Bolton (2017), Hunt (2017) and Doggett and Osman (2017).

²⁴ For an account of this event, see: Minor (2017).

²⁵ For a copy of this working paper, see: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/A-CONF.229-2017-NGO-WP.32.pdf>

²⁶ For a copy of this working paper, see: <https://www.un.org/disarmament/ptnw/pdf/A%20CONF.229%202017%20NGO%20WP.14.pdf>

²⁷ For example, see: Acheson (2017a).

promoting the need for this prohibition in the Treaty. Each year, PAX releases the ‘Don’t Bank on the Bomb’ report²⁸. This report identifies companies throughout the world that invest in nuclear arms producers. Furthermore, PAX co-hosted a side event called ‘banking on a ban’ which discussed the impacts that a nuclear ban treaty would have on nuclear armed states²⁹. Namely, the focus was on the need for the inclusion of a prohibition of financing of nuclear weapons in the ban treaty. This action was further supported by ICAN who promoted the need for such a prohibition through appealing to their members to write to financial institutions to ‘divest from all nuclear weapons companies’ (ICAN, n.d-d).

Aforementioned, a draft ‘Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’ was released by the President following the close of the March negotiations³⁰. This provided an opportunity for many global civil society organisations to submit a working paper in response to the draft, further ensuring that the specific aspects they supported were included in the final treaty. Amongst others, ICAN, RCW, Amplify Youth Network, Peace Boat and IPPNW, were among global civil society organisations to submit working papers in relation to this draft convention³¹. These working papers made suggestions and recommendations as to how this convention could be improved, many in relation to the specific aspects that global civil society had shown support for above. These were made available through the conference website, allowing governments and other organisations to have access to these.

Throughout the course of the negotiations, several global civil society organisations and individuals took advantage of the designated conference room for their use, hosting various events to further promote the need for the adoption of a treaty³². For the most part, at least one side-event was scheduled per day, all of which were hosted by a wide-ranging set of organisations, focused on several different elements relating

²⁸ For more information see the ‘Don’t Ban on the Bomb’ official website:
<http://www.dontbankonthebomb.com/>

²⁹ For an account of this event see Beenes (2017).

³⁰ The Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons can be accessed at:
<https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/A-CONF.229-2017-CRP.1-Revised-Preamble-20-June.pdf>

³¹ For a full list of working papers submitted by NGOs during negotiations, see:
<https://www.un.org/disarmament/ptnw/submissions-ngos.html>

³² For a calendar detailing the side-events that took place during negotiations, see:
<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/calendar>

to the negotiations and need for a nuclear ban treaty. In many cases, these events were conducted with the support of a country who similarly supported a ban treaty³³. For example a side-event titled ‘nuclear winter, nuclear famine and the nuclear ban treaty’ was hosted by IPPNW³⁴. This event focused on understanding the repercussions from both a medical and environmental perspective. These events were amongst several others focused on topics from the impact of a Trump administration on the nuclear ban treaty³⁵ to the psychological dimension of nuclear weapons³⁶. Through utilising this conference room, global civil society were able to continue to mobilise support for a ban treaty and explicitly share their arguments in support of a ban treaty. Through engaging a broad range of different speakers and organisations, several different aspects of the treaty were able to be discussed and deliberated, supporting the negotiations taking place at the same time.

In addition, there were also a number of public events which were held during negotiations which were directly related to the conference. Of note, the ‘Women’s March to Ban the Bomb’ was held on 17 June, in conjunction with the second session of negotiations³⁷. This event was coordinated by WILPF and supported the adoption of a nuclear ban treaty. This event was premised on the basis of the disproportionate effects of nuclear weapons on women and was supported around the globe with other demonstrations supporting this nuclear ban treaty. In addition to this, WILPF, in conjunction with the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the UN, hosted a side-event in the designated conference room for participants in the conference to attend, titled ‘gender and nuclear weapons’³⁸. Other public events included a ‘ban the bomb: a pledge for a safer world’, an event which brought together several local New York University students and civil society, to discuss the nuclear ban treaty and the

³³ For example, the side-event titled ‘the nuclear ban and the problem of hosting nuclear weapons belonging to other nuclear states’ was co-hosted by the ‘The Permanent Mission of Brazil’ in conjunction with ‘The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs’. See: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/11774-nuclear-ban-daily-vol-2-no-2>

³⁴ For more details, see: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/11781-nuclear-ban-daily-vol-2-no-8>

³⁵ For more information on this event, see: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/11392-nuclear-ban-daily-vol-1-no-1>

³⁶ For more information on this event, see: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/11786-nuclear-ban-daily-vol-2-no-13>

³⁷ For an account of this event, see: <https://wilpf.org/women-have-banned-the-bomb/>

³⁸ For more information, see: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/11780-nuclear-ban-daily-vol-2-no-7>

progress of the negotiations thus far³⁹. Such an event ensured that the negotiations were transparent and information about the subject matter was accessible for those not only directly involved in the negotiations, as well as continually engaging more people to understand the importance of the negotiations that were taking place.

In the period leading up to the negotiations taking place, as well over the duration of the conference itself, there were efforts by global civil society to garner the support of influential individuals to support their desire for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. On their website, ICAN have acknowledged some of these individuals and their support for ICAN's work and a ban on nuclear weapons. Namely, Ban Ki-moon, Desmond Tutu, Herbie Hancock and the Dalai Lama were amongst individuals who expressly supported the work of ICAN⁴⁰. Amongst other things, having the support of these individuals added an additional dimension of the respect for the work that they were undergoing. It is likely that these expressions of support would have acted in a way to encourage support by others and further inform and spread awareness of their work.

Another illustration of garnering the support of influential people, is the letters submitted to the conferences by certain global civil society groups. Namely, the Future of Life Institute submitted an open letter at the beginning of negotiations, which expressed support for a nuclear ban treaty, which was signed by over 2,500 scientists, including well-recognised scientists such as Steven Hawking⁴¹. Moreover, IALANA submitted a letter on behalf of some of those involved in the legal profession or legal studies which similarly expressed their support for the adoption of a nuclear ban treaty, suggesting the inconsistency of nuclear weapons with international law⁴². The letter declared that 'the nuclear ban treaty effort constitutes an important affirmation of the norms against nuclear weapons', with signatories including former New Zealand Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer and several other well respected legal professionals. Acquiring the explicit support of these professions

³⁹ See Brisse (2017) for more information.

⁴⁰ For their individual statements, see: <http://www.icanw.org/>

⁴¹ For a complete list of signatories to this letter and more information, see: <https://futureoflife.org/nuclear-open-letter/>

⁴² For further information see Burroughs (2017).

that are widely respected, demonstrates the need for such a treaty to be adopted, both to participants and those not participating in the negotiations alike.

4.2 Adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Following the final session of negotiations, on 7 July 2017 an overwhelming majority voted in favour of the adoption of the final text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In total, 122 states voted in favour of the adoption of the Treaty, whilst Singapore abstained from voting and the Netherlands voted against it (UN General Assembly, 2017). As previously mentioned, no NWS participated in the negotiations, let alone cast a vote. Nevertheless, this treaty was met with great pleasure, by both supporting states and global civil society alike. In relation to the final text of the treaty, RCW's director, Ray Acheson, published an article in the Nuclear Ban Daily, which provided a 'review of the text' (Acheson, 2017b). It discusses aspects of the Treaty which have been met with support such as 'strong reflections of the catastrophic humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, including gendered impacts and disproportionate impacts on indigenous communities'. However, there were inevitably parts of the Treaty which were not met with the same enthusiasm, such as the fact that no specific mention of 'financing of nuclear weapons' was included in the text, similarly the 'transit' of nuclear weapons was not explicitly prohibited as well (Acheson, 2017b). As summated by Acheson (2017b), 'the treaty that delegations here in New York have negotiated may not satisfy all visions or interpretations of the best way to ban nuclear weapons, but it does constitute a progressive sound, legally-binding effective prohibition of these genocidal, suicidal weapons of mass destruction'.

4.2.1 Discussion of the role of global civil society during negotiations

For the most part, during the negotiations for the nuclear ban treaty, global civil society was made up of the same individuals and organisations that were at the forefront of action during the humanitarian initiative, albeit having expanded in numbers. Arguably, this was made possible through the 'organisational platform' of ICAN remaining the centre of co-ordination for civil society action and support for

the ban treaty. Aforementioned, the actions undertaken by global civil society during the humanitarian initiative were collectively framing the nuclear weapons discussions, highlighting the need for a nuclear ban treaty. Similarly, during the negotiations for a treaty banning nuclear weapons, there was a significant focus on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Obviously, this was in a different context, as the consequences were being focused on in a way that encouraged states and other members of global civil society to include provisions specifically acknowledging and remedying these consequences. In both instances, this was done through information being gathered and subsequently shared with both states and civil society, as well as through specific events focusing on these matters, such as side events during the negotiations and civil society forums during the humanitarian conferences. Furthermore, direct participation in the conferences and negotiations allowed global civil society to more effectively carry out these actions, with access to a wide range of delegations from various states and NGOs. Thus, it can be said that global civil society remained norm entrepreneurs for the emerging norm of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons.

Security issues, such as nuclear disarmament, have typically been regarded as fundamentally involving dialogue merely between states, to the exclusion of other actors such as civil society (Alcalde, 2014; Bolton & Minor, 2016). However, the campaign undertaken by global civil society preceding the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons arguably defied this presumption. Collectively through their actions, global civil society were able to aid in the re-framing of nuclear disarmament discussions from that of a means of international security, to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Following analysis of the individual actions taken by global civil society during the humanitarian initiative and negotiations of the Treaty, it can be said that the role that they played was that of 'norm entrepreneurs' for the emerging norm of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons.

A number of factors enhanced the ability of global civil society to play the role of 'norm entrepreneurs' during this period, as well as added to the arguable success of this campaign which resulted in the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Firstly, an important acknowledgment to make is that of the access

that global civil society were granted over the course of the campaign. Alcalde (2014, p. 238) understands these rules and procedures governing such a process as the 'rules of the game'. By way of example, in Oslo, Nayrait and Vienna, global civil society were able to contribute to the events making up the three conferences and assisting in ensuring the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons were at the forefront of discussions by states and civil society involved. This was made possible through their explicit invitation and their encouragement to be involved with all three conferences. Furthermore, global civil society were able to directly be involved in negotiating the treaty to ban nuclear weapons. This was a result of the UN explicitly allowing this, as well as allowing civil society to undertake side events in support of the negotiations. In the event that these opportunities were not at global civil society's disposal, the extent and significance of the role played by global civil society would likely be far less.

Another factor which facilitated global civil society's ability to play the role of norm entrepreneurs, was through the effective 'organisational platform' of ICAN, which facilitated their efforts. At the close of negotiations, ICAN had 468 partner organisations in 101 countries throughout the world (ICAN, n.d-a). The existence of such a coalition allowed for this large and diverse group of organisations to have a unified voice throughout the process. Namely, the organisations advocated for a 'strong and effective ban treaty' (ICAN, n.d-c). ICAN acted as the coordinator for organisations both during the humanitarian initiative and the ban treaty negotiations, subsequently allowing for ICAN to operate in an effective and unified manner. Furthermore, due to the wide range of organisations involved, the influence of ICAN in different countries and in different areas of expertise ensured that a wide range of groups and people were exposed to and included in the campaign. Finally, the International Steering Group of ICAN is made up of a number of experienced and well-respected international organisations such as WILPF, IPPNW, Peace Boat and Article 36. Having this experience at the forefront of the coalition would have aided in ensuring that ICAN was running in an efficient manner and undertaking beneficial activities.

Finally, the fact that what ICAN and other global civil society groups were advocating for was supported by a number of like-minded states was another

additional factor assisting in the ability for global civil society to play the role of norm entrepreneurs. By way of example, through hosting events as part of the humanitarian initiative, Norway, Mexico and Austria all suggested their desire for the conversation surrounding nuclear disarmament to be re-shaped, and subsequently take place. Through these countries hosting these respective events, global civil society could use these as a platform for sharing what they were advocating for, the adoption of a comprehensive nuclear ban treaty.

Amongst others, these factors outlined above contributed to allowing global civil society to play the role of norm entrepreneurs during the period leading to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This role was explicitly recognised at the end of 2017, through ICAN being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 2017 for their efforts during this campaign. More specifically, for ‘its work to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and for its ground-breaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such weapons’ (The Official Web Site of the Nobel Prize, 2017). This recognition illustrates the significance of the role that global civil society, coordinated by ICAN efforts, had in the period leading to the adoption of the treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

4.2.2 The normative status of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons

In order to understand if the ‘tipping point’ for this emerging norm has been reached, it must be determined if a ‘critical mass’ of states were persuaded to become norm leaders and adopt the new norm of a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear weapons. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, there is no ‘specific criteria’ for when a tipping point occurs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 901). In accordance with the suggestion that one-third of the total states in the system are needed to ‘tip’ the process, it could be said that the tipping point was reached. Namely, due to the fact that 122 states out of 193 member states of the UN voted in favour of adopting this Treaty.

However, it is important to acknowledge the states who did and did not adopt this norm, as ‘some states are critical to a norm’s adoption; others are less so’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). In relation to this, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 901) suggest that ‘critical states are those without which the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised’. In the present case, the ‘norm goal’ can be said to be to prohibit nuclear weapons, eventually leading towards their total elimination. As previously acknowledged, none of the states that were involved in the negotiations, and similarly no states that voted in favour of the Treaty’s adoption, were states known to possess nuclear weapons. Thus, it is difficult to see how a ‘tipping point’ for this norm can be said to have been reached with the adoption of this treaty, if no states who actually possess the weapon adopted it. Thus, this norm can still merely be described as ‘emerging’, with further action by ‘critical’ states needed to surpass the tipping point and proceeding stages.

The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons signifies the most recent development in the area of international nuclear disarmament law. Until this point, nuclear weapons remained the only class of weapon of mass destruction not comprehensively outlawed at international law. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that no state who actually possesses nuclear weapons has ratified this Treaty, thus it could be argued that the potential outcome of this Treaty is limited in a practical sense. However, proponents of the Treaty have not naively understood that this treaty would act to immediately eliminate all nuclear weapons on a global scale. Alternatively, it has been understood as a means of initiating an ‘alternative normative framework for mobilising states to the cause of nuclear disarmament’ (ICAN, n.d-c; Thakur, 2017). Thus, it has been appropriate to understand the adoption of this treaty through a constructivist perspective, in the context of an emerging norm of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the norm life cycle (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) has provided an appropriate means to understand the development of this norm, as well as those who have had an active role in this process.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, more specifically the engagement of global civil society during this period. As a result of this, two significant conclusions can be drawn, directly relatable to this thesis. Firstly, the engagements undertaken by global civil society during this time suggest that their role remained largely unchanged from during the humanitarian initiative, thus can be described as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ for the emerging norm of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. Secondly, it is likely that the emerging norm of a comprehensive prohibition on nuclear weapons has not yet reached the ‘tipping point’, thus remains an emerging norm in relation to the norm life cycle. The following chapter will draw on these conclusions to relate them to the broad purpose of this research, as well as utilising it to suggest further action by global civil society.

Chapter 5: Conclusion and policy recommendations

This dissertation was undertaken to understand what the role was of global civil society during the period leading to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Accordingly, the 'norm life cycle' from *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change* (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) was applied as a means of facilitating an answer to this research question. As well as providing a framework to understand global civil society's role, this also enabled a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons to be understood in normative terms, thus through a constructivist perspective. Namely, due to the lack of 'critical states' adopting this norm, it can merely be understood as an 'emerging norm' in accordance with this framework. In relation to the role played by global civil society in the process, relevant analysis of their engagements during this period was undertaken. Specifically, during the humanitarian initiative as well as the negotiations for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, global civil society carried out a range of formal and informal activities which aided to the re-framing of nuclear weapons discussion in international multilateral discussions. Subsequently, illustrating the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, focusing on the need for a treaty prohibiting these weapons. Collectively, this analysis illustrates that the role played by global civil society during the period leading to the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was that of 'norm entrepreneurs' for the emerging norm of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons.

Below, two policy recommendations are given of possible future action that could be undertaken by global civil society. More specifically, these are recommendations for global civil society to aid in the development of the emerging norm of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons, to become an international norm. These bring together elements from the norm life cycle (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), as well as draw on things established in previous chapters.

5.1 Policy recommendations for global civil society

As previously established, following the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons can still merely be described as an emerging norm. In accordance with Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), before it can be considered an international norm it must firstly reach the tipping point, followed by a norm cascade and subsequently norm internalization. It must be acknowledged that it is by no means inevitable that an international norm will always complete the ‘life cycle’, with many failing at some point throughout this process. Thus, in this case it is essential that norm entrepreneurs, such as global civil society, continue to play an active role to ensure that the emerging norm continues to develop. In particular, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) acknowledge that norm entrepreneurs can be particularly useful actors in relation to the ‘norm cascade’. More specifically, they can act as ‘agents of socialization by pressuring targeted actors to adopt new policies and laws and to ratify treaties by monitoring compliance with international standards’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 902). Furthermore, they ‘provide the information and publicity that provoke cognitive dissonance among norm leaders’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 904). Accordingly, two policy recommendations have been given below of appropriate actions that could be taken to assist in the development from the norm’s current status in the norm life cycle as ‘emerging’, by global civil society.

5.1.1 *Support ratification and implementation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons*

As stipulated in the text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, it ‘shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited’. Arguably, once the treaty has entered into force, it will attract greater respect and attention internationally. Therefore, this should be endeavoured to be achieved as soon as possible. As of 6 February 2017, a total of 56 countries had signed the Treaty, yet only 5 countries had taken action to ratify the Treaty in their respective countries (ICAN, n.d-k). Therefore, global civil society could assist in facilitating this. This could be modelled off the case of the

Geneva Convention where the ICRC continued to play a significant role following the adoption of the treaty. More specifically, the ICRC became the ‘chief socializing agent helping states to teach the new rules of war to their soldiers, collecting information about violations, and publicizing them to pressure violators to conform’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 902).

Comparably, it is encouraged that ICAN and other global civil society organisations continue to play an active role, despite their primary objective of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons being achieved. This could be done through supporting states to ratify the Treaty, as well as continuing to encourage states that have not signed the Treaty to undertake such action. Following this, global civil society could utilise the biennial meetings of state parties as an opportunity to re-garner support and put increased pressure onto parties who have not yet signed the treaty. Furthermore, ICAN could work to bring attention to individual states, private companies and state leaders who seemingly violate provisions within the treaty, even if they are not party to the treaty. For example, Article 1 of the treaty includes a prohibition to ‘assist...anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty’. Although the treaty does not explicitly define what constitutes ‘assist’, it can be assumed that it includes activities such as the ‘transit’ of nuclear weapons through a state’s sea, air space or land as well as ‘financing’ nuclear weapons production. Thus, if any such activities are carried out by states who possess nuclear weapons, as well as those who do not, attention should be drawn to this. Furthermore, attention could be drawn to the more obvious prohibitions included in the Treaty such as if countries undertake nuclear testing and development. Drawing attention to such actions by states and subsequently putting pressure on states to change their actions would be in accordance with the concept of ‘socialization’, which is likened to ‘peer-pressure among countries’ by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 903). Collectively, pressuring states and drawing attention and criticism to them could work to force states within the international community to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

5.1.2 *Garner further civil society support in ‘critical states’*

As discussed in Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 901), some states are ‘critical to a norm’s adoption’. Thus, if some states that are considered to be ‘critical’ could be persuaded to sign and ratify the treaty, this could have a significant impact on the ‘tipping point’ being reached, subsequently allowing for a norm cascade and norm internalization to occur. As previously discussed, states critical in this instance would be those that have nuclear weapons capabilities. Furthermore, it could also arguably include those countries who host nuclear weapons, but do not possess any of their own. Evidently, these said states have little desire to sign and ratify the treaty in the near future, evidenced through their non-participation and in some instances boycotting of the negotiations. Thus, another means of pressuring these states would need to be undertaken, such as pressure from civil society within these ‘critical states’ to conform to this treaty. ICAN and other global civil society organisations could act in a way which facilitated the continued development of a strong civil society in these states. Arguably, this is already present, given the attention and scope of events such as the Women’s March to Ban the Bomb in New York, and other like events. However, they must continue to grow and keep this civil society present and ensure that momentum is not lost. This could involve mimicking events which have already been undertaken, such as marches, petitions and educational events, as well as undertaking new initiatives targeting new groups of people and areas of society.

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